Let them brew! Reflexivity, and division of labour in deliberation for science and technology governance by Lee, Yun Jeong
   
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis 
Available online via Sussex Research Online: 
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/   
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.   
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author   
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author   
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details   
 
 
 
 
Let Them Brew! 
 
Reflexivity, and Division of  Labour in Deliberation 
for Science and Technology Governance 
 
 
Yun Jeong Lee 
 
 
DPhil in Science and Technology Policy  
University of Sussex  
 
 Submitted January 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in 
whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
………………………………..  
 
Yun Jeong Lee 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements  
 
Finally, I have come to this stage of  writing an acknowledgement for all those who have 
supported me on my long journey of  my doctoral research. Recalling the years, at this time, 
I firstly have to thank to God, who has been with me at every step of  way as my rock. I 
believe He put many people into my journey for company, to whom I need to express my 
deep thanks here. Firstly, my acknowledgment has to go to my two sincere supervisors, 
Professor Gordon MacKerron and Professor Andy Stirling. There are no words adequate 
enough to express my immense gratitude to them. I do believe this thesis has been 
completed in conjunction with them. I was so lucky to have Gordon, who has been a 
steady supporter and carer, guiding me with holistic discipline and detailed advice for my 
thesis. Particularly, his expertise and intellectual capacity were such benefits to me to 
improve the quality of  this thesis. Andy has been a living inspiration to me. The amount of  
energy in his intellectual and everyday life has amazed and influenced me. Such influence 
has been embedded in my thesis. I also owe a ton of  debt to two huge intellectual figures 
who have also been such warm carers in SPRU, Professor Nick Von Tunzelmann and 
Professor Ed Steinmueller.  
 
I also want to give my thanks to those who helped me through my fieldwork: interviewees 
who were much more than just information-givers - they shared their precious time and 
cups of  tea, as well as their life-stories. Without their shared experiences and information, 
there would not be much to present in the way of  research findings. Especially, I am 
indebted to Robin Grove-White, Paul Rylott, Sue Mayer, an anonymous Evaluation Team 
member, and David Corr on the GM Dialogue case; and David Ball, Keith Baverstock, 
Pete Wilkinson and Malcolm Lynden on the CoRWM case for their precious information 
and honest view, despite the uneasy context of  political debates. I extend my sincere thanks 
to Ian Coates and Adam Scott, who gave their valuable contributions to this study from the 
position in the government. I also have to acknowledge those who I met on the way to 
approach them, a local bus driver in Bristol, two railway employees on the way to Anglesey 
and Suffolk, and Helen Grove-White who offered me such a warm, kind stay in Anglesey. 
 
DPhil research has not been just an intellectual journey, but comprises many other parts of  
my life. My appreciation is extended to those who filled those other parts of  my life: 
friends in the Freeman Centre (many of  them have now been spread across the world), the 
Korean community who comforted me when I was homesick, and my dear Brighton-family 
iv 
 
in Christ Church Brighton, were all resources of  power for my life, intellectually, socially, 
spiritually and materially. Also, my good friends, Hey-Sook, Melanie in London and 
Eunkyong, Kyeongsun and Jooyeon in Seoul supported me with their friendship and 
encouragement. I am also grateful to Julia Brown, who proofread and helped me with my 
expressions in this thesis. 
 
I would like to thank my family for their support that deserves more appreciation 
than I could ever possibly express. My mother has shown her untiring love and support 
throughout my life. I am so lucky to be her daughter and am very proud of her. Lastly, my 
husband, Jong-Woon Lee, who despite joining my DPhil journey in the latter stage, 
nevertheless became such a source of strength to me in every aspect to enable me to 
complete my long journey. This thesis is dedicated to my mum and my husband, with 
gratitude and love. 
v 
 
Yun Jeong Lee 
 
University of Sussex  
DPhil in Science and Technology Policy 
 
 
Let Them Brew! 
Reflexivity, and Division of  Labour in Deliberation  
for Science and Technology Governance 
 
This thesis examines the theoretical premises of  and ways that macro deliberative 
approaches to decision making function in application to specific instances of  science and 
technology governance. Macro-level deliberations constitute complex, extended, distributed 
decision making processes, in contrast to individual micro deliberation exercises undertaken 
in particular settings. Macro deliberations employ the mechanism of  ‘division of  labour’ in 
terms of  actors, tasks and methods in order to secure the two essential qualities of  
‘inclusiveness’ and ‘deliberativeness’ – thus resolving the inherent tension between number 
of  participants and deep discussion. Accordingly, the thesis focuses on the ways in which 
this paradoxical mechanism of  ‘inclusion by division’ functions in macro deliberations. An 
interrogation of  two UK nationwide public deliberation cases – GM Dialogue (on GM 
crops) and the CoRWM process (on radioactive waste) – sheds light on the significant role 
of  reflexivity in such macro deliberative approaches to decision making.  
 
The thesis adopts a triangulated approach towards both documents and interviews 
employing contending representations to cross-check the one with the other. In 
considering the ways in which reflexivity constitutes a critical quality of  the process and 
outcome of  division of  labour in macro deliberations, the thesis argues that the notion of  
reflexivity is central to explaining how macro deliberation functions: 
 
The reflective and self-contingent feature of  reflexivity enables participants to explore 
diverse rationales on division of  labour through continuous generation of  new rationales; 
this recursive self-reconfiguration process of  rationales on division of  labour entails an 
evolutionary development of  division of  labour. As division of  labour is played out not in 
a static, exogenous fashion, but through a dynamic, endogenous construction process, 
reflexivity in real-world macro deliberations illuminates some significant contrasts in the 
ways that ‘deliberation’ and ‘inclusion’ take place to those characterised in theory.  
 
Indeed, deliberation emerges in practice as more than just open rational dialogue. In order 
to understand this more fully, it must be seen in terms of  diversity of  material, social and 
political interactions, and relationships – referred to here as ‘discursive relations’. In reality, 
then, inclusion occurs in more emergent ways than intended by design, rather, unfolding as 
participants engage with each other. In this way, actors’ divergent views are cross-reflected 
and mutually influence each other, not through theoretically-envisaged top-down 
aggregation but via a kind of  endogenous ‘fermentation’ process. In this way, reflexivity 
actually makes macro public deliberation a more effectively inclusive and deliberative 
decision making process. 
 
In short, recognition of  this inherent reflexivity in macro deliberations offers practically to 
aid improved understanding of  the complex process of  engagement in science and 
vi 
 
technology governance. It suggests that we would benefit from shifting our attention 
somewhat away from the direct provision of  strictly prescriptive design protocols towards 
the construction of  better general environments for facilitating more reflexivity, which 
should enable actors to shape their own reflexive deliberation.  
Then let them brew! 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
PUBLIC DELIBERATION IN SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY GOVERNANCE IN THE UK (1997–2006)1
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This study’s theoretical and empirical research seeks to answer the question of  the 
implications of  reflexivity in the understanding of  the division of  labour in macro-risk 
deliberations. Taking this question as its starting point, the study locates its context in the 
UK political arena from the late 1990s to the mid 2000s – a period in which public 
deliberative exercises were practiced more than had been the case hitherto, both in terms 
of  frequency as well as in the area of  Science and Technology (ST) governance. Such a 
change appears to have taken place as a reaction against the pervious dominant approach 
of  the technocracy, and aimed at a better mode of  governance in the development of  ST 
(Wynne 2006; Chilvers 2007). This was particularly so in relation to policy making on 
technological risk-related regulation.2
 
  
Following a series of  policy failures in various ST governance areas such as the bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, and deadlock in government strategies for GM 
technology and radioactive waste management, the trust of  the British public in policy 
makers’ ability and intentions with regard to the good governance of  ST diminished. In the 
mean time, it became clearer that there was increased public desire to participate in the 
policy making process more directly. The government side also realised that a change in the 
mode of  governance was necessary in order to move away from its position of  deadlock 
and lack of  public trust. Therefore, across different ST development areas, there was a 
general acknowledgment of  societal demand for public engagement in ST governance. 
                                                 
1 This study addresses the specific period 1997 to 2006 for the following reasons: it begins with 
Blair’s New Labour party gaining power in 1997, one year after Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis 
(BSE) broke out in 1996, and covers the formative years of both macro-deliberation exercises 
examined later – GM Dialogue and Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM).  
GM Dialogue was discussed from 2001 the actual processes unfolding in 2003. CoRWM was 
commissioned in 2003, publishing its final report in July 2006. 
2 This thesis discusses issues around ST governance in general, particularly from the late 1990s to 
the mid-2000s. Many recent issues around UK ST governance have been closely associated with 
newly emerging technologies and technological risk. Therefore, the discussion in this thesis 
addresses both (controversial) science and technology governance, and technological risk 
governance. 
2 
 
 
 
Broad societal support for and interest in the public deliberative approach to the ST policy 
making process notwithstanding, there were conflicting notions around the design and 
delivery of  such a new mode of  public engaged decision making (Chilvers 2008). 
Consequently, particular design preferences have been exercised, and various tensions and 
struggles have been reflected in practical deliberation exercises – e.g. GM Dialogue and 
CoRWM – in the UK over the last two decades or so.  
 
Given this context of  broad support for change in the ST policy making process – towards 
public deliberative decision making and yet with varying perspectives on purposes and 
expectations around innovation in the mode of  ST governance – the present study 
addresses the ways in which different public deliberation mechanisms operate in the actual 
context of  ST policy making.  
 
Public deliberation mechanisms refer to the various forms of  political decision-making 
processes that involve citizens’ deliberation such as the consensus conferences, deliberative 
polls, and citizens’ juries that have been implemented in recent decades. Such forms of  
political decision making share their essential principles with deliberative democracy theory 
(Pellizzoni 2001; Wilsdon and Willis 2004; Hendriks 2004; Chilvers 2008; Lövbrand et al. 
2011). In spite of  the difficulty in finding a single shared conception of  deliberative 
democracy held by the many political theorists (Elster 1998; Pellizzoni 2001; Hendriks 
2004), understanding the qualities that it seeks would help portray how distinct it is from 
other forms of  governance.  
 
The core set of  qualities that deliberative democracy pursues comprises ‘inclusiveness’ and 
‘deliberativeness’ (Elster 1998; Bloomfield et al. 2001; Hendriks 2004). This form of 
democracy addresses the inclusion of wider society in political decision making that 
extends beyond the narrow realm of the experts or elite; a process that it has been argued 
should proceed in a deliberative manner rather than as an aggregation of  preferences or 
competition of  interests (Pellizzoni 2001; Hendriks 2004). Yet, ironically, there is a tension 
between these essential twin qualities of  deliberative democracy, as it is necessary to restrict 
the number of  participants if  the quality of  the discussion is not to suffer.  
 
In addressing this tension, among the different approaches to deliberative democracy, 
‘micro-deliberative democracy’ emphasises the potential of  in-depth discussion in helping 
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to ensure the quality of  deliberativeness in the decision-making process. Due to this focus 
on in-depth discussion in the interests of  a high level of  deliberativeness, participation is 
inevitably restricted to a relatively small number of  people with a tightly regulated 
procedure in a specific setting (Hendriks 2004; Parkinson 2006). On the other hand, 
proponents of  macro-deliberative democracy believe that it is possible for many people to 
be included in and deliberate on a single decision-making process, by sharing overall 
deliberation process and allocating participants to different tasks using various micro-
deliberative methods. Such a notion of  ‘division of  labour’ has been employed in this 
approach as a means of  maximising in-depth discussion aimed at deliberativeness, as well 
as facilitating the engagement of  a wide range of  voices in discussion without 
compromising on inclusiveness. However, it is necessary to examine this concept more 
closely because it would seem to lead to a different tension, that between division and 
inclusion.  
 
This thesis begins by examining how the alternative macro approach to micro-deliberative 
democracy might work in an actual deliberative process aimed at technological risk policy 
making. In so doing, it pays attention to the operation of  reflexivity in macro deliberation 
exercises. In a thorough discussion of  the issues that arise in considering reflexivity, Lynch 
(2000) argues that reflexivity is often claimed to be “a methodological virtue and source of  
insight” (p. 26), despite the difficulty of  seeing “just what is being claimed” (ibid. p. 26). 
The concept of  reflexivity indeed varies depending on the area in which it is interpreted 
and applied (ibid.). Given the variations in understanding and usage of  reflexivity, this 
thesis confines its scope of  study regarding reflexivity to indentifying ‘its implications in 
the understanding of  the divisions of  labour of  macro risk deliberations’. 
 
The primary concept of  reflexivity of  this thesis pays attention to subject’s reflection and 
its contingent outcome: reflexivity arises while a subject continuously reflects on (responses 
to) the environment (other subjects and its condition). Subject’ reflection on other subjects 
and the condition, projects its representations (meanings and relationships) on to the 
environment. Consequently, subject’s earlier representations serve to re-construct its own 
environment, which in turn, influences the subject itself  by re-conditioning its subsequent 
reflections. Lynch (2000, p. 28) highlights this contingent quality of  reflexivity as “some 
sort of  turning back”. This forms a common element across different conceptions of  
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reflexivity in the social sciences3
 
 as well as the basis for the general usage of  the term in 
this thesis. In this sense, this inherent property of  human interaction can be described as 
being reflective, endogenous, self-contingent and self-influential. 
This property explains one of  the distinctive characteristics of  human interaction in society 
– the way in which knowledge about society is produced. As recognised in Giddens’ 
famous ‘double hermeneutic’ (1984 p. 284), knowledge itself  (and the processes through 
which it is produced) is socially mediated, social phenomena constitute both object and 
subject of  any knowledge about society. As multiple actors mutually know each other as 
objects and subjects, the reflexivity iterates recursively.   
 
Therefore, one specific element in understanding this relationship between reflexivity and 
social knowledge production in this thesis, concerns the plural identities of  subjects. Is the 
‘subject’ of  specific bodies of  knowledge concerning science and technology (ST), for 
instance, best understood as an individual, an organisation, a wider institution or an entire 
discourse. Each yields potentially contrasting social ontologies 4
 
. Reflexivity in this sense 
arises not only from the level of  individual subject’s reflection, but also from inter-
reflections (or interactions) of  agents across and within multiple nested social layers – of  
the kind that may be found in an ST system. This view of  reflexivity is especially relevant 
to any attempt to understand the implications of  contrasting divisions of  labour in macro 
deliberation mechanisms.  
The next section comprises a brief  account of  how the above notion of  reflexivity is 
associated with the concept of  division of  labour in macro deliberation, as corroborated in 
the ensuing part of  the thesis through the examination of  empirical data. 
 
Reflexivity has a significant influence on the process and outcome of  division of  labour in 
such macro deliberation.  It is a unique quality that may be further developed while the 
various elements of  macro deliberation interact with each other. In other words, while the 
                                                 
3 Lynch (2000) categorises the various concepts of reflexivity discussed in the literatures as 
“mechanical, substantive, methodological, meta-theoretical, interpretative, and 
ethnomethodological.” However, (as Lynch himself admits) the categorisations in his inventory of 
reflexivity are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive, and thus the conception of reflexivity 
employed in the present thesis may encompass any given one or combination of them. 
4 Adopting divergent ontologies allows a subject to exist with its different boundaries(identities). In 
other words, under different ontology, a subject is a different being. This concept is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2 Theoretical Consideration. 
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internal and external elements of  macro deliberation inter-reflect each other, the results re-
condition subsequent reflections. And due to the recursive reflection process and self-
contingent nature of  reflexivity in the inter-reflection of  participants (and wider 
stakeholders), a prolonged operation of  the procedure continuously produces various 
rationales for the division of  labour itself  – generating different ideas on how to divide (or 
compose) the overall deliberation process. Participants (individually and collectively) 
develop divergent views on who should play what kind of  role by what method. Through 
the recursive process of  inter-reflection among participants, their ideas about the division 
of  labour are changed and developed, meaning that overall deliberation becomes an 
evolutionary process.  
 
Indeed, this inherent property arising from fundamental human interactions emerges more 
explicitly at the macro level of  deliberative mechanism than the micro one. This means that 
despite the inherent nature of  reflexivity, it is possible to promote this property and macro 
deliberative mechanism may support the condition for encouraging it. Therefore, the more 
explicit and deliberate form of  reflexivity may more readily be achieved in a deliberative 
process that is constituted of  plural and diverse elements in a less formally structured 
mechanism. 
 
By explicitly recognising and promoting this inherent property of  reflexivity, participants 
are able to deliberate and explore more effectively the widely divergent views concerning 
the ‘labour’ of  deliberation (what to discuss, who should discuss it, and what methods 
should be used). This should in turn make it possible to be integrated more effectively into 
an overall process of  macro deliberation, divergent understandings in different micro-
deliberative exercises, concerning the appropriate or prevailing division of  labour. This 
illuminates the role of  reflexivity in terms of  the way in which division of  labour takes 
place in macro risk deliberation.  
 
In short, it is reflexivity that enables macro deliberation to function. And paradoxically, 
macro deliberation facilitates reflexivity. Detailed evidence and discussion to support this 
argument proceed in the following chapters of  this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
1.2 Changes in UK Science and Technology Governance   
 
Before exploring this study’s key research subject – an inquiry into deliberative mechanisms 
– this section elaborates the context of the deliberative turn in ST governance during the 
last few years of the 20th
 
 century. 
‘Deliberative turn’ (Dryzek 2000), ‘two-way public engagement with science’ (Wynne 2006), 
‘citizen engagement’ (Horlick-Jones 2007), ‘participatory turn’ (Chilvers 2007; 2008), and 
‘participatory deliberation’ (Stirling 2008) are some of the terms coined to describe the 
changes in ST governance that emerged in many democratic countries (Horlick-Jones 
2007) in the late 1990s. Such a variety of articulations notwithstanding, the aforementioned 
key terms characterise a new mode of ST policy making designed to engage wider sections 
of society – the public and stakeholders – in the ST policy decision making process. This 
innovative means of decision making was applied in particular to policy areas that were 
closely associated with technological risk: areas that in many cases involve uncertainty as 
well as conflicting interests and values, which therefore often cause controversy.  
 
While there were many causes of such changes, the BSE crisis of 1996 may be regarded as 
the event that most shook up the UK policy making environment in the late 1990s, 
provoking debate around a new mode of ST governance and suggesting a need to rethink 
the existing ST regulation system. However, the BSE crisis was not a single unfortunate 
and discrete episode, but a kind of symbolic juncture representing an accumulation of 
policy failures in ST governance. The political environment that brought about such 
changes was dubbed as the era of public mistrust in ‘public institutions’ (Löfstedt and 
Horlick-Jones 1999), in ‘scientists’ (Wilsdon and Willis 2004) and/or in ‘science [itself]’ 
(Wynne 2006). Due to worldwide experience of a series of policy failures in ST governance 
at the hands of governing agencies (Jasanoff 1997; 2003), for example, the Three Mile 
Island, Chernobyl, and Bhopal accidents; the genetically modified organism (GMO) debate; 
and mounting uncertainty around risk issues, the scientific expert community came to the 
realisation that it must justify its knowledge claims to the wider society (Wilsdon and Willis 
2004; Lövbrand et al. 2011). Consequently, UK ST policy making circles could no longer 
reasonably deny the involvement of wider society in decision making on ST policy (Stirling 
2008).  
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A number of  different kinds of  argument aimed at public engagement in ST regulation 
were advocated by various stakeholders with the aim of  better addressing principles of  
openness and transparency (Irwin 2006; Wynne 2006). This approach was inaugurated with 
guidelines for science advice in policymaking (The Use of  Scientific Advice in Policy Making)5
 
 in 
1997 by Lord Robert May, who was at that time the government’s chief  scientific advisor 
(1995–2000). This policy document addressed the importance of  openness in the science 
policy making process, and was followed by a series of  similar proposals from various 
influential institutions advocating public engagement.  
The Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) published a report in 1998, 
Setting Environmental Standards, addressing this new style of  governance (Irwin 2006). The 
House of  Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology also contributed to the 
debate, addressing the need of  a “new mood for dialogue” due to the “crisis of  public 
confidence,” in their third report on Science and Society (2000). Such rhetoric was then 
adopted in the wider context, at European Union (EU) level, as a foundation for general 
governance. In July 2001, the European Commission’s White Paper on Governance (2001) 
addresses the new mode of  governance, proposing five principles ‘openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence’ for ‘good governance’.  In the same year, the 
very heart of UK government ST policymaking, the Office for Science and Technology 
(OST), published its Code of  Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees (2001), which 
encouraged broad participation in science advisory committees. It was followed by the 
report Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty, which was 
published by the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office Strategy Unit the following year (2002). 
One of  its six suggestions for successful risk handling is that departments and agencies 
should gain the public’s trust before offering advice. In order to do this, it recommends 
“openness and transparency, wider engagement of  stakeholders and the public, wider 
availability of  choice, and more use of  ‘arm’s-length’ bodies” (Report Summary, p. 3). 
 
‘Openness’ (OST 1997); ‘crisis of public confidence’ (House of Lords 2000); ‘democratic 
governance’ (The European Commission 2001); ‘broad participation in scientific advice’ 
(OST 2001); and ‘public trust for risk and uncertainty’ (Cabinet Office 2002) are some of 
the key terms employed by various agencies as foundations in their proposals for change in 
ST governance. Such words demonstrate the problem in- or direction of change for- ST 
                                                 
5 Its second edition was published in July 2000. 
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policy making that those key agencies recognised as the central issue. Yet those different 
words lead up to an essential concept - ‘public engagement’. Such differing but interrelated 
notions underpinned various rationales reflecting different priorities that were adopted by 
different perspectives in the debate on a public deliberative approach.  
 
1.3 Various Rationales for Public Engagement in Science and 
Technology Governance 
 
Given that there were different bases for the construction and operation of  a range of  
public deliberation mechanisms, in setting the scene, this opening chapter focuses on the 
various rationales that underpinned such a deliberative turn in UK ST governance in the 
1990s.  
 
Fiorino(1990) addresses existing contrasting arguments on the rationale for public 
participation in technological risk governance for environmental decision making, that is, 
‘normative’, ‘substantive’ and ‘instrumental’. Some consider that the public should be 
involved in political decision making in the interests of  democratic process; others think 
that public participation in policy making delivers substantive benefits in improved 
outcomes; and yet others suggest that engaging the public in the decision-making process 
constitutes an instrument for the achievement of  specific policy aims such as public 
acceptance of  final decisions (ibid.). Stirling (2005; 2008) further develops and applies this 
framework to elucidate different bases for the ‘social appraisal of  technology’. He (2008) 
elaborates on Fiorino’s framework, arguing that three distinct rationales can be employed 
for different reasons from different perspectives and “any given cultural perspective [of  
institution]” (e.g. that of  the UK Treasury or Department of  Environment6
 
) (p. 273) can 
accommodate all of  three normative, substantive, and instrumental rationales in various 
contexts.  
First, it can be argued that the democratic normative perspective in most cases forms the 
basis of  the rationale for public engagement in ST governance, as in the aforementioned 
proposals (e.g. OST 1997, 2001; RCEP 1998; House of Lords 2000; The European 
                                                 
6 Stirling (2008) cites these examples based on the respective documents HM Treasury (2004) 
Science & innovation investment framework 2004–2014, and DEFRA (2004) Evidence and innovation: Defra’s 
needs from the sciences over the next 10 years. 
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Commission 2001; Cabinet Office 2002). Horlick-Jones et al. (2007) summarise the trend 
for ‘citizen engagement’ in the interests of ‘good governance’ and the ‘democratic process’, 
which was a response to the ‘deficits of democracy’, in addressing the “shortage of 
knowledge, trust, and legitimacy” (pp. 1–2). Kemp et al. (2006) in the same vein, also find 
that this recognition of the need for actual change in public engagement in ‘radioactive 
waste management’, and for further ‘good governance’ and ‘sustainable futures’, is an issue 
of “legitimacy and trust” (p. 1030). These commentators observe that this deliberative turn 
in ST governance was strongly based on democratic values.  
 
‘Citizen empowerment, equity, social justice (Chilvers 2007)’, ‘the scope, resourcing, 
openness, representativeness, accessibility, facilitation, transparency, or accountability of 
engagement (Stirling 2008)’ were the terms for the qualities that would determine the 
democratic values of such new modes of ST policy making process. Therefore, in 
accordance with the democratic imperative, public engagement in the ST policy making 
process is considered to be right thing as long as it meets such criteria (Stirling 2008). ‘The 
right process’ is thus the most important aim for proponents of this perspective (Wilsdon 
and Willis 2004; Stirling 2008; Renn et al. 1995). For example, the European Commission’s 
White Paper on Governance (2001) seems to suggest that democracy is the overarching 
prerequisite of  good governance: 
 
“Five principles underpin good governance and the changes proposed in this White 
Paper: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Each principle is 
important for establishing more democratic governance […]” (The European 
Commission 2001, p. 10) 
 
In particular, as an arena in which scientific experts have traditionally dominated, a 
rationale for including the public and other stakeholders in the decision-making process 
based on the principle of openness and transparency would seem to reflect the democratic 
interests of equity, empowerment, legitimacy and accountability (Kemp et al. 2006; Chilvers 
2007; Stirling 2008; Lövbrand et al. 2011).  
 
One possible counterpart of  this new mode of  ST governance is ‘technocracy’ (Pellizzoni 
2001; Chilvers 2008; Stirling 2008). Technocracy is the conventional approach to ST 
decision making whereby it is considered that only expert knowledge can legitimately 
contribute to decisions (Chilvers 2008; Stirling 2008; Lövbrand et al. 2011). Pellizzoni 
(2001) cites Dahl (1985) and Beck (1992) as examples of  those who oppose this notion and 
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warn of  the “anti-democratic and dysfunctional consequences of  ever-increasing reliance 
on technocrats and bureaucrats, and they call for changes to be made to the political 
institutions and the democratization of  science” (p. 64). Lövbrand et al. (2011, p. 475) 
articulate the reaction against technocratic dominance in terms of  “efforts to democratize 
scientific expertise.” This stance attempts to meet perceived societal demand for the 
questioning of  the legitimacy of  scientific expert decision making and, thus makes a case 
for the right of  the public (and other stakeholders) to participate in decision making.  
 
Another perspective on the rationale for public engagement in ST governance 
acknowledges the substantive benefits of, for example, quality and competence (Chilvers 
2007), and social robustness (Stirling 2008) in decision making. Such advocates argue for 
the inclusion of wider social knowledge, values, and interests in political decision making in 
ST governance on the distinctive grounds that these will result in substantively better 
decision outcomes. This substantive rationale gains credence in the area of technological 
risk associated with uncertainty in particular (Fiorino 1990; Stirling 1998; Wilsdon and 
Willis 2004; Chilvers 2007). In this regard, Stirling (2008) argues that the precautionary 
principle helps condition forms of technology appraisal that include greater public 
participation in the interests of a more exhaustive and thorough exploration of issues, 
problems and their solutions, thus arguably leading to substantively better decisions.  
 
A European Environment Agency (2001) report, ‘Late lesson from early warnings: The 
precautionary principle 1898–2000’ also advocates the precautionary principle in seeking “to 
provide information of direct use for improving decision-making and public participation.” 
Throughout the analysis of various cases, the report addresses 12 points for improved 
decision making on broad environmental issues that reflect the Agency’s appreciation of 
‘pluralistic appraisal’ (Stirling 2008, p. 271) through the inclusion of the knowledge and 
values of wider society in precautionary governance on health and environmental issues. 
The following three points in particular address the substantive perspective underlying the 
recommendations of the report: 
 
“7. Evaluate a range of alternative options for meeting needs alongside the option 
under appraisal, and promote more robust, diverse and adaptable technologies so as to 
minimise the costs of surprises and maximise the benefits of innovation. 
8. Ensure use of ‘lay’ and local knowledge, as well as relevant specialist expertise in the 
appraisal. 
9. Take full account of the assumptions and values of different social groups.” 
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(European Environment Agency 2001, p. 169) 
 
The second volume of the report (European Environment Agency 2013) evaluates the 
changes of the preceding decade in respect of those issues addressed in Volume 1. It 
concludes that its recommendation of 2001 of “involving a wider range of stakeholders [in 
order to obtain] a richer body of information from more diverse sources” (p. 670) has been 
followed, particularly in the areas of public health and environment policy, although few 
others have been learnt (ibid.).  
 
We now turn to the instrumental rationale, according to which public engagement is seen 
as a means to achieve particular prior aims. In other words, engaging the public in ST 
governance could be useful for addressing the specific interests of  certain groups, 
institutions or systems. This notion has been variously articulated in terms of  a “more 
legitimate [decision] and leads to better results” (Fiorino 1990, p. 228)7
 
; “enhanced public 
legitimacy, acceptability and trust in risk decisions” (Chilvers 2007, p. 198); and “specific 
forms of  acceptance, trust or intelligence” (Stirling 2008, p. 271). The legitimacy addressed 
in this rationale has specific targets. In other words, public engagement in ST governance is 
legitimate only for specific groups, institutions or systems. Such specific interests and aims 
are not grounded in the general values or norms of  the context in which the claims are 
made. Therefore, there must be those who are uninterested in, excluded from the benefits 
of, or even oppose the specifically targeted ends. Stirling (2008) points out that an 
instrumental rationale is defined in relation to “ends conditioned by [a] proximate power 
structure” (p. 274), for example, in order to ease “public opposition to those policy 
commitments like nuclear power, chemical pesticides, and food additives, and, more 
recently, some aspects of genetic technologies” (Wynne 2006, p. 213). In this line, one 
specific feature of  this, is the focus on generating singular policy prescriptions, rather than 
a plurality of  possible recommendations, each corresponding with alternative perspectives. 
The instrumental benefits of  this singularity lies in its value for legitimating decisions, 
fostering credibility and providing a resource for blame management in wider political 
processes (Stirling 2008). 
Perhaps in order to conceal such influence by incumbent interests, the instrumental 
rationale for public engagement tends to be less explicitly acknowledged in policy 
                                                 
7 However, it seems that Fiorino’s account for instrumental perspective is conflated with his 
account for substantive one. 
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literatures (Stirling 2008). Crucially, deliberative democracy theory, which is recognised as a 
kind of  backbone to public engagement discourse and practice (Pellizzoni 2001; Wilsdon 
and Willis 2004; Hendriks 2004; Chilvers 2008; Lövbrand et al. 2011), tends not to address 
the realpolitik under which instrumental imperatives often come to the fore.  
 
Variations in articulation and focus notwithstanding, deliberative democracy theorists 
commonly cite normative and substantive reasons why this form of  democracy should be 
considered for solving contemporary problems (Hendriks 2004; Parkinson 2006). 
Examples of  such a conceptualisation of  deliberative democracy with the normative and 
substantive rationales include the debates around ‘proceduralist and non-proceduralist’ 
deliberative models (Bregman 2000), and ‘procedural and epistemic positions’ (Dryzek 
2002). However, there seems to be an absence of  acknowledgement of  the instrumental 
rationale from these discussions. This is perhaps due to the inconvenient negative 
connotations of  this point in a theoretical discourse that otherwise typically tends to 
advocate participatory practices. Therefore, instrumental motivations tend to be 
operationalised in an implicit way, and are more evident in practice than in discourse. 
Consequently, discussion of  instrumental motivations is also more often to be found in the 
analysis of  the practices of  deliberative decision making (e.g.  Fiorino 1990; Chilvers 2007;  
Stirling 2008) than in the direct documentation. 
 
It may be that the implications of  this instrumental rationale in forming discourse around 
and practice of  public engagement are easily overlooked. Therefore, the following section 
probes this instrumental perspective-based rationale more deeply than the previous two 
explicitly discussed rationales. In particular, it addresses key issues in the discourse on the 
various rationales for public deliberation in ST governance that were portrayed by high 
profile policy institutions such as the House of  Lords and the Prime Minister. In terms of  
their central role in the UK ST regulatory system, addressing key issues identified would 
seem to be essential to an understanding of  the context of  the deliberative turn.  
 
Public understanding of  science; the respective roles of  scientists and the public; and the 
loss of  public confidence were the key issues in the discourse of  public engagement in UK 
ST policy making. It may be important to understand those key issues supporting, 
underlying in various rationales for the deliberative turn before exploring its different 
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mechanisms. Various discussions on how to design and deliver deliberative mechanisms 
reflecting such issues will proceed in the ensuing examination of  the two case studies.  
 
1.3.1 Public Understanding of  Science  
 
Burgeoning discourse advocating public engagement in science policy making helped to 
drive the change in ST governance in the UK. Some commentators argue that this trend 
was a shift away from the ‘deficit model’ of technocracy towards democratic decision 
making with public (and wider stakeholder) engagement (e.g. Kemp et al. 2006; Horlick-
Jones et al. 2007). 
 
Wynne (1991) employs the term ‘deficit’ in his earlier critique of the prevalent assumption 
in the perceptions of many scientists and policy-makers regarding public understanding of, 
or attitude to, science. In broad terms, this view holds that it is the public’s ignorance of 
science that causes what is held to be a negative attitude toward science. ‘The public’, is 
thereby framed in terms of subjects to be educated in order to improve understanding of, 
and support for, scientific experts and their work (Wynne 1991, 1993, 2006).  
 
Wynne (2006) argues that many assumptions in this deficit model (such as the deficit in 
public understanding of science) contrastingly, continued to underpin much of the newly-
advocated mode of public engagement in ST governance. An important rationale for the 
new mode was again that the public’s lack of understanding of science resulted in it losing 
confidence in science and science governance institutions, a situation that should be 
improved through education. Irwin (2006) contends that the model of deficit in 
understanding was replaced by the idea that there was a lack of trust, describing this shift as 
“a more subtle version of the old deficit model” (p. 306). Although Irwin (ibid.) does not 
deny such change of  participatory mode or its importance in terms of  ST governance and 
deliberative democracy, he argues that there was rather a shift in the ‘rhetoric’. Chilvers 
(2007) also addresses this trend as a partial divergence from the old deficit model in his 
discussion. The narratives of many governmental institutions’ proposals for public 
engagement support this argument (Chilvers 2008). 
 
For example, the House of  Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000) 
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addressed “the new mood for dialogue”, describing the situation as a “critical phase of 
crisis” in science (and society) that was due to the public’s lack of trust. Their report 
consists of five chapters: its introduction (Chapter 1) addresses the ‘crisis of public 
confidence in science’; Chapter 2 is entitled ‘Public attitudes and values’, which are 
diagnosed as negative due to a lack of trust; then, in Chapter 3, ‘the crisis of trust’ calls for 
‘a new mood for dialogue’ and seeks a two-way understanding between the public and 
scientists. Yet, rather than promoting mutual appreciation, it seems that it is actually 
intended to improve the public’s understanding of scientists’ work, and improve scientists’ 
understanding of the impact of the public’s understanding of science on society and public 
opinion’:  
 
“7. However, the crisis of  trust has produced a new mood for dialogue. In addition 
to seeking to improve public understanding of  their work, scientists are beginning to 
understand its impact on society and on public opinion.  
8. Efforts to improve relationships between science and society take many forms. We 
have reviewed some of  the principal influences […]  
9. Much excellent work is being done to raise the public understanding of  science. 
All these institutions must, however, respond to the new mood for dialogue.” 
(Chapter 3) 
 
The discussion then moves on to the issue of  how to create dialogue: Chapter 4, which 
deals with ‘communicating uncertainty and risk’, addresses the need for a radically different 
approach to the process of  policy making in the areas associated with science by 
emphasising the principle of  ‘openness’. Finally, Chapter 5, which is entitled ‘Engaging the 
public’, concludes with the claim that there is “the new mood for dialogue.” Its final 
statement argued that the ultimate purpose of  which is articulated thus: 
“17. All these approaches have value. They help the decision-maker to listen to 
public values and concerns; and they give the public some assurance that their views 
are taken into account, increasing the chance that decisions will find acceptance.” 
Chilvers (2007) also analyses the rationale for the need of  public dialogue articulated by the 
House of  Lords on this report (2000) is based on instrumental perspective seeking 
“enhanced public legitimacy, acceptability and trust in risk decisions” (p. 198) 
 
Another example of evidence for an instrumental rationale based on the similar 
perspectives of public understanding of science was given by Blair in his speech (Science 
Matters, 2002). The narrative here basically champions the virtues of science for the sake of 
the UK economy and society in general; his position being that the public’s lack of 
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understanding of science obstructed the development of new technology, which was 
contrary to the interests of the UK. Although he accepted that there were concerns around 
risk and uncertainty, he claimed they did not arise from bad science but owing to bad 
management of good science (ibid.).  
 
Blair’s (Science Matters 2002) speech may be summarised as follows: by the time New Labour 
came to power in 1997, people had lost trust in science and scientists due to the BSE crisis. 
This was because the previous government had not managed ST policy efficiently. The 
present administration was investing heavily in new technology in particular, which would 
be of great benefit to British society. New Labour had the correct approach; however, it 
was not merely a matter between the government and the scientific community, but 
necessitated an understanding between society and science. There was a need for people to 
understand science better. Although the precautionary principle was important, responsible 
ST policy should be made on the basis of the facts rather than prejudice or anxiety. 
Therefore, UK society needed a dialogue upon which to build trust in what science could 
do for the public:  
 
“We need, therefore, a robust, engaging dialogue with the public. We need to re-
establish trust and confidence in the way that science can demonstrate new 
opportunities, and offer new solutions.” 
Therefore, the rationale for investment in science education was not to improve scientific 
capabilities or orientations, but to transform what was perceived to be society’s generally 
negative and cautionary attitude towards science into a more positive and favourable 
attitude. This was the ultimate reason for the dialogue with the public. Indeed, Blair (ibid.) 
quite clearly expressed a patronising attitude towards the public, explicitly treating them 
merely as subjects to be educated: 
“The response of  the government must be to encourage openness, transparency and 
honesty […] But this isn’t just about Government and science. It’s crucially about 
society. We need better, stronger, clearer ways of  science and people communicating. 
The dangers are in ignorance of  each other’s point of  view; the solution is 
understanding them. […] This task will be aided if  we can embed a more mature 
attitude towards science in our society.” 
 
In addition to such an instrumental purpose underpinned the discourse around public 
understanding of  (or attitude to) science as the reason for public engagement in ST 
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governance, there was another assumption firmly embedded in the dominant rationale but 
which was usually not explicitly reflected in discussion: an inherent dichotomy between the 
wider role of  scientists and that of  the public in ST policy-making. 
 
1.3.2 The Respective Roles of Scientists and the Public  
 
In the ST governance discourse, the way in which the public is viewed in terms of its 
relation with science determines the respective roles of the public and scientists. It may 
reasonably be argued that defining the respective roles of the public (and stakeholders) and 
scientists, then determines the design of a deliberative mechanism.  
 
Underlying assumptions concerning the respective roles of the public and the scientific 
community continued to manifest essentially the same simple dichotomy as that embedded 
in the deficit model: namely, the assessment of scientific knowledge by scientists and the 
deliberation of values by the public. However, posing questions about the role of values 
(and interests) in determining scientific knowledge, shifts the discourse from the roles of 
the scientific community and the public in the ST policy making process, to the more 
general relationship between values and scientific knowledge per se. Therefore, such 
questions also draw attention to the role (or influence) of scientists’ own values and 
interests in the construction of scientific knowledge.  
 
Much advocacy for public engagement from various governmental institutions called for a 
serious consideration of public (and stakeholders’) values and interests. However, the 
values in question were effectively restricted to ‘external’ political or ethical dimensions 
rather than those embedded in scientific knowledge per se. By this logic, political and 
ethical values were the cause of controversy that could be resolved through effective 
political dialogue. The ultimate aim was more to gain acceptance of predetermined 
decisions than to allow the serious consideration of the epistemic content of ST policy 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992; Stirling 1998; Leach et al. 2005). Indeed, the simple 
dichotomy between the scientists’ knowledge and the public’s values (and interests) is quite 
heavily embedded in the discourse on the rationales for the public engagement in ST 
governance. For example, in the report Science and Society of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Science and Technology (2000), public engagement was regarded as helping 
to assure the public that its values and concerns would be listened to, thus increasing the 
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likelihood of  its acceptance of  any given decision: 
“17. All these approaches have value. They help the decision-maker to listen to 
public values and concerns; and they give the public some assurance that their views 
are taken into account, increasing the chance that decisions will find acceptance.” 
(Chapter 5)8
 
 
Blair (Science Matters 2002) also presented his concept of  the role of  values in science 
policymaking clearly in his speech: “We cannot have vital work stifled simply because it is 
controversial.” According to his logic, values are not a criterion to be considered in making 
actual decisions on ST policy: 
“Science is just knowledge. And knowledge can be used by evil people for evil ends. 
Science doesn’t replace moral judgement. It just extends the context of  knowledge 
within which moral judgements are made. It allows us to do more, but it doesn’t tell 
us whether doing more is right or wrong. Science is also fallible. Theories change. 
Knowledge expands and can contradict earlier thinking. All of  this is true, but none 
of  it should stop science trying to tell us the facts.” 
Therefore, his contention was that the legitimate process of  science policy making should 
be based firmly on the facts, and there was no room for considering values that might have 
existed prior to or in parallel with the facts: 
“The fundamental distinction is between a process where science tells us the facts 
and we make a judgement; and a process where a priori judgements effectively 
constrain scientific research. We have the right to judge but we also have a right to 
know. A priori judgement branded Darwin a heretic; science proved his tremendous 
insight. So let us know the facts; then make the judgement as to how we use or act 
on them.” (Science Matters 2002) 
 
Chilvers (2007) identifies the distinction that the previous mode of risk governance utilised 
a science-centred approach led mainly by the scientific community, whereas the new mode 
constituted an ‘analytical-deliberative’ form of risk governance that was more of an 
‘opening up’ of the risk decision process with, in particular, public involvement in ‘front-
end framing’. His analysis of recent radioactive waste management exercises found a 
dichotomy between “public deliberation and scientific analysis” (Chilvers 2007, p. 218). 
Therefore, such management did not employ ‘front-end’ public framing of policy. Instead 
of engaging the public from the early stage of framing, it amounted to a failure to integrate 
                                                 
8 This part of the literature has been used in the previous section.  
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engagement throughout the decision-making process in its separation of ‘science and 
citizen’ (ibid., p. 197).   
 
Chilvers’ (2007) distinction between ‘science and citizen’ is based on knowledge: first, 
formal (specialist) knowledge among scientists; second, limited specialist knowledge among 
stakeholders; and third, lay (experiential or local) knowledge among ‘publics’9
 
 of various 
kinds. In this regard, Chilvers (ibid.) refers to Collins and Evans’ (2002) typology of 
expertise, finding it useful in its extension of forms of expertise – and their possible 
combination in analytical–deliberative processes – which consist of “scientific specialist 
expertise (core-set scientists); contributory expertise (non-specialists from the general 
public); and interactional expertise (i.e. facilitators) and translation expertise 
(communicators)” (cited in Chilvers 2007, p. 202). Although Chilvers (ibid.) mentions in 
passing that this typology fails to take into account values or interests (p. 202), he does not 
discuss the matter further. Rather, he develops a second typology of levels of ‘citizen-
science interaction or integration’ in the analytical–deliberative process consisting of “non-
interactive, interactive, and active level[s],” noting that the active level of integration eases 
the distinction between ‘deliberation/analysis and citizen/science’.  
Although Chilvers (2007) claims to integrate analysis and deliberation, criticising the 
separation between science and citizen, his discussion still reflects an implicit dichotomy 
between scientists and citizens. The key axis is still formed by who has what kinds of 
knowledge (determined and labelled by distinguishing scientists, publics, and 
communicative experts such as facilitators), rather than how scientific knowledge or 
decisions are constructed. The latter approach may offer a useful analytical angle if 
questions are posed concerning the role of scientists’ values and interests in the 
construction of science and associated decisions. Instead, attention is just made only  to 
the ‘public framing role’, which he finds to accord with Wynne’s (1996) emphasis on the 
“cultural truths of lay actors and their role in shaping knowledge commitments” (cited in 
Chilvers 2007, p. 215). 
 
Demeritt et al. (2009) argue that although public engagement in science and technology 
(PEST) is not a panacea for all ST governance-related issues, it can contribute substantively 
                                                 
9 Chilvers (2007) acknowledges the plurality. 
19 
 
 
 
to “better science and science policy” in two ways: as “normative steering and epistemic 
checking.” The normative steering role of PEST means that it can provide “a more 
acceptable science and science-based policy” with “clear mechanisms of democratic 
accountability and control.” Epistemic checking, on the other hand, necessitates 
contributions from “knowledgeable (if uncertified) experts from among the lay public.” 
Demeritt et al. (2009) also refer to Collins and Evans’ (2002) study on expertise. They 
acknowledge that a more conventionally-accepted epistemic role for public engagement in 
ST governance would involve some knowledgeable experts from the lay community 
verifying and adding their contributions to formal scientific work: 
 
“In its very strongest form, it dissolves any epistemic or political distinction between 
scientists and citizens into a vastly expanded public debate. In this brave new world 
the specific need for public engagement with science is no longer so clear, since 
science carries no special epistemic status and truth is a matter of convention, 
determined through persuasion, popularity, and power. For many this radical version 
of PEST as epistemic checking strays too close to relativism. It denies any foundation 
for warranting belief and preventing the extension of debate by dissenters, however 
ignorant, ill‐informed, or duplicitous their claims. Accordingly, the more common 
version of PEST as epistemic checking retains the traditional epistemic warrant 
granted to scientific experts, but opens up their claims to checking by, and 
contributions from, knowledgeable (if uncertified) experts from among the lay public.” 
(p. 24)  
 
Such rhetoric is in the same arena of debate as that concerning who has knowledge – in 
fact, in respect of the roles of values and interests, it more accurately addresses who has the 
facts rather than how scientific knowledge is produced and applied to ST policy-making. 
The simple equation of ‘scientists: the public = scientific knowledge (facts) providers: 
values holders’ was often taken for granted in discussions on public engagement in ST 
governance. However, according to this narrowly defined equation, any possible 
contribution to the construction of scientific knowledge from other aspects of scientists 
and the public such as scientists’ values and interests, and the public’s epistemic knowledge, 
was not considered.  
 
Therefore, this dichotomy did not allow the exploration of other possible input such as 
political or ontological elements in forming various rationales for public engagement, or 
their potential influence on the design of practical exercises in ST governance. Application 
of such a constrained paradigm to public engagement in ST governance prompted 
accusation of such things as disempowered and exclusive participation, restricted 
institutional framing, strategic manipulation, and a narrowing of the debate (Chilvers 2007). 
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Different rationales for the design of public engagement partly reside in this fundamental 
disparity in assumptions about the way ST policy is determined. 
 
Defining the roles of  scientists and the public in the process of  decision making is a 
contentious issue, as the above discussion demonstrated. Jasanoff  (1987) argues that 
although it seems neutral, much of  the language employed in the debate on the boundary 
between science and policy is concerned with the need to “explain or justify the allocation 
of  power and prestige between the institutions of  science and government” (p. 199). This 
conceptualisation is extended to the wider context of  ST governance whereby such 
boundary-defining language becomes the preferred medium of  all interest groups who are 
interested in “the way power is distributed among centres of  scientific and political 
authority” (Jasanoff  1987, p. 199). 
 
The following section addresses the discourse on public confidence, in which, conversely 
to the boundary-defining language above, boundary-conflating language (between science 
and scientific institutions) has been employed, but to the same end of  serving the interests 
of  groups in the policy making circle.  
 
1.3.3 Between a Loss of  Confidence in Science and in Scientific Institutions 
 
Discussion around public engagement in ST governance also highlights the matter of  the 
debate on ‘public confidence’. ‘Public confidence’ (or rather the lack thereof) was claimed 
by various governance institutions to be the reason why public engagement had become 
such a burning issue in the first place – presumed earlier confidence had been lost and 
therefore needed to be found again. Although the arguments differed in their various foci 
on confidence in science, scientific advice to the government, science policy, the science 
policy-maker, and science governance institutions, this general theme became the dominant 
rationale for the need for public engagement in the many proposals for UK ST governance 
(e.g. the House of  Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 2000; Commission 
of  the European Communities 2001; Blair 2002; the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office 
Strategy Unit 2002). 
 
However, whether the call for public engagement was due to the public’s loss of  
confidence in science, or in science governance institutions are rather different matters, and 
we can draw separate inferences from each assumption. For the public to lose confidence 
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in science implies that science as a body of  reliable knowledge – presumably undermined 
by uncertainty, such that it is no longer sufficiently robust to inform judgements over on 
potential harmful or beneficial outcomes. On the other hand, for the public to lose 
confidence in governance institutions (including government advisory bodies) holds two 
possible implications: firstly, science has become insufficiently trustworthy – thus 
governance institutions cannot control it; and secondly, science is trustworthy but it is 
governance institutions that display the insufficiency in their capability to control its 
consequences. Yet, across different contexts and discourses, the ways in which the term 
‘public confidence’ was used as a rationale for public engagement in various institutions’ 
proposals obscured these crucial differences.  
 
Indeed, in parliamentary debates and other meetings, the notion of  lost confidence was 
tossed around between these two scenarios, with stakeholders talking past each other or 
shifting expediently between references to ‘science’ and ‘scientific institutions’. Thus, the 
discourse around public confidence, which yielded radically contrasting proposals for the 
design of public engagement in ST governance, was instrumentally employed by different 
actors to construct their respective rationales depending on their particular interests, as 
exemplified by debate in the House of  Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology 
(2000), and the argument adopted by Blair (2002).  
 
When the issue of  public confidence was raised in the context of  UK ST governance in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, many governance institutions discussed it in terms of  
consumers’ confidence responding to the wake of  the BSE crisis, their reports thus 
highlighting misgivings of  consumers the products of  technology, i.e. the safety of  the 
products. As the main stakeholders were regulators, industry and consumers, the debate 
around public confidence focused on the consumer’s perspective of  the market rather than 
society’s appraisal of  the development and application of  new technology. Indeed, the 
general public was regarded as the consumer of  the by-products of  ST and the other actors 
as stakeholders who were managing it badly.  
The following quotation from a BBC Online News item of  26 October 2000 – just after 
the publication of  the Phillips Report (the BSE Inquiry) – shows how the public was 
positioned in this discourse:  
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“Speaking after its publication, Lord Phillips went further, declaring: “We do think, 
and have found, that there was what you might call a cover up in the first six 
months.” It is quite possible that some of  the officials involved will face disciplinary 
action in the future. And it is certain that public confidence in Whitehall to protect 
consumers’ interests has been fatally damaged.”10
 
 
In 2000, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) published a report entitled Excellence 
and Opportunity: A Science and Innovation Policy for the 21st Century. As its title suggests, it was 
intended to promote ST for innovation in the UK. The order of its headings indicates the 
narrative of the argument. It begins with ‘a science policy for the 21st century’, which 
concludes with the assertion that ‘public satisfaction’ is a prerequisite to the success of the 
innovation process. It then describes the virtue of science under the heading ‘excellence in 
science’, going on to advocate maximisation of opportunities to exploit the benefits of 
innovation. The final section addresses the need for ‘confident consumers’, emphasising 
the role of the government in achieving consumer confidence with regard to the safety of 
ST innovation and transforming it: 
 
“[…] into products and services that consumers want. Public satisfaction feeds the 
cycle because public support underpins investment in the basic science that fuels the 
innovation process.” (Executive Summary, p. 2) 
 
 The House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology report Science and 
Society (2000) implies that public confidence means confidence in scientific advice to 
government in the context of the BSE crisis.” Consideration of the nature of confidence 
then addresses the discourse on society’s confidence in science: 
“Society's relationship with science is in a critical phase. Science today is exciting, and 
full of  opportunities. Yet public confidence in scientific advice to Government has 
been rocked by BSE; and many people are uneasy about the rapid advance of  areas 
such as biotechnology and IT - even though for everyday purposes they take science 
and technology for granted. This crisis of  confidence is of  great importance both to 
British society and to British science.” (Chapter 1) 
 
In the following chapter of the report, the public’s negative attitude to science is diagnosed 
as a lack of trust in the purpose of its application, by the government and industry in 
particular: 
“Survey data reveal, however, negative responses to science associated with 
Government or industry, and to science whose purpose is not obviously beneficial. 
                                                 
10Available from (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/992883.stm) 
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These negative responses are expressed as lack of  trust.” (Chapter 2) 
 
On the other hand, in the EC White Paper for Governance (2001), the term ‘confidence’ is 
articulated clearly as “confidence in the end result and in the institutions which deliver 
policies” (p. 10) in the description of  its five principles (openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence). 
  
HM Treasury report Science & Innovation Investment Framework 2004–2014 (2004) also 
discusses public confidence in respect of its rationale for public dialogue. However, it 
adopts different interpretations of the term within its own report. It is interesting to note 
how the narrative under the heading ‘Public confidence in and engagement with science 
and technology’ is developed in the summary. There are three paragraphs under this 
heading: the first one (1.36) begins by advocating public confidence in terms of a societal 
ethical and regulatory framework within which to push forwards with new technology; the 
second paragraph (1.37) discusses how much money the government plans to spend on 
public engagement in order to improve confidence in new areas of ST policy; and the last 
paragraph (1.38) concludes by warning animal rights extremists of the government’s 
commitment to tackling them (p. 14). 
 
For his part, Blair’s reference in his speech of  a loss of  trust and confidence (Science Matters 
2002) refers to a deterioration of  faith in the general virtues and benefits of  science, 
claiming that such confidence should be restored through public engagement: 
“We need, therefore, a robust, engaging dialogue with the public. We need to re-
establish trust and confidence in the way that science can demonstrate new 
opportunities, and offer new solutions […] But it’s no exaggeration to say that in 
some areas we’re at a crossroads. We could choose a path of  timidity in the face of  
the unknown. Or we could choose to be a nation at ease with radical knowledge, not 
fearful of  the future, a culture that values a pragmatic, evidence-based approach to 
new opportunities. The choice is clear. We should make it confidently.”  
 
Public confidence in the capability of science lies in the question, “To what extent can 
science benefit or harm us?” On the other hand, the question of public confidence in the 
capability of ST governance institutions relates to whether they are able and willing to 
manage science well for us. These are completely different matters. Uncertainty in risk 
governance implies that there is insufficient capability to control science due to uncertainty 
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in scientific knowledge. It is not that we might make a mistake, even though there is a 
definite answer, but that we do not know how to reach the right answer or whether an 
answer even exists.  
 
However, these two separate discussions were employed strategically to justify each 
stakeholder’s argument, as exemplified above. Blair’s speech (Science Matters 2002) was also 
another such instance. He lays the blame for the public’s loss of confidence around the 
BSE case with the Conservative government that was in charge of managing science when 
the crisis arose. Accordingly, he argues that the present crisis is due to the mismanagement 
of the latter but that he can handle it better. The narrative of ‘bad management of good 
science’ thus proves useful as a means by which a successor can accuse a predecessor of 
poor government:  
“Mr Brown [Gordon Brown, Chancellor of  the Exchequer in the Blair Government 
from 1997 to 2007] is well aware that any attempt (to) use the report to make 
political capital out of  the BSE disaster, which has seen the loss of  dozens of  lives, 
would dramatically backfire… But he also knows he does not have to do so just yet. 
The disaster happened during Tory governments and Labour is untouched by it […] 
The media coverage of  the Phillips’ report will do his work for him by reminding 
voters of  the Tories' role in the affair.” (BBC Online News 26 October 2000)11
 
 
This opening chapter has discussed the context of the deliberative turn in UK ST 
governance in the 1990s. In particular, the chapter examines the elements that brought 
about such a change: catalysts that comprised the several policy failures in various areas of 
ST governance, and the societal demand for a democratic policy making process engaged 
with wider sections of society. It also discusses three different perspectives underlying 
rationales claimed for the need of the change with a few examples of proposal suggested by 
the central actors in UK ST policy making circle. With this discussion, it particularly draws 
attention to the various key issues associated with the instrumental perspective, which 
supports public engagement in ST governance much implicitly, comparing with the other 
two. In each case, attention has been given to the implications of the different rationales 
for public engagement in ST governance. Just as different stakeholders’ perspectives 
embody often radically contrasting assumptions, so do large implications arise for the 
design of public engagement. The consequences have been widely reflected in the 
development and delivery of various deliberative mechanisms for ST governance in the UK 
                                                 
11 Available from : (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/992883.stm) 
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such as the example case of GM Dialogue and CoRWM to be examined in this thesis later. 
Accordingly, understanding of  underlying values, assumptions, interests, knowledge, and 
ontologies in respect of  diverse rationales will facilitate appreciation of  the context of  the 
development of  public deliberation mechanisms that have been operated in actual ST 
policy making in the UK. 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
This chapter begins with presenting the overarching research question, and briefing the key 
concepts, which give a broad picture of  what this study is about. It then situates this 
research in a specific setting – a deliberative turn in UK ST policy making arena in the 
period from the late 1990’s to the mid 2000’s. In so doing, it addresses the issues around 
the driving factors of  such change in the mode of  ST governance. The discussion in 
particular, draws attentions to the underlying assumptions and presuppositions of  the 
rationales that were arranged by the governmental institutions in that period. 
 
In Chapter 2, which addresses theoretical considerations, I examine the key concepts of  the 
two theories that underpin this thesis: deliberative democracy and reflexive governance. 
Consideration of  these concepts provides the study with its overarching research question: 
What are the implications of  reflexivity in the understanding of  the division of  labour in 
macro risk deliberations? Examination of  the established perspective on deliberative 
democracy, i.e. micro-deliberative democracy, reveals that its limitation lies in the fact that it 
prioritises deliberativeness over the other essential quality of  such democracy, that of  
inclusiveness, thus leaving it open to accusation of  exclusivity.  
 
The discussion then moves on to the alternative approach of  macro-deliberative democracy. 
The macro-deliberative approach attempts to overcome the tension between inclusion and 
deliberation by introducing the notion of  division of  labour, allocating different issues to a 
variety of  participants for discussion in diverse ways through micro deliberations aimed at 
securing both inclusiveness and deliberativeness. However, close examination of  this 
approach raises the question of  whether and how such division of  labour can overcome 
the further tension between division and inclusion, and secure both qualities of  
inclusiveness and deliberativeness.   
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The second part of  the theoretical discussion examines the notion of  reflexivity in 
governance. It introduces the current literature on reflexivity in the context of  ST 
governance, and elaborates on the concept of  reflexivity and its role in ST governance. For 
the purposes of  analysis, the two dimensions of  reflexivity, i.e. outcome and process, are 
treated separately: with regard to outcome, reflexivity multiplies the elements of  the ST 
system; and in terms of  process, reflexivity facilitates the evolution of  the ST system 
through recursive, endogenous generation to a reconstitution of  its elements.  
 
The theoretical consideration of  the implications of  reflexivity in ST governance raises the 
further question of  the role of  the nature of  reflexivity in understanding macro 
deliberation in ST risk policy making. The aforementioned overarching research question 
was developed by combining these two questions arising from theoretical discussion on 
deliberative democracy and reflexive governance.  
 
In Chapter 3, I delineate the ways in which this study was designed and conducted. I 
elaborate the process of  developing the research question, my rationale for choosing the 
two cases, and the methods I employed for data collection and analysis.  
 
This is followed by Chapter 4, which examines GM Dialogue, and Chapter 5, which 
addresses the deliberations of  CoRWM. These two chapters present this study’s empirical 
analysis of  each case respectively. GM Dialogue and CoRWM represent the empirical 
findings of  the study, which are subsequently utilised in my analysis of  the ways in which 
macro-deliberative mechanisms operate. The results of  the analysis of  both cases are 
examined according to the same criteria in each chapter. This is in order to emphasise that 
they were chosen as equally valid examples of  macro deliberation in technological risk 
policy making, although this does not mean the two cases were in any way identical.  
 
The UK government Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) was 
responsible for these two macro deliberation programmes for technological risk policies, 
which can generally be characterised as manifesting uncertainty and controversy. Two 
specific risk issues that Defra was obliged to address were the commercialisation of  GM 
crops and the management of  radioactive waste. Defra faced similar challenges in dealing 
with each policy issue, such as moratorium and serious public distrust, as well as its strong 
policy orientation towards the development of  both GM technology and nuclear 
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technology.  
 
Each of  these empirical chapters begins by discussing its respective case background, 
which establishes the context in which GM Dialogue and CoRWM were established. It 
then analyses the ways in which the various divisions of  labour in each case have taken 
place. The results are presented under the themes ‘inclusion’ and ‘deliberation’; considering 
that division of  labour is the means employed by the macro-deliberative approaches to 
maximise the two essential qualities of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness. Therefore, in 
order to examine the macro-deliberative mechanism, this study gives attention to and 
analyses the key concept of  macro deliberation, i.e. division of  labour. It critically observes 
how inclusion and deliberation have proceeded in order to achieve the qualities of  
inclusiveness and deliberativeness as macro-deliberative democracy theorists assume.  
 
Firstly, the results of  my observations under the theme of  inclusion in each case show how 
the whole programme was divided by (or composed of) different actors, their tasks and 
various micro-deliberative methods, and the ways in which such division in terms of  actors, 
tasks and deliberative methods was incorporated into the overall programme. Secondly, 
discussion under the theme of  deliberation in each empirical chapter analyses how the 
decision making process proceeded with regard to extent of  deliberativeness. In so doing, 
chapters 4 and 5 raise various caveats to the assumed characteristics of  deliberative 
democracy theory. In examining the issues and characteristics that emerged throughout my 
analysis of  division of  labour, these empirical chapters demonstrate the significant 
influence of  reflexivity in these two macro risk deliberation practices.  
 
Chapter 6 summarises the results of  my empirical analysis of  the two cases, which had 
both differences and similarities. The big picture of  these public engagements took the 
form of  macro deliberations that manifested various divisions of  labour with regard to 
actors, tasks and methods. In addition, although the two programmes addressed different 
technologies, they were both related to technological risk that involved a great deal of  
uncertainty, and controversial values and interests. Moreover the context in which each of  
the two public deliberation exercises was established was similar in as far as it reflected the 
government’s position. Two programmes were conducted consecutively within a single 
term of  office on the part of  Blair. That on public deliberation over GM crops began in 
2001, the actual Dialogue being held in summer 2003. Shortly after the completion of   GM 
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Dialogue, CoRWM was set up in 2003, submitting its final report to the government in July 
2006. 
 
On the other hand, the two programmes were set up for different purposes. GM Dialogue 
was mandated to review the current diverse perspectives of  UK society on GM crops, 
while CoRWM was tasked with offering policy options directly to the government. The 
nature of  the risk each was faced with was also different: GM Dialogue had to answer the 
question of  whether UK land should be sown with GM crops or not, whilst CoRWM was 
restricted by the existing legacy of  nuclear waste management. Accordingly, practice 
around division of  labour varied, which meant that the structure of  each programme 
different, as well as the policy influence of  the results.  
 
Differences between these two public deliberation programmes notwithstanding, my 
analysis of  these examples of  macro deliberation asks whether  such mechanisms can 
operate according to the key concept of  division of  labour as an alternative to micro-
deliberative decision making. In other words, the close examination of  division of  labour in 
these two case studies reveals that the discursive structure and plural elements of  macro 
deliberation facilitate reflexivity as well as reflexivity helps division of  labour achieve the 
qualities of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness. However, this suggests that such 
achievement of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness differs from that characterised in 
established deliberative democracy theory.  
 
Final chapter 7 concludes with the answer to the research question of  this study directly – 
implications of  reflexivity in the understanding of  the division of  labour in macro risk 
deliberations.  In demonstrating the role of  reflexivity in macro deliberation exercises and 
the ways in which divisions of  labour of  macro deliberation operate in reflexive process, 
the second section of  this concluding chapter give suggestions on the conditions which can 
facilitate more reflexive deliberation. It is followed by drawing the broad discussion 
regarding the meaning of  the deliberative turn for the decision making to ST policy making. 
This chapter ends with suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATION 
 
2.1 Deliberative Democracy 
 
The notion of  deliberative democracy has been prominent in discussions surrounding 
governance over the last two decades, in particular in Western society. This trend has been 
associated with societal pressure for improved quality in participation, from diverse social 
voices in policy-making. Seeing those who might be influenced by the policy as being 
entitled to make substantive input into the policy, this form of  democracy aims for ‘higher 
quality’ involvement of  the general public and stakeholders in the policy-making process. 
The term ‘deliberation’ generally requires a more sophisticated definition than the looser 
idea of  ‘participation’, which usually refers to greater inclusiveness. A truly deliberative 
process demands application of  rigorous normative criteria concerning the style, scope and 
structure of  dialogue that are actually undertaken. 
 
A wide range of concepts and definitions of deliberation has been developed. Though 
expressed in contrasting terminologies, there exist many conjunctions between concepts 
and distinctions. One such distinction is between different imperatives or rationales for 
deliberation (Fiorino 1990; Stirling 2005; 2008). As established in the previous chapter, a 
‘democratically normative’ rationale is oriented towards aims of ‘democratic emancipation, 
equity, equality and social justice’, while the ‘substantive’ imperative focuses on whatever is 
held to constitute the ‘quality’ of the decision’s outcomes and a third ‘instrumental’ view 
explicates the perspective that deliberation serves a means for achieving specific ends 
(Stirling 2005). Despite existence of this disjunction between these different rationales for 
deliberation, an important conjunction is found in its primary concepts. 
 
2.1.1 Concepts 
 
Underlying the positions articulated by different deliberative democracy theorists, the 
essential qualities of  deliberative democracy theory all consist in various forms of  
deliberativeness and inclusiveness (Elster 199812
 
; Bloomfield et al. 2001; Hendriks 2004). 
                                                 
12 Elster gives his account for this, using his the terminology -  democratic part for inclusiveness and 
deliberative part  for deliberativeness -  in his explanation (1998, pp. 8-9) 
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2.1.1.1 Inclusiveness  
Phrases of  public participation, public engagement, public consultation, and public 
deliberation in the context of  political decision making, connote a certain degree of  
public’s partaking in decision making process, despite their various ends and means in the 
process. With these different terms and conditions, people, agendas, and methods are 
included in the collective political decision making (Bloomfield et al. 2001). 
 
Inclusiveness is one of the primary qualities focused upon by deliberative democracy 
theory. Public deliberation in deliberative democracy theory should be inclusive so as to 
engage a wide spectrum of people as possible and their various values (and interests) in a 
deep discussion. The inclusion of many people’s values (and interests) as possible is 
democratically valuable for a legitimate decision making, as voices can be heard from all   
parties (in particular minority) not just from the elites or experts. Elster (1998 pp. 8-9) 
points out this ‘democratic part’ as one essential element constituting the notion of 
deliberative democracy (along with ‘deliberative part’). He argues that the concept of 
deliberative democracy implies a collective decision making, which should involve a direct 
or indirect participation of people affected by decision. Inclusion of wider sections of 
society in a decision making process is also argued to have a substantive benefit, as diverse 
ideas make decisions robust (Bloomfield et al. 2001; Hendriks 2004). For the instrumental 
purpose, inclusion of  contending parties in a decision making process can deliver policy 
makers benefits of  increasing the policy acceptance or sharing the blame. 
 
2.1.1.2 Deliberativeness  
 
Public deliberation goes beyond simple acts of  democratic participation, such as voting 
among given options: instead, it involves a deep discussion among participants. Ideally, 
public deliberation in deliberative democracy theory should consist of  forms of  reasoning 
using publicly defendable arguments (Elster 1998; Rawls in Dryzek 2000). In order to 
achieve this, the process should not be susceptible to bias made from any particular 
political interest or power (Cohen 1998). This notion is deeply rooted in Habermas’ theory 
of  communicative action (Fraser 1990; Warren 1993; Dryzek 2000; Bloomfield et al. 2001) 
which holds faith in the possibility of  meaningful approximations to such ideal 
communication. Therefore, established deliberative democracy theorists, influenced by 
Habermas’ notion of  the public sphere, emphasise a form of  distortion-free political 
dialogue (Dryzek 2000). Deliberative democracy theorists assert the potential of  public 
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reasoning for political decision-making (Bohman 1996; Cohen 1997, 1998; Bregman 2000; 
Luskin and Fishkin 2002; Levine et al. 2005), which should not be a form of  aggregation 
or competition of  preferences and interests (Pellizzoni 2001; Hendriks 2004). James 
Bohman (1996), for example, defines deliberation as a ‘dialogical joint activity’ emphasising 
‘public reasoning’, which makes decisions more convincing and epistemic through the 
‘open and free public dialogue’ of  all citizens. 
 
2.1.2 Potential for Governance of  Technological Risks 
 
Both academics and practitioners in the governance of science and technology have 
explored diverse dimensions of technological risk assessment and management over the 
last three decades. There still remains, however, a vast range of dissension, owing to the 
‘contentious and uncertain’ characteristics of risk issues (Chilvers 2007). This challenge has 
shifted risk debate from a quantitative analytic style to that of a more participatory dialogue 
between diverse members of society.  A report published by the United States National 
Academy of Sciences in 1996 called for the combining of these approaches in an ‘analytic-
deliberative’ mode of appraisal (Stern and Fineberg 1996). This new approach towards the 
governance of technological risks, urged the  policy-making process to include the public 
in governance of technological risk with a strategy comprised both of assessment and 
dialogue. The goal was to develop mutual trust between the public and those who dealing 
in risk management, and to enhance risk management practices with direct public input 
(Renn 1998). In this light, many frameworks of governance of technological risks have 
encouraged public deliberative engagement (Renn and Wiedemann  1995; Wynne 2002).  
As a result, over the last two or three decades, various forms of practice of public 
deliberative engagement have been exercised in the governance of technological risk, such 
as citizens’ juries, deliberative polls, consensus conferences, public forums and so on 
(Wynne 2002; Jasanoff 2003; Renn 2004; Irwin 2006; Renn and Roco 2006; Chilvers 2007; 
Levidow 2007).  
 
2.1.2.1 Increasing Mutual Understanding in Conflicts over Risk Issues 
 
Those who maintain the qualities of public deliberation for governance of technological 
risks argue that participants involved in the decision-making process should may have 
observed how the decision evolved. In the course of discussion, participants are exposed to 
the possibility of being contested, and are therefore challenged to weigh their own, and 
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others’, reasons rationally in order to arrive at a collective decision (Bohman 1996). Even if 
they do not agree fully with the content of the decision, they may understand the reasons 
behind the decision, or at least be more tolerant towards the decision.  This would be 
helpful particularly in the technological risk related policy-making context, as risk issues are 
often controversial due to their uncertainty and stakeholders’ divergent interests. Renn et al. 
(1995) also points out that ‘the public’ is not a single homogeneous group; rather, it is a 
heterogeneous group of individuals who have different interests. In the same light, 
Gutmann and Thompson stress that the outcome of deliberation should be “a mutual 
respect and a modus vivendi” rather than the consensus of common interest of all (Dryzek 
2000, p. 17). This is the case, in particular, when incumbent knowledge for judgment is not 
sufficient to convince all parties to agree with a specific decision, and the knowledge and 
interests of different parties are opposed to one another. Considering these elements, it is 
believed by those dealing with technological risk issues that increasing mutual 
understanding through public deliberation could play an important role in reducing conflict. 
  
2.1.2.2 Robust Decisions Responding to Uncertainty of Risk Issues 
 
In addition to enhancing mutual understanding in conflict situations, the deliberative 
participation of diverse members of society has a substantive value in terms of responding 
to the uncertainty nature of risk issues. Plural values from various actors could strengthen 
the robustness in risk decisions, the consequences of which are often unpredictable 
(Bohman 1996; Dryzek 2000; Shulman et al. 2003). 
 
Many policy issues, in particular technological risk-embedded ones, cause substantial 
controversy over the results and the procedure of  decision-making, as the values behind 
decision-making are not uniform and depend on whose criteria and framework are 
employed (Wynne 2002; Jasanoff  2003). Due to the issue of  increased uncertainty of  
technological risk, scientific knowledge in such issue related policy-making loses its 
credibility with the public (Jasanoff  2003; Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2005). Even 
within the scientific community, there has been increasing dissent about how to assess the 
issue. Therefore, science does not appear to have the same credit on policy-making process 
for technological risks that it once enjoyed.  
 
In this situation, plural values from the wider sector of  society would help to create various 
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scenarios for different contexts. This preparation could help policy to be more resilient in 
the face of  what remain unpredictable consequences of  risk decisions. Therefore, not only 
in the sense of  legitimate procedure, but also in the sense of  resources (Steele 2001) for 
better decisions, plurality has a significant value in policy-making for technological risks 
(Wynne 2002; Jasanoff  2003; Levidow 2007; Stirling 2007).  
 
2.1.3 Tension between Inclusion and Deliberation in Institutionalising Deliberative 
Democracy 
 
Many practitioners and theorists of  the governance of  science and technology have made 
efforts to institutionalise the qualities of  deliberative democracy theory by exercising and 
evaluating various forms of  deliberation (Stirling 2005; Chilvers 2007). Their efforts to 
produce innovative designs of  deliberative practices have yet to overcome the challenge of  
the inherent tension between deliberation and inclusion. Due to the scale issue, it is 
inevitable to have to compromise between two qualities of  public deliberation, namely 
deliberativeness and inclusiveness.  Simply speaking, the problem is that it is very difficult 
for a large number of  people to have a high quality discussion. 
 
As the notion of  plurality is at the centre of  public deliberation, such approach aims to 
engage many people with their different values in public reasoning in an equal and free 
manner. In practice, however, the greater number of  people that are brought together, the 
more difficult it becomes to undertake equally accessible, clearly reasoned debate 
(Bloomfield et al. 2001; Fishkin and Laslett 2003; Parkinson 2006).  
  
2.1.4 Micro-Deliberative Democracy 
 
2.1.4.1 Focusing on Deliberativeness 
 
Having recognised this intrinsic challenge to the institutionalisation of  the qualities of  
deliberative democracy, established deliberative democracy theory prioritises 
deliberativeness over inclusiveness.  Hendriks (2004) categorises this approach as micro-
deliberative democracy with a comparison to an alternative approach, namely macro-
deliberative democracy. This explicit distinction between micro and macro approaches has 
emerged in the work of  three scholars (Keane 2000; Hendriks 2004; Parkinson 2006).  
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Having been based on the common elements across differently articulated concepts 13
 
, 
micro-deliberation could be characterised as a form of  collective decision making activity, 
of  which central foci are democratic conditions for communicative decisions making 
(Bohman 1996; Cohen 1997; Dryzek 2000). This more established, prevalent understanding 
of  deliberative democracy pays greater attention to ‘normative requirements and 
constraints on deliberation’ (Bohman 1996, p.16). Under this stance, public deliberation can 
be (arguably) depicted as a political journey in a particular part of  the public realm, 
searching for the common good through equal and free dialogue. This definition of  micro-
deliberation implies its underlying assumption that there is a common good and that 
participants have the willingness and competence to generate equal and independent 
reasoning to achieve such dialogue. 
These differently articulated definitions and their underlying assumptions suggest the 
democratic communicative activity is still one of  the most essential elements for 
determining deliberation (Fraser 1992; Bohman 1996; Elster 1998; Dryzek 2000). In this 
light, deliberation should be protected from any kind of  distortion or coercion, of  such 
kind as was created by ‘the exercise of  power, manipulation, indoctrination, propaganda, 
deception etc.’ (Dryzek 2000, p. 2). In brief, its condition can be met only when 
participants are: firstly, competent in deploying rational argumentation in public and 
secondly, willing to try cooperatively to identify the common good. Pellizzoni (2001) argues 
that although deliberative democracy theorists acknowledge that modern society is a 
pluralistic place in which political preferences conflict, they also believe that a ‘free and 
open dialogue’ (Bohman 1996) oriented towards the common good (Cohen 1997; Elster 
1998) can resolve the conflict (Steele 2001).  
 
                                                 
13  Many deliberative democracy theorists position themselves distinctively from others by 
emphasising and/or rejecting specific aspects of  the notion of  deliberative democracy. For example, 
Bohman (1996) differentiates himself  from the proponents of  ‘ideal procedure’, stressing the 
concept of  ‘public reasoning’- open and free exchanging of  public reasons. Dryzek argues his 
position is more tolerant to the forms of  deliberation encompassing ‘argument, rhetoric, humour, 
emotion, testimony or storytelling, and gossip’ than the restricted terms to deliberation, i.e. only a 
form of  public arguments of  other deliberative democrats.  The only condition, which he stresses 
for deliberation is ‘the requirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in non-
coercive fashion’. (2000, pp.1-2) 
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As micro-deliberative democracy theory focuses on the quality of  deliberative 
communication, it requires rigorous pre-requisites for participants, and a tightly structured 
procedure to be controlled for participants to deliver the desirable deliberative 
communication. As a result, the theoretically envisaged micro-deliberation can become far 
removed from real deliberative situations and this rigidly constrained form of  micro-
deliberation has to compromise with the principle of  inclusiveness (Young 1997; Hendriks 
2004). Accordingly, micro-deliberation appears, in fact, to be exclusive in practice.  
 
2.1.4.2 Criticism: Being Exclusive  
 
Conditions based on the unrealistic underlying assumptions of  micro-deliberative 
democracy theory call for caution and raise the question of  whether inclusiveness can be 
realised in practice. 
 
Difficulty in identifying the common reason for the common good through 
reasoning  
 
It would be true to say that there must be a final decision at the end of  a deliberation, even 
in the case of  an irresolvable disagreement amongst participants. However, there might not 
be a common good or common reason, particularly, when a deliberation practice has to 
deal with uncertain, ambiguous or incommensurable (Pellizzoni 2001) technological risk 
issues. ‘Plurality’ is situated at the core of  the notion of  deliberative democracy, as 
established in the previous section. The eclectic information and views of  different 
participants in deliberation may enhance the level of  robustness in decisions (Bohman 
1996; Dryzek 2000; Shulman et al. 2003). On the other hand, they may also increase the 
level of  disagreement amongst participants, but what if  the level of  difference is such that 
it is ‘intractable’?, asks Pellizzoni (2001). Micro-deliberative democracy theorists 
acknowledge the existence of  plural reasons in deliberation. However, they also believe in 
the function of  “the best argument” (ibid.) to promote the common good with the 
common reason. In other words, they assert that the rational reasoning of  many 
participants, with their diverse stakes and interests, would be able to identify a common 
reason. However, Pellizzoni argues that the aim of  deliberation should be an agreement on 
practice rather than a common reason: “not to define principles, concepts and broad goals 
but to devise concrete solutions for concrete and circumscribed problems (2001, p.79)”.  
In particular, the increasing uncertainty of  technological risk issues in science and 
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technology policy-making makes it harder to expect rational argument to find a common 
reason. There may be very limited space for rational argument for the common good and 
the common reason in a particular, technological risk related policy-making context.  
 
Difficulty of  politically free and equal reasoning 
 
Another contentious premise of  micro-deliberative democracy theory is its belief  in 
politically free and equal reasoning. In real practice it is difficult to preserve a deliberative 
process as rational reasoning, from any type of  distortion, manipulation or strategic 
persuasion (Pellizzoni 2001; Eriksen and Weigard 2003). Pellizzoni (2001) explains that 
there are two types of  power associated with communication: one is external power over 
communication (who speaks) and the other is internal power in communication (how they 
speak and what they say).  He analyses the relationship between power in communication 
and democracy with a comparison of  strategy, technocracy, constructivism and deliberation. 
Pellizzoni’s quadrant of  analysis over ‘power in communication and democracy’ (Figure 
2.1) is based on two axes of  internal and external power in communication. As his analysis 
shows, deliberation sits on the quadrant, which assumes only internal power in 
communication, i.e. reasoning. There, the assumption is a belief  in the capability and 
willingness of  participants to engage in argumentative reasoning.       
                                          
Figure 2.1 Power in Communication and Democracy  
 
 
(Source: Pellizzoni 2001, p. 63) 
 
It is difficult, however, to detach external power from internal power in communication. 
What a speaker says and how she/he says it cannot be separated from the speaker’s social, 
political and economic background, which functions as the external power over his/her 
communication. External power which inheres in that the speaker himself/herself, affects 
communication. In practice, securing communication completely immunised from external 
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power is impossible. In particular, as the technological risk related policy-making context is 
very much associated with participants’ different stakes, it would be dangerous, or at best 
naïve, to believe that communication is ever free from external power. The idea that 
communication could be free of  its political context could, in fact, be strategically abused 
in order to legitimise external power (Pellizzoni 2001). It has been established that the 
principles of  the deliberativeness–focused, micro-deliberative approach, therefore, are far 
removed from the real deliberative situation. The micro-deliberative approach becomes 
necessarily exclusive if  the process is to meet these conditions. It is for this reason that 
critiques of  micro-deliberative democracy raise the question of  exclusiveness.  
 
2.1.5 Macro-Deliberative Democracy 
 
2.1.5.1 Trying to Secure both Qualities of Deliberativeness and Inclusiveness by 
‘Division of Labour’ 
 
Some deliberative democracy theorists address institutionalisation in a different way. What 
is categorised as macro-deliberative democracy theory (Hendriks 2004) tries to overcome 
the tension between deliberation and inclusion by employing a ‘division of  labour’. Despite 
various ways in which the idea of  a division of  labour is conceived by different theorists, an 
important degree of  the division of  labour is commonly involved in those different forms 
of  macro approach. Macro-deliberative democracy theory applies the division of  labour 
across different actors, tasks and methods of  deliberation.  The division of  labour allows 
macro-deliberation to include more people in different roles, and thus it may secure the 
twin qualities of  deliberativeness and inclusiveness. In order to do so, the deliberation 
expands its boundary and lowers the bar for the conditions of  the deliberative process.  
For example, it is not necessary for all participants to have a simultaneous deliberative 
dialogue in one place; rather, participants play different roles with diverse deliberative 
methods for various issues at different stages of  the deliberation process. Therefore, this 
approach attempts to make it possible to engage a large number of  participants with 
different roles in a deliberation process. 
 
Hendriks (2004) distinguishes between theories of  micro- and macro-deliberative 
democracy according to scale and formality. She demonstrates that the theory of  micro-
deliberative democracy focuses on ideal conditions of  the deliberative procedure, while the 
theory of  macro-deliberative democracy pays less attention to strict communicative norms 
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but wider ‘open public discourse’(p. 37). On the other hand, Keane (2000) categorises the 
public sphere into three levels according to their heterogeneity and variable size, namely: micro-
public spheres, where multiple disputants interact at the sub-nation state level, such as the 
various local spaces in which citizens are involved; meso-public spheres, where millions of  
people interact at the nation state level, including neighbouring countries, which are 
mediated by news media, such as newspapers or broadcasting; and macro-public spheres, where 
hundreds of  millions of  people engage in disputes at a global or regional level.  
 
Parkinson (2006) elaborates on these scale issues as the attributes which distinguish the 
micro and macro approaches. One clear distinctive feature of  micro-deliberative democracy 
theory is that it is applicable only to a small scale of  deliberation, where deliberation occurs 
in a small site with many conditions of  public reasoning procedure in place. He argues that 
many scholars are concerned with this kind of  small site deliberation with different modes 
of  micro–deliberation, such as “citizens' juries’ (Stewart, Kendall and Coote 1994; Smith 
and Wales 2000), deliberative polls (Fishkin 1997), consensus conferences (Joss and Durant 
1995) and parliaments (Bessette 1994)” (ibid., p. 5). On the other hand, Parkinson’s 
alternative approach, macro-deliberation, takes place in contexts which cross space and 
time and where participants are engaged in deliberation with many different “threads, 
which change and interact over time” (ibid., p. 6). 
 
Therefore, macro-deliberative democracy theorists also believe in the existence of multiple 
forms of deliberation for public discussion. Different deliberations have different actors, 
issues and communication methods.  Acknowledging these multiple deliberations is an 
attempt to avoid the problem of exclusiveness for public discussion; that is to say, the idea 
that the tightly-structured single public sphere can be exclusive to the rest of the members 
of society. 
 
Parkinson (2006) argues that the legitimacy problem of micro-deliberative democracy 
encourages a move towards a macro-deliberative democracy approach. Macro-deliberative 
democracy theory has more flexible conditions for procedure and so it can embrace 
multiple deliberative moments in a wider arena of deliberation. Thus, it is not necessary for 
participants to engage in debate simultaneously. Instead, this wider picture of deliberation 
allows more people in multiple deliberations across multiple places and times. This 
approach assumes that these multiple deliberative moments are linked and that they can 
work together as one deliberation. 
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In the same light, Pellizzoni (2001) addresses the permeability between private and public 
spheres. He argues that those issues that people discuss in their private lives can be 
transferred to state level discussion. Maintaining this permeability between private and 
public spheres, he supports a Deweyan idea- “fostering an associative life as open as 
possible to what lies beyond the functional or spatial borders of each deliberative 
community” (Pellizzoni 2003, p. 349). In this sense, he also sees the public sphere as a 
larger form of public discussion, which consists of multiple deliberations. Here, the public 
sphere is understood to be a system consisting of “different, partially overlapping and 
potentially inclusive circles” (ibid., p. 348). 
  
Fraser (1990, 1992) posited a view of  plural public spheres by criticising Habermas’ earlier 
work of  the single public sphere’s ignorance of  women, the proletariat and popular culture. She 
argues that the public sphere should include private interests and issues rather than just 
public reasons. Benhabib (1996) also contends that the traditional view on public discourse 
still leaves women’s interests exclusively in the private sphere. 
 
Although Habermas’ (earlier) work of  ideal communication has provided the basis for 
established (micro approach) deliberative democracy theory (Bloomfield et al. 2001), he 
also later explored the idea of  multiple deliberations within the public sphere. Responding 
to criticisms of  his idea of  the single public sphere, Habermas’ later work (the two-track 
model in Between Facts and Norms, 1996) recognised two parts to the public sphere: the 
informal zone as a place where public opinion is constructed and the formal zone as a sphere 
where political decisions are made (Schneider 1997; Cohen 1999). 
 
In addition, due to communication technology, civil society nowadays has different modes 
and channels by which to discuss political issues. It is, therefore, a significantly different 
context to that of  the European bourgeois coffeehouses of  the 18th century, which 
provided the model for the idea of  the public sphere. Consequently, diverse methods and 
styles of  communication exist and thus should be considered for public deliberation. In 
brief, the loosened definition and the broadened boundary of  deliberation under the 
macro-deliberative democracy approach, allow more people, issues and forms of  
communication to be tabled. This approach holds the premise that these multiple 
deliberative moments are transferred and integrated into a whole deliberative system, as 
Mansbridge explains: 
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“The venues for deliberation fall along a spectrum from the representative assembly 
(Bessette 1994), to the public assembly producing a binding decision (Cohen 1989, 
Gutmann and Thompson), to the “public sphere” (Habermas, [1962] 1989), to the 
most informal venues of  everyday talk.” (Mansbridge in Macedo 1999, p. 227) 
 
As macro-deliberative democracy theorists maintain the possibility of  the integration of  
multiple micro-deliberations into a single macro-deliberation, they hold the potential of  a 
‘mix and match’ method of  the elements of  deliberation depending on the context. That is 
to say, the whole macro-deliberation process is composed by arranging different actors, 
tasks and methods. Here we see the concept of  the division of  labour, which is employed 
by macro-deliberative democracy theorists, in order to achieve the twin qualities of  
deliberative democracy, namely deliberativeness and inclusiveness. 
 
Of course, the idea of a division of labour has a longer historical lineage. Adam Smith 
(1776) saw that a division of labour would improve the productivity and effectiveness of 
labour. Particularly, when applied to a larger scale of business, Smith argued that much 
more division of work had been seen in great manufactures, obviously, more so than in trifling 
ones. Macro-deliberative democracy theorists have shed the same light on the division of 
labour in political practices as Smith did with reference to the general business of society. 
 
2.1.5.2 Divergent Ontologies over Division of Labour of Public Deliberation among 
Macro-Deliberative Democracy Theorists 
 
Although there is a shared acknowledgement of  the function of  the division of  labour in 
macro-deliberation, macro-deliberative democracy theorists see deliberation as a different 
kind of  ‘labour’. For example, some see it as a decision-making process, or a social learning 
exercise, or an institution. Therefore, they have different views as to how to divide 
deliberation: who should be involved in what task and in which way.  For example, 
Habermas’ distinction locates between two parts of  the public sphere (1996): the informal 
public sphere builds public opinion and the formal public sphere makes a political decision. On 
the other hand, Pellizzoni differentiates the private sphere and the public sphere and 
emphasises the permeability between them. He addresses the importance of  “the 
experience of  cooperation in the division of  labour” amongst participants in deliberation 
(2003, p. 348). Another approach towards the division of  labour of  public deliberation is 
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Saward’s (2003) reflexive procedural method. He argues that a democratic practice is 
constituted by different devices and principles: “we need systematically to stand back from 
existing models precisely in order to manipulate and combine their elements in 
democratically promising, tailored ways” (ibid., pp. 167-8). He lists parliament, public 
agencies, public hearings, debates, elections, majority rules, systems of  representation, 
deliberative polls, citizens’ juries and so forth as examples of  the device (ibid., p. 167). 
These devices are to be arranged in a single mode, or a combination mode, within and 
across the different stages of  decision-making. Parkinson (2006), on the other hand, 
elaborates the deliberation process as decision-making stages, namely – define, discuss, decide 
and implement 14
 
. Each of  these four stages has its own role in the deliberation process. 
Furthermore, each stage has multiple actors and channels; even within one stage there are 
different actors and channels working together. Also, depending on the stage, actors and 
channels have different roles to play; no matter how different their respective roles and 
power may be, all participants are involved in a single, whole deliberation.  
One of  the recent discussions (Conference Deliberative society at the University of  York in 
June 2009) among eminent scholars in this area also shows these diverse views over 
deliberation and the division of  labour. Well-known deliberative theorists there (e.g. 
Bohman, Christiano, Dryzek, Mansbridges, Parkinson, Warren etc.) discussed the question 
of  what the components of  the big picture of  deliberation and society are. Different 
conceptions of  the division of  labour were both implicit and explicit in this discussion. For 
example, Thomas Christiano (University of  Arizona) proposed an explicit division of  
labour between experts and citizens on the basis of  their different knowledge. Others, 
however, implied that the division of  labour is, in fact, applicable to different institutions. 
In addition, among the institutional views presented, different scholars understood 
‘institution’ differently. For instance, some discussed it as a micro-deliberative practice, such 
as the citizens’ jury or a deliberative poll whilst others took the institution to mean the 
agents of  society, like the legislation system, universities, the media and so on. John 
Parkinson, of  the University of  York, proposed an institutional view that ‘macro-
deliberation’ is an institution associated with a specific problem, which is then developed to 
solve the problem, after which it can then disappear. 
 
No matter how conceived, macro-deliberative democracy theory has common elements 
                                                 
14 Parkinson adapted this category from Catt, H. (1999) Democracy in Practice, London: Routl
edge. 
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that allow it to be distinguished from micro-deliberative democracy theory: macro-
deliberation deals with issues of  extensive scope and scale (for example, at an international, 
national or regional level). It is constituted by smaller, nested deliberative activities and it is 
involved in the explicit division of  labour across actors, tasks and methods, believing in the 
permeability amongst multiple deliberations. 
  
2.1.5.3 Tension between Inclusion and Division: the ‘Paradox of  Plurality’ in the 
Division of  Labour 
 
Adopting a macro level approach to deliberative democracy theory as the alternative 
approach to micro-deliberative democracy theory however, involves facing a different 
challenge for its institutionalisation. This is the tension between division and inclusion since, 
in order to divide participants into different roles in deliberation, it is necessary for certain 
participants to be excluded from certain roles and issues. Thus, the division of  labour raises 
the question of  exclusiveness again in this alternative approach, which generates, what this 
thesis calls, a ‘paradox of  plurality’.   
 
Plurality, as elaborated upon in the previous section, is the core concept of  deliberative 
democracy theory. Plurality in deliberative democracy specifically represents two sides of  
the same coin as ‘challenge’ and ‘essence’.  Regarding the implementation issues of  
deliberation, plurality is a challenge, as it is practically hard for many people with plural 
values (and interests) to explore them in depth. On the other hand, with regard to the 
essential qualities of  deliberation - inclusiveness and deliberativeness, plurality is an 
essential element to be achieved.  However, due to the inherent tension between 
deliberation and inclusion, micro-deliberative democracy theory puts more emphasis on 
deliberativeness than inclusiveness, prioritising plurality in depth of  values. On the other 
hand, macro-deliberative democracy theory tries to enhance plurality actively in order to 
overcome the dilemma between deliberation and inclusion. It expands the boundary of  
deliberation with the aid of  the division of  labour, so as to secure both qualities of  
deliberativeness and inclusiveness. Division of  labour in macro-deliberative democracy 
theory is a kind of  means by which to enable the deliberation to include more people and 
simultaneously to remain in quality discussion for the depth of  values. 
 
However, the division of  labour in macro-deliberative theory compounds a different 
exclusion to micro-deliberative democracy theory. Micro-deliberative democracy theory 
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focuses on the depth of  values of  limited participants over certain issues through quality 
discussion. Its condition, therefore, excludes the majority of  people from providing input 
into the issues and thus restricts its scope and scale. On the other hand, the division of  
labour in macro-deliberative democracy theory allows more participants and more issues 
into the deliberation. Its condition, however, limits certain people’s values only to certain 
issues again, although the number of  participants and issues covered in the whole 
deliberation may be greater. Therefore, it appears that in order to afford greater attention 
to a plurality of  people and issues, it is paradoxically necessary for each value to be 
articulated in a less inclusive (pluralistic) way. This poses a question of  representativeness, 
as it raises the question of  who should deliberate over which issue. In this sense, Gutmann 
and Thompson disagree with the idea of  division of  labour, arguing that “deliberative 
labour should not be divided so that representatives give reasons while citizens merely 
receive them.” (in Parkinson 2006, p. 166).  
 
It can be seen, again, that this macro-deliberative democracy approach becomes a subject 
that needs to be re-examined. Once plurality is raised as a concern, the question of  
legitimacy in the micro-deliberative democracy approach becomes apparent; plurality can 
cause micro-deliberation to compromise inclusiveness. However, in the alternative 
approach, (i.e. macro-deliberative democracy theory), plurality becomes a solution by which 
to resolve the tension between inclusion and deliberation by expanding the boundary of  
deliberation and believing in the function of  the division of  labour. This, however, 
compounds a different tension between division and inclusion and thus also raises the 
same question of  exclusion. Therefore, a critical discussion of  deliberative democracy 
theory raises the question: 
 
Whether and how divisions of  labour would be useful to maximise the two qualities of  
inclusiveness and deliberativeness in macro risk deliberation exercises? 
 
In addition to these discussions on deliberative democracy, there is another theoretical 
strand, which constitutes the analytical framework of  this thesis, namely reflexive 
governance, which will be discussed in the next section of  this chapter.  
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2.2 Reflexive Governance  
 
Giddens’ (1990) and Beck’s (1992) sociological works make seminal contributions to the 
literature on reflexive governance, highlighting and explaining the importance of  reflexivity 
in modern society (Stirling 2006). There have also been efforts by scholars, such as Wynne 
(2002), Grin (2006), Stirling (2006), Voss and Kemp (2006), and Stirling and Smith (2007), 
to encourage the attributes of  reflexivity in particular areas of  environment governance 
and sustainable development. These scholars, in particular have an interest in the 
relationship between science and technology and society. Their arguments regarding 
reflexive governance either constitute a claim to the intrinsic nature of  reflexivity and its 
role in the governance of  ST, or a normative assertion of  the desirability of  a more 
reflexive direction of  ST governance. At the same time, however, scholars with 
instrumentalist perspectives have ignored the existence or tried to reduce the degree of  
reflexivity. Wynne (2002) observes this tendency in studies of  reflexivity: 
 
“The substantial work in SSK-inspired sociology and politics of  technology (e.g. 
Bijker et al., 1987; Feenberg, 1999; Latour, 1992; MacKenzie, 1989; MacKenzie and 
Wajcman, 1999; Rip et al., 1995; Winner, 1986) has emphasized the importance of  
understanding the contingency of  social and technical constitutions of  technologies, 
as a matter of  (an enlarged agenda for) democratic technology policy and design, on 
the basis of  more upstream, socially-inclusive, more continuing and more open-
ended processes of  human negotiation. Explicitly or implicitly, innovation, design 
and their driving interests would be matters for democratic deliberation, not merely 
impacts. However, although they are increasingly the exclusive focus of  attention, 
they remain a limited back-end agenda.” (Wynne 2002, p. 464)  
 
This part of  my thesis explores the intrinsic nature of  reflexivity with regard to ST 
governance issues. To do so, I elaborate on the process and outcome dimensions of  reflexivity 
by exploring its attributes in relation to the elements of  ST governance. 
 
2.2.1 Reflexive Modernisation and Governance 
 
The origin of  the discussion on reflexive governance is rooted in the notion of  ‘reflexive 
modernisation’ (Beck et al. 1994). Beck (1993, 1994 in Voss et al., 2006) asserts that one of  
the most significant features of  the modernisation phenomenon is self-confrontation. 
Rationality-oriented modernity – first modernity, as Beck (2003) terms it – faces the problems 
(side effects and risks) that modernisation creates as it progresses, such as technological 
risks and illegitimate decision-making processes. This is so-called self-confrontation. Beck 
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(2006) employs this distinctive feature of  modernisation as an analogical term for reflexive 
modernisation. However, reflexive modernity – second modernity, as coined by Beck (2003) – 
also occurs in the process of  solving these problems. In other words, the “reorientation of  
modernisation” towards second modernity occurs through a kind of  self  re-structuring 
process as reflexive modernisation transforms its institutions in order to rectify the 
problems it has created (Grin 2006, p. 60). 
 
“As the twentieth century gives way to the twenty-first century, this dynamic, which is 
turning back reflexively – in the sense of a kind of ‘self-confrontation’ – upon itself, is 
now dissolving the familiar formulae of simple modernity [first modernity].” (Beck 
2006, p. 32) 
 
Discussion around the notion of  governance reflects a similar understanding of  modern 
society to that of  the notion of  reflexive modernisation. Grin (2006, p. 57) agrees with 
Pierre and Peters’ (2000, p. 1) articulation of  the central account of  governance as 
“shaping the market and society [and science] 15
 
 into a desired form.” In this light, he 
explains one of  the reasons that reflexive modernisation matters for governance as follows: 
“Both, as concepts, explicitly consider the institutions of  state, market, science and society 
and their relations (and the ways in which they are conceived) not as givens, but as objects 
of  more or less considerable scrutiny and change” (Grin 2006, p. 57). These  two concepts 
of  reflexive modernisation and governance each represent efforts to grasp the complex, 
distributed, emergent characteristics of  modern society. In particular, they both pay 
attention to the processes constituting the endogenous transformative potential of  society. 
The rise of  the notion of  governance from the late 20th century embodies a crucially 
contrasting meaning to the notion of  government (Voss 2007). The term ‘government’ 
encourages a view under which the governing of  resources and rules in a social system is 
the business of  a discrete social actor functioning as a ‘subject’ of  ‘decision-making’. Under 
this view, it is ‘the government’ that sets and administrates the resources and rules, which 
shape a system. In this perspective, therefore, the government is the subject and the system 
is the object, which needs to be managed by government. This is the conventional 
approach in the context of  ST policy-making – seeing government as the subject and ST as 
the object to be managed by the government.  
 
                                                 
15 Grin (2006) adds science to Pierre and Peters’ (2000) articulation. 
46 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the notion of  governance pays attention to the mode by which a 
system is constituted. Dynamic16
 
 relations of  constituents of  the system are the subjects 
that set and administrate its resources and rules. By this logic, the system is understood not 
merely as the object to be dealt with by government, but is itself  also a subject that, 
through governance, shapes itself. This is similar to the understanding of  ST development 
in the discussion of  the socio-technical system. The socio-technical systemic approach 
regards the process of  the development of  ST in terms of  interaction between ST and 
other societal agents. In this perspective, the socio-technical system is the subject that 
manages ST as well as the object that is simultaneously managed by social agents.  
Yet, the focus of  the differentiation of  subject and object does not rely on drawing our 
attention to the dichotomy between them; rather, the point is the opposite in showing the 
close relationship between subject and object in this context. In other words, such a 
percept emphasises the unique nature of  ‘duality’ in governance. Giddens (1984) articulates 
this as paradoxically the ‘absence of  the subject’ in his notion of  structuration: 
 
"Structure, as recursively organized sets of  rules and resources, is out of  time and 
space, save in its instantiations and co-ordination as memory traces, and is marked by 
an 'absence of  the subject'. The social systems in which structure is recursively 
implicated, on the contrary, comprise the situated activities of  human agents, 
reproduced across time and space. Analysing the structuration of  social systems 
means studying the modes in which such systems, grounded in the knowledgeable 
activities of  situated actors who draw upon rules and resources in the diversity of  
action contexts, are produced and reproduced in interaction. Crucial to the idea of  
structuration is the theorem of  the duality of  structure, which is logically implied in 
the arguments above. The constitution of  agents and structures are not two 
interdependently given sets of  phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. 
According to the notion of  the duality of  structure, the structural properties of  
social systems are both medium and outcome of  the practices they recursively 
organize."  
(Giddens, 1986/1984:25 in Voss 2007, p. 27) 
 
Giddens (1984) accounts for the duality in the structuration of  the social system as a 
playing of  the role of  the subject and, simultaneously, the role of  the object. That is to say, 
                                                 
16In this thesis, I employ the term ‘dynamic’ to describe a key aspect of reflexivity – both theoretical 
and empirical. The meaning here is that given by the Oxford English Dictionary: “(of a process or 
system) characterized by constant change, activity, or progress: a dynamic economy” 
 (http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/dynamic?q=dynamic). Accordingly, placing 
this particular adjective in front of terms such as ‘relations’ or ‘interaction’ in this thesis highlights 
the way of  interactions and nature of relationships among elements (and participants) as 
‘changing, active, influential, powerful, non-static, etc.’  
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the double sides of  the dual nature of  the social system represent, on the one hand, the 
subject, which constitutes the structure, and, on the other, the object, which is the being 
that is constituted. In Giddens’ (ibid.) terminology, the structuration of  the social system 
implies its dualistic relationship to practices as both medium and outcome. Practices are 
shaped according to structure, and structure is the result of practices (Sewell 1992). Sewell 
(ibid.) notes that according to this view, human agency and structure are “far from being 
opposed, in fact presuppose each other” (p. 4).  
 
2.2.2 Duality of  Process and Outcome in Reflexive Governance 
  
I find Giddens’ (1984) duality of  medium and outcome useful to the understanding of  the 
nature of  the reflexivity of  governance. Accordingly, this duality is also employed as a 
fundamental pillar of  the analytical framework of  the present thesis, which aims to 
facilitate an understanding of  the implications of  reflexivity in ST governance. However, I 
use a different term for this duality, namely, ‘process and outcome’, rather than Giddens’ 
(ibid.) ‘medium and outcome’. I make this distinction because the term ‘medium’ implies 
that the property of  structuration may be restricted to the means the social system employs 
to deliver output. This directs our attention to the external, enforcing power and its output 
of  social systems. Therefore, rather than ‘medium’, I suggest the term ‘process’ to shift our 
attention to the bigger picture embracing the way in which output is constructed with a 
wider aspect; although both ‘medium’ and ‘process’ present the ‘enabling’ (Swell 1992) 
feature of  structuration. Process also clearly implies a counterpart to the ‘outcome’ of  
duality. Therefore, the duality of  process and outcome stresses the endogenous property of  
structuration, and the dual relationship as subject and object of  reflexivity. Analysis, based 
on such a framework of  duality of  process and outcome pays attention both to the way in 
which the constituents of  the ST system interact, and to the outcome of  such interaction. 
 
Going back to the concept of  governance, an important contrast between ‘governance’ and 
‘government’ is that the former stresses the dynamic relations between the constituents – 
including non-state actors – of  the system. According to this perspective, in the context of  
ST governance, any understanding of  the development of  ST relies on a better grasp of  
the ways in which societal agents (including the incumbent ST) interact with each other. 
This represents the dimension of  process. Rhodes (1997 in Voss 2007) articulates 
governance as “a change in the meaning of  government, referring to a new process of  
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governing” (p. 21).  
 
With similar insight, Grin (2006) argues that there has been increasing interest in 
governance, which regards issues raised as about “the transformation of  the ways in which 
government and societal and market actors are dealing with each other” (p. 60). Grin (ibid.) 
goes on to give examples of  ‘network management’ (Kickert et al. 1997), ‘public 
participation’ (Newman 2001), and ‘promoting self-organisation’ (Rhodes 1997) as 
elaboration of  such a concept of  governance (Grin 2006, p. 60). 
 
Paradoxically, according to this explanation, the concept of  governance also implies the 
outcome of  governing. Governance is the resultant pattern, which is shaped by the 
interactions of  the system’s constituents; it is the dimension of  outcome. Certain dynamic 
and complex relations between society’s agents themselves (including the incumbent ST) 
are the constituents, which shape the ST system. Development of  new ST does not take 
place solely in the laboratory, but through the dynamic interactions of  society’s agents, such 
as in their testing, adaptation and application of  new ST. The above-mentioned examples 
of  network management, public participation, and promoting self-organisation thus imply 
not only the process of  governing but also a certain outcome of  governing. 
  
Therefore, accounts of  governance embrace aspects of  both the process (the ways in which 
the system’s constituents interact) and of  the outcome (the resultant pattern of  interactions 
of  the system’s constituents) of  governing. This feature of  duality centres on the concept 
of  governance. Voss (2007) also finds this duality in Ortmann et al.’s (2000) work on 
organisation:  
 
 “When we say ‘organisation’ we operate with a fundamental ambiguity. We could refer 
to the process of  organising or to its outcome, the ‘being organised’ of  social 
interaction and hence a system or organised agency” (in my [Voss] own translation p. 
26) 
 
Here, Ortmann et al.’s (2000) ‘ambiguity’ between the process and outcome with regard to 
the understanding of  organisation corresponds with Giddens’ (1990) duality of  structuration. 
 
As established thus far, this property of  duality in reflexivity is already embedded in the 
concept of  governance. Researchers must have built the notion of  reflexive governance on 
this nature of  reflexivity in governance and then tried to highlight the reflexive feature 
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more explicitly with respect to governance issues.  Some strands of  the debate on reflexive 
governance – especially in the area of  sustainable development – present their normative 
direction more explicitly. They do not just discuss it as a phenomenon but also address the 
need for a more reflexive approach as an effective way to respond to the new environment 
of  ST development. In so doing, the duality of  process and outcome in particular is often 
presented in a normative way with the claim that the two dimensions should be combined 
in an approach to governance issues.  
 
Voss’ work Designs on Governance (2007) is based on Giddens’ notion of  duality of  medium 
and outcome. Voss (2007) expands it to explain the relationship between ‘design’ and 
‘dynamics’ in governance, arguing that policy instruments have been understood either as 
the design or the outcome of  governing in studies of  policy. He contends that the ‘design 
perspective’ in policy studies is based on the concept of  the ‘central control of  
government’, which is a conventional, instrumentalist approach to policy; while the 
‘dynamics perspective’ pays attention to ‘emerging and self-organising social order’, which 
is a systemic approach to policy (Voss 2007). Voss (ibid.) goes on to claim that the 
perspectives of  design and dynamics both have shortcomings in their grasp of  policy as 
each ignores the other concept. Thus, as neither perspective alone can explain governance 
issues, he suggests that both should be taken into consideration and integrated into a single 
overarching understanding of  policy (ibid.).  
 
Smith and Stirling’s (2007) work on the governance of  the socio-technical system also 
seems to possess a similar insight to the duality of  medium and outcome as Giddens’ 
(1984) notion of  structuration. Smith and Stirling (2007) analyse the duality feature of  the 
socio-technical system, finding that there are two distinct approaches to its understanding. 
The first is the managerial approach whereby the socio-technical system may be objectified, 
and through which it is regarded as an issue of  ‘governance on the outside’; and the second 
is the reflexive approach whereby the co-constitution of  the socio-technical system may be 
understood, and through which it is regarded as an issue of  ‘governance on the inside’ 
(ibid.). Smith and Stirling (ibid.) address the need to move from two separate approaches to 
a combined one, arguing that a unification of  these contrasting perspectives will improve 
the development of  policy.  
 
These arguments in favour of  the need for an integrated approach to the two dimensions – 
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process and outcome – of  governance reflect its singular property, namely, its duality. 
Accordingly, normative discussions around the notion of  ‘reflexive governance’ are 
presumably attempts to draw our greater attention away from the conventional, managerial 
approach towards the role of  reflexivity in order to promote a better understanding of  
governance issues.  
 
2.2.3 Dimensions of  Process and Outcome of  Reflexivity 
 
The conclusion of  the previous section notwithstanding, the discussion in this section pays 
separate attention to the two dimensions – yet single property – of  reflexivity. This is a 
working operation that seeks to understand the concept of  reflexivity and its implications 
in ST governance.  
 
Primary understanding of  the property of  reflexivity may be aided by observing the 
recursive process of  a subject’s reflection (Spirals in the Figure 2.2.). Reflexivity arises 
during the continuing process of  the subject’s reflection on (response to) the environment. 
Figure 2.2 depicts this process. When a subject (S) responds to the environment (E), it 
reflects (L) on other subjects (objects from its perspective) and its condition, and projects a 
response/representation (R -such as meaning or relationship) onto the environment. 
Consequently, subjects re-construct their own environment, which conditions their next 
representation. This process suggests a contingency in terms of  the way in which subjects’ 
representations return to influence the subjects themselves by re-structuring their own 
environment. Reflexivity is the property raised through this recursive process of  reflection, 
which is reflective, endogenous, self-contingent, and self-influential.  Plural processes are 
set in motion – the middle one (S1) alone being highlighted to show the details of  the 
process (Figure 2.2).  
 
Stirling’s (2006) ‘recursive loop’ emphasises this quality of  contingency in reflexivity, which 
represents the iterative and interactive relational process between a subject’s ‘representation’ 
and its ‘intervention’: 
 
“We face a recursive loop, in which it is recognized that representations are 
contingent on a multiplicity of  subjective perspectives, and that these subjective 
perspectives are themselves reconstituted by processes of  representation. As a 
result, any associated interventions are also simultaneously contingent on and help 
condition a series of  divergent but equally valid potential subjective 
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representations.” (Stirling 2006, p. 230) 
 
Stirling’s (2006) understanding of  reflexivity relies on the notion that “attention 
simultaneously encompasses and helps constitute both subject and object” (p. 228); that is 
to say, the subject’s representation of  the object returns to the former by reconditioning it.  
 
At this point, one of  the salient features of  understanding reflexivity should be addressed: 
no self-evident boundaries (identities) exist between different subjects. This represents an 
ontology issue, which implies there are differently drawn boundaries for each subject and 
loop. Referring to the illustration below (Figure 2.2), there are plural subjects in the 
environment, and plural moments when a new turn of  the loop develops; and there are 
inner layers within each subject and thus within each loop.  
 
Thus, the governance system consists of  differently layered governing domains, and 
changes (through generating responses) take place across different moments and domains.  
 
Through this account of  reflexivity, the ST governance system may be explained as the 
whole environment in which such multiple subjects exist and inter-reflect(S1, S2, S3, etc.), 
and, as in the example of  S1, one that comprises multiple subjects that also contain smaller 
subjects embedded inside them. Therefore, the development of  the ST system can be 
understood in terms of  systemic change through representation of  its own operation, that 
is, a recursive process whereby the system generates and re-configures its resources and 
rules over time.   
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Figure 2.2  Reflexivity in the Recursive Reflections of  Subjects 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2.3.1 Dimension of  Process: Recursive Re-configuration of  Resources and Rules 
of  the ST system over Time 
 
Applying the above concept of  reflexivity to understand ST governance, agents of  the ST 
system are the embedded subjects/objects, such as the market, science, policy discourse, 
various organisational institutions, and so on. Their interactions produce representations, 
such as new scientific knowledge, discourse, a regulatory framework, etc. These newly 
produced representations therefore become new constituents of  the ST system and re-
shape its incumbent structure. This recursive re-constitution process of  the system 
continuously re-shapes its own structure; therefore, the system evolves through a process 
of  self-re-configuration. Wynne (2007) terms this the “reflexive process of  subject–object 
co-construction,” which is involved in the ‘essential contingency.’ (p. 462). Such a 
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contingency feature of  the reflexive process in the ST system concerns the continual 
generation and re-configuration of  resources and rules of  the system, which eventually 
leads to evolutionary change of  the system. 
 
Particular attention to the dimension of  the process of  governance implies that we 
approach governance by observing the ways in which a pattern is being shaped. As the 
reflexive process is recursively perpetuated, any given outcome does not last forever. Rather, 
a certain constituted shape is temporarily formed at a certain moment of  the process, at 
which it is immediately ready to change. The examples of  a new policy network, bottom-up 
environment movements, an independent body for providing policy advice, and public 
engagement in ST policy-making are the results of  agents’ inter-reflections, which then 
construct a new context for developing new ST; therefore, they re-condition the ways in 
which agents govern the development of  ST. This recursive process thus keeps re-shaping 
the system by replacing the old structure with a new one. Accordingly, a newly constituted 
pattern is stable for some time and is then re-arranged with a newly generated structure. 
Grin (2006) explains the ‘transformation of  institutions’ with regard to this dimension of  
process “as the transformation of  the ways in which government and societal and market 
actors are dealing with each other” (p. 60). 
 
Voss’ (2007) concept of  ‘designs on governance’ elucidates the interaction between ‘design’ 
(intended implementation) and ‘dynamics’ (unintended development) in governance, 
holding that both design and dynamics are elements of  structuration. According to this 
hypothesis, there are three different grades of  structuration: an emerging grade, an 
establishing grade, and a changing grade, which are differentiated depending on the degree 
of  influence of  each element (of  design and dynamics) on the other (ibid.). An expansion 
of  Voss’ (ibid.) hypothesis corresponds with the evolutionary reflexive process of  the 
system. Such a differentiation of  grades highlights the notion that there are different 
moments that together constitute a spectrum of  change to the system.  
 
Kemp and Loorbach (2006) also discuss this dimension in a similar way to Voss (2007), 
adopting the concept of  ‘transition management’, and arguing that transition takes place in 
a “variation-selection-reproduction process at the societal level.” Kemp and Loorbach 
(2006) go on to stress the complexity of  the process of  social change in terms of  
“outcomes of  interaction between the individual actions and strategies of  a large number 
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of  actors” in multiple levels of  governance: 
 
“Our society is always changing. Over the past decades, however, driven by 
transnational trends such as internationalization, informalization and individualization 
(Schnabel, 2000), the process of  social change has become increasingly complex. 
Choices at a societal level are the outcomes of  interaction between the individual 
actions and strategies of  a large number of  actors that have different perspectives and 
goals. Increasingly, policy-makers are for example forced to take into account the issues 
of  societal actors and social partners in the process of  policy-making (Mayntz, 1994: 
Kooiman, 1993). This happens at different levels in parallel, generating complex multi-
level governance structure (Scharpf, 1994: Kohler-Koch, 1999).” (Kemp and Loorbach 
2006, p. 103) 
 
One example that demonstrates the perpetual change in policy practices is the 
technological risk governance framework. Many such frameworks (e.g. US-NRC 1996; 
IRGC 2006; WHO/FAO 2006; Safe Foods 2006; UK Cabinet Office report 2002) show 
iteration as one of their most important features, emphasising the significance of the 
flexibility to include feedback in the process. The aforementioned risk governance 
frameworks all constitute an iterative cyclical process. When new information or 
knowledge is recognised, it forms an input into the process, after which it re-examines 
issues in the light of this newly added input. Such a process is encouraged and designed to 
maintain a cyclical form, but the cycle is in fact a series of inter-linked loops, which reflects 
a spectrum of different moments of change in the whole process. The following quotation 
from Smith and Stirling (2007) also explains the perpetuation of change in reflexive 
governance over time: 
 
“However imperfect or provisional they may be, commitments will (of  course) be 
formed. Whether consensual, majoritarian, elitist, or to meet sectional interests, 
pragmatic ‘decisions’ must be made (or at least be seen to be made). This analysis 
reminds reflexive governance theorists why any (managerial) ‘implementation’ will 
always be provisional and, indeed, why ‘decisions’ have to be put into a broader 
historical context.” (Smith and Stirling 2007, p. 369) 
 
In short, recursive, reflexive interactions between the constituents of  the ST system 
continuously produce the resources and rules of  the system; therefore, the system evolves 
through the perpetual re-configuration of  its structure while it responds to its own 
representations. 
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2.2.3.2 Dimension of  Outcome: Continuously Generated Resources and Rules of  
the ST System  
 
Discussion on the outcome of  governance implies that we consider a certain moment of  
the governing process. Agents of  the ST system (such as organisational institutions, science, 
the market, discourse, etc.) interact and produce representations of  the system, such as 
understandings, knowledges, stakes, relationships, and power structures within the system. 
Representations produced in this way change the condition of  the agents such that they 
become new constitutional elements of  the ST system. Subsequently, the agents are obliged 
to respond to the newly constructed system. In this way, their recursive reflexive process 
perpetually generates new sets of  representations. Such are the resources and rules of  the 
ST system.  
 
Voss and Kemp (2006, pp. 6–7) cite ‘constructive technology assessment’, ‘deliberative 
policy-making’, ‘trans-disciplinary research’, ‘foresight exercises’, ‘cooperative policy-
making’, ‘transition management’ and ‘adaptive management’ as examples of  new reflexive 
approaches. Thus, by such means, the agents of  the ST system generate, for example, 
conflict, uncertainty, and ambivalence on the one hand, and explore different perspectives 
on and alternatives to these problems on the other.  
 
One important element in the understanding of  the outcome of  reflexivity is the ontology 
issue. As discussed in the introduction to this section, ontology is called into play with the 
drawing of  a different boundary for each subject/object. Marsh and Furlong (2002) define 
ontology as a theory of  ‘being’; that is, it relates to the different ways in which an object 
can be seen to exist. Marsh and Furlong (ibid.) go on to explain how the ontological view 
of  the researcher shows her/his “view about the nature of  the world” (p. 18). Accordingly, 
as people have different ontological views, the boundaries of  subjects/objects might not be 
viewed as the same for all: some boundaries are so explicit that they can be readily agreed 
upon, but others may be contentious. Thus, the boundaries of  a social subject are not self-
evident but are constituted contrastingly under different ontologies.  
 
Therefore, acknowledging divergent ontological views allows us to conceptualise the co-
existence of  differing agent boundaries in the ST system. These multiple boundaries are 
not always physically mutually exclusive but may be regarded as distinct, each capable of  
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playing its particular role in and effecting its respective influence on the system. Thus, there 
are a greater number of  agents that actually play substantive roles in and exert influence on 
the system (as determined by virtual boundaries drawn between agents under different 
ontologies as well as physically distinctive agents) than the number of  those that physically 
distinctively exist.  
 
In addition to these multiple individual agents, there are multiple layers of  agents within 
each one – whether boundaries are explicit, implicit or partly overlapping. Therefore, in 
addition to individual agents’ representations, plural groups and levels of  agents also 
introduce their collective representations into the system. Thus, the ST system consists of  
different, layered governing domains. For example, the multi-level model in studies of  the 
ST innovation system acknowledges different levels of  the socio-technical system, namely, 
“macro–landscape, meso-regimes and micro-niches” (Kemp and Loorbach 2006, p. 108). 
Each level consists of  different domains and agents interact with one another according to 
their different identities in each domain. Therefore, under this multi-level model, ST 
innovation takes place through agents’ (individual and collective) interactions within and 
across multiple levels of  the ST system (Kemp and Loorbach 2006).   
 
Subjects’ multiple identities (either individual or collective) and their multiple 
representations (e.g. relationships and meanings) are the resources and rules that shape the 
structure of  the ST system. Multiple subjects bring their multiple representations into the 
system continuously through the reflexive process. The example of  increasing interests and 
exercises in the use of  networks in ST governance reflects recognition of  these multiple 
agents for a better understanding of  ST governance. Distributed, diverse, plural agents 
across multiple levels and groups within the system create diverse meanings and complex 
relationships through their interactions.  
 
Observation of  such reflexivity in the ST system has improved our understanding of  the 
ST system from a linear approach to a complex net-shaped one. Smith and Stirling (2007) 
corroborate this notion thus: 
 
“Since successful socio-technical development emerges through complex networks 
of  actors, artefacts and institutions, so governance will need to engage across many 
of  the points and processes within those networks (Smith et al., 2005). Imposing 
normative goals of  sustainability upon existing systems implies connecting and 
synchronizing changes among a formidable array of  processes across many different 
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points in the system. Governance must consequently fulfil distinct diagnostic, 
prognostic, prescriptive and co-ordination functions.” (Smith and Stirling 2007, p. 
353) 
 
The notions of  multi-level governance, network management, and the deliberative 
participation of  various social actors recognise such co-existence of  multiple agents and 
their multiple representations within the system. Accordingly, the multiple identities of  
agents and their multiple representations form the increased constituents of  the ST system. 
Through their reflexive interactions, these elements subsequently multiply their 
relationships and meanings within the system. In this way, reflexive governance enables the 
ST system to explore multivalent perspectives in society (Wynne 2002; Jasanoff  2003; 
Stirling 2006; Voss and Kemp 2006; Smith and Stirling 2007). 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 
As Lynch (2000) points out, although the literature discusses what reflexivity does to a 
certain extent, it is never clearly defined what it is. Rather, commentators discuss reflexivity 
from theoretical or methodological standpoints contrasting it with being ‘unreflexive’, as a 
“methodological virtue and source of  superior insights, perspicacity or awareness” (p 26). 
This may be so because it is a fundamental property that can only reveal its meaning and 
possible role through the action of  ‘reflection’. Thus, understanding reflexivity depends on 
an appreciation of  the ways in which reflections take place as well as their outcomes. This 
thesis suggests that such an essential human action is the starting point of  understanding 
the elusive concept of  reflexivity; at its simplest, reflexivity is the property that arises while 
a subject continuously reflects when interacting with ‘objects’ (other subjects).  
 
However, when considering the implications of  reflexivity, it is important to differentiate it 
from just ‘being reflective’. Reflexivity implies continued reflection and thus the 
contingency aspect such that the result of  reflection re-conditions its subsequent 
reflections. This element of  contingency determines the nature of  reflexivity (Lynch 2000; 
Wynne 2002; Stirling 2006), in addition to the state of  being reflective. This percept 
accords with the notion of  ‘self ’ alluded to by many commentators on reflexivity; for 
example, in terms of ‘self-awareness’ (Giddens 1993), ‘self-confrontation’ (Beck 1994), and 
‘self-reflection’ (Bohman 1996). Such a self-contingent feature indicates the significance of  
the dual relationship between process and outcome discussed previously.  
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The application of  this notion of  reflexivity is extended from the human interactive level 
to the systemic level. With the ontological boundaries of  subject addressed in previous 
section, reflexivity also operates at the even higher level of  the ST governing system. 
Reflexivity may operate at different levels (boundaries) of  subject, for example, in an 
individual person’s reflection; inter-personal reflection; inter-reflection between groups of  
people; and inter-reflection between organisations, institutions or systems. Accordingly, 
given the multi-layered boundaries of  subject, the present thesis addresses a wide range of  
reflexivity instances, that is, from the points of  view of  the individual, various groups of  
actors, the technology regulatory system construction process, and, ultimately, the greater 
picture of  the overall UK ST governing system. Here, the boundary of  the subject begins 
at the personal level and expands to the collective level, namely, the agent that consists of  
layered interior groups of  individuals. In terms of  a multi-layered ST governance system 
and its constituent agents (individuals, groups and institutions), reflexivity is manifested as 
a property that appears from and determines the inter-reflection and response of  such 
agents at different levels of  the system. 
 
In this way, reflexivity perhaps provides a useful methodological insight (Lynch 2000) 
through which to understand elements of complexity, connectivity, continuity and 
contingency; as well as, paradoxically, fragmentation, diversity and plurality. Such duality 
may also be useful to explain not only the conceptualisation of process and outcome of 
governance previously discussed, but also the scenes whereby opposite elements coexist, 
and are linked and contingent – such as vertical/horizontal, diachronic/synchronic, 
problems/solutions, cause/effect, individual/collective, and process/outcome – in the 
system. 
 
Our tentative explanation of the inherent nature of reflexivity might then raise the question 
as to whether all forms of governance are automatically reflexive. It may be true that the 
intrinsic nature of reflexivity exists in any type of ‘governance’. Indeed, Lynch (2000) 
argues that reflexivity is inherent being: “[...] an unavoidable feature of the way actions 
(including actions performed, and expressions written, by academic researchers) are 
performed, made sense of, and incorporated into social settings [...] it is impossible to be 
unreflexive” (p.26). Like Lynch’s point and as established in the previous discussion, the 
duality of reflexivity is itself already embedded in the notion of governance. The question, 
59 
 
 
 
therefore, should not be about whether all governance is reflexive or not, but rather centre 
on the understanding which condition of governing makes governance more or less 
reflexive; and whether reflexivity should be promoted in governance. 
 
The discussion should be thus focused on the relationship between the condition and the 
level of reflexivity. Accordingly, the questions can be further developed into an enquiry as 
to why this greater attention to reflexivity has arisen in recent debate, and the nature of the 
difference between the contemporary context and that which obtained previously in terms 
of such recognition of reflexivity in ST governance. For the present study, specifically, the 
question then is why reflexivity matters for the understanding of divisions of labour in 
macro risk deliberation exercises. 
 
A singular precondition – at least according to my theoretical examination findings – 
necessary for a ‘more’ reflexive governance system is plurality in the elements of 
governance (multiple actors and their representations). Following on from this fundamental 
condition is greater discursive structure of the environment in which the actors play their 
roles. Such a context is contrary to a managerial, controlling, instrumental approach to 
governance in a tightly structured environment. Therefore, discursiveness creates more 
room for the actors themselves to play their roles. This perhaps helps to explain the reason 
why the debate on reflexive governance is more prevalent in the recent era of ST 
governance, which is characterised by a more complex setting, involving diverse 
perspectives.   
 
Therefore, in the context of  this thesis, a discussion of  reflexivity is relevant to an 
understanding of  divisions of  labour in macro-deliberation. As established previously, 
macro-deliberation comprises extended forms of  diverse deliberation, and contrasts with 
the individual examples of  micro-deliberation, which is more concerned with a specific 
setting to address a particular issue involving a comparatively small number of  actors. The 
relatively high level of  diversity and plurality in elements of  macro-deliberation may drive 
the promotion of  reflexivity in ST governance. Multiple elements of  macro-deliberation in 
an expanded and less structured environment also engage reflexivity, and these two 
elements may be contingent on each other. From this insight, it can be inferred that there 
are closely overlapping characteristics and connections between reflexive governance and 
macro-deliberation. 
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In short, having critically examined issues around the notion of  deliberative democracy and 
reflexive governance, each part of  the previous discussion has yielded its question, thus:  
 
Deliberative Democracy – Whether and how would divisions of  labour be useful to 
maximise the two qualities of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness in macro-risk deliberation? 
 
Reflexive Governance – Why does reflexivity matter in the understanding of  divisions of  
labour in macro risk deliberation? 
 
To conclude the discussion on these two strands of  theory, namely, deliberative democracy 
and reflexive governance, this chapter ends with the research question for this thesis:  
 
What are the implications of  reflexivity in the understanding of  the division of  
labour in macro risk deliberation exercises? 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
3.1 Framework of  Analysis  
 
In Chapter 1, the discussion on discourses around the new mode of  ST governance with 
public engagement drew our attention to the various stakeholders’ broad approval on the 
growth of  public engagement in ST governance in the UK, and yet their widely divergent 
rationales.  Chapter 2 introduced and examined two theoretical considerations - namely, 
deliberative democracy and reflexive governance - around ST governance regarding 
development of  new technologies and their risks. It was an intellectual process of  both de-
composition and re-composition of  constituting conceptual elements of  those two 
theoretical considerations. It provides me with the basis for building a framework of  
analysis, from which I derived themes of  analysis and a leading question for this research. 
Figure 3.1 presents the framework of  analysis built on the basis of  the elicited concepts 
from theoretical considerations (two qualities of  deliberative democracy, i.e. inclusiveness 
and deliberativeness; and two dimensions of  reflexive governance, i.e. outcome and 
process). The map of  this framework will navigate this research through the process with 
the research question. 
Figure 3.1 Framework of  Analysis 
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My research is conducted in a kind of explorative approach. This study does not have a set 
hypothesis to test from empirical evidence. Instead, it exposes empirical data to a question, 
which has been developed from two interim questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ (detailed 
explanation follows in the next section) seeking the implications of reflexivity in macro risk 
deliberation process. Developing an analytical framework and drawing findings were 
accomplished through a series of interactions between theoretical considerations and 
examinations of empirical data. Figure 3.2 presents this research process, consisting of 
seven sequential steps.  
 
Figure 3.2 Process of  Research 
 
 
 
The first step was to review the literature on deliberative democracy regarding its two core 
qualities, namely inclusiveness and deliberativeness. It observed the inherent tension 
between them and examined the possibility of  the idea of  a division of  labour in an 
attempt to maximise both qualities as suggested in the macro-deliberative approach.  A 
thorough critical examination of  deliberative democracy theory generated question A: 
whether and how divisions of  labour would be useful to maximise the two qualities of  
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inclusiveness and deliberativeness in macro risk deliberation exercises. The second step was 
to investigate empirical data with the research question A. Collecting and analysing data 
rather took place simultaneously, since the results of  analysis had led the direction of  
where to dig out further for the next sets of  data collection. The third step of  this process 
was a critical phase, which confirmed one important finding of  this study, namely 
reflexivity nature in divisions of  labour in real risk deliberation exercises. During this phase, 
although I identified the inherent reflexivity in a real macro-deliberation process, it was not 
yet the stage of  crystallising what exactly the nature of  reflexivity is, nor its possible effects 
in the macro risk deliberation process. Nevertheless, the inherency of  reflexivity was found 
and some unexpected characteristics of  the two qualities of  deliberative democracy 
(inclusiveness and deliberativeness) appeared to me. These findings raised in my mind a 
suspicion on the possible causality relationship between the reflexivity and the unique 
characteristics of  divisions of  labour, and inclusiveness and deliberativeness.  Fourthly, 
therefore, I visited another theoretical consideration, i.e. reflexive governance. The work at 
this step focused on understanding the notion of  reflexive governance and researching a 
clue to understand its possible effect on the divisions of  labour in risk deliberation 
exercises. Accordingly, this stage of  literature review provided me with another question B: 
why reflexivity matters in the understanding of  the divisions of  labour in macro risk 
deliberation. Raising this Question B was followed by Step 5, which developed and 
completed a kind of  blueprint of  analysis. Therefore, the framework of  analysis (Figure 
3.1) was built on the ground that not only derived from theories solely, but was the result 
of  interactions between empirical analysis and theoretical discussions. Completion of  
building the framework enabled me to develop a final research question for this study, 
which was composed of  the two interim questions - A and B: ‘What are the implications of  
reflexivity in the understanding of  divisions of  labour in macro risk deliberation exercises?’. 
The next step 6 was the phase of  re-examining the previous findings and further 
investigation, bearing in mind the final research question. Finally, Step 7 was able to 
synthesise all the analysis under the research question.  
 
3.2 Methodology  
 
3.2.1 Case Studies 
 
This research adopts the case study approach to analyse two recent macro-deliberations in 
UK ST governance, namely the GM Dialogue on the commercialisation of  genetically-
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modified crops and the process overseen by the Committee on Radioactive Waste 
Management (CoRWM) on the management of  radioactive waste. I have chosen the two 
different cases identified above, considering the following criteria: firstly, which elements 
correspond with the characteristics of  macro-deliberation? In terms of  the 
unprecedentedly large scale of  both programmes, their wide scope of  issues and methods, 
and, importantly, the divisions of  labour adopted, to a certain degree, these two 
deliberation programmes for ST governance represent the core characteristics of  macro-
deliberation established previously in Chapter 2. Secondly, both cases were exercises as part 
of  the regulation process of  particularly technological risk-related policy, such as GM 
(genetically modified) technology and nuclear technology. 
 
A case study approach is useful when the research is particularly about contemporary 
events and when a researcher cannot control the environment (Yin 2003). Yin suggests that 
if  the research pursues the answers to “how” or “why” questions, case studies form a 
particularly useful research strategy. He (ibid.) explains that the case study shares many of  
the same techniques with the historian approach, and history study is also preferred in 
research with the questions “how” and “why”. However, the case study approach can be 
more flexible regarding its methods for producing evidence, such as observing the events 
directly and interviewing the people who were involved in the events. My two cases, chosen 
for this study, were already completed a few years ago and thus, in the sense of  a 
retrospective approach, this approach might share many techniques with the historian 
approach. However, having considered that my research subject is investigating the 
dynamic and complex relationships, interactions and tensions of  actors in a real-life context, 
the case study approach will give a much deeper, more meaningful explanation on the ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions of  my study.   
 
The research sources for this study can be expanded from the written texts in documents 
to in-depth interviews, possibly revealing the vivid atmosphere surrounding the events and 
the respective personal experience. A case study approach is also useful in terms of  its 
flexibility in research process to adjust its design on the way (Yin 2003).  It is more flexible 
than other research methods since it can be changed according to the situation and the 
process, and can be mixed freely with quantitative and qualitative approaches (ibid.), thus 
seeks a triangulation. My research process is an exploration of  the scenes around and 
within the events, regarding dynamic interactions of  their elements. In order to capture the 
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profound picture of  every nook and cranny of  the scenes, and their implicitly inner-layered 
scenes, it is necessary for my research plan to be flexible enough to be amended in order to 
include any unexpected element of  the story during the course of  investigation. 
 
3.2.2 Data Collection  
 
The methods employed involve the systematic examination of  published and unpublished 
documents (official reports, meeting minutes or transcripts, notes, emails, presentations and 
comments on websites, the press, and various critiques or evaluations), and 19 intensive 
semi-structured interviews (18 face-to-face interviews and one telephone interview). In 
addition, there were a few email communications during the data collection process, which 
provided me with some important information. These communications were not through 
interview nor used as verbatim in the text of  the thesis. However, information from those 
communications was part of  constructing knowledge about the context of  the cases as well 
as design of  interviews.  
 
Given the subject of this study, direct simultaneous observation would give the analysis 
greater benefits regarding the possibility of capturing various and subtle happenings around 
and within the events. In this light, it might be the best strategy for this research of 
witnessing the way in which messages and occurrences are developed within the context, 
following the dynamics of change.  However, due to the fact that my two cases were 
already completed, I am employing a retrospective approach: data collection for this 
research, therefore, relies on the archives of written texts already developed and the 
reflections of people who participated in the events. 
 
3.2.3 Triangulation Technique 
 
Analysis of  data for this study particularly draws on the triangulation technique in order to 
build up a picture of  the division of  labour in macro-deliberation by collecting the points 
of  view of  various actors, evidenced from documents and interviews. Triangulation refers 
to the use of  more than one method to characterise a single phenomenon (Byman 2003). 
In this research, it included not only triangulating interviews with documentary analysis, 
but also triangulation of  different angles from various actors around the happenings. This 
research specifically explores the divergent views on the division of  labour in macro-
deliberation from various actors and how these different views are reflected in deliberation. 
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Therefore, the purpose of  employing triangulation lies not in seeking the truth in terms of  
who is right or wrong; rather triangulation enables the elicitation from actors’ contending 
perspectives to be more reliable and valid. With this purpose in mind, triangulation is 
carried out over divisions of  labour: the different perspectives on the general structural 
form of  the division of  labour, the specific categories of  actors’ roles within the forms of  
division of  labour, and the different instantiation of  these roles by actors. 
 
3.2.4 Documents  
 
Published and non-published documents (as itemised above) were collected through 
personal contact, by request on the information via email communication, and from the 
electronic archives on various websites. This research did not have a specific period for 
collecting documents; instead, gathering and building textual corpus from various 
published and unpublished documents continued from the beginning of this research in 
order to improve my understanding of the cases. Determining the cases for this research 
has been based on the understanding of the nature and characteristics of the cases. 
Therefore, at the very initial stage of this research, I approached the mainly official 
documents (e.g. the official final reports of GM Nation?, two main reports of Science 
Review, the final report of the Economic Study for GM Dialogue and the final report of 
CoRWM) and also the evaluative critiques, of both cases. These documents were mostly 
accessible from their official websites or from the relevant government department’s 
(DEFRA) electronic archives. Preliminary document analysis provided me with an 
understanding of the general overview of the cases. The specific challenge I faced at this 
stage, was that the main website of GM Nation? closed in the middle of my study. The last 
record date that I accessed the website remained as July in 2007. Sometime after that point, 
I realised the website of GM Nation? strand had completely closed down, while other parts 
of GM Dialogue for the Science Review strand and the Economic Study strand were still 
alive and accessible until sometime in 2010. Fortunately, I saved all introductory main 
pages of GM Nation?. However, I still did not have a fully saved back-up of all documents 
published on the website, such as various meeting minutes, transcripts and various reports 
on specific issues. Therefore, I contacted various people in DEFRA. What I was last told 
from DEFRA, however, was that they were planning to revive the data in the future17
                                                 
17 The original URL of GM Nation? strand (
. 
http://www.gmnation.org.uk) was accessed on 29 
July 2007. This original website was closed down sometime in 2008 and a few years later, the 
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Therefore, I was unable to have access to all the documents that I needed, such as 
transcripts of public meetings, except for only a few main reports from the original website. 
However, I was eventually able to obtain most of the documents that I needed from 
various interviewees. Thanks to their cooperation, I could collect, not only published 
documents, but also unpublished personal records, such as emails, notes and other relevant 
internal documents. 
 
A further stage of the analysis of documents involved exploring the details of the cases in 
order to understand the issues related to my research interest, via the minutes or transcripts 
of various meetings, interim reports of various sub-events, relevant auxiliary papers and 
evaluation reports of each case. This stage of the document analysis provided me with the 
basis for designing interviews.  In particular, I discovered various tensions and struggles 
among the actors during this stage of analysis, which enabled me to construct the interview 
structure. I developed interview questions for semi-structured in-depth interviews and also 
the candidate list for the interviewees on the basis of the results of documentary analysis of 
this stage.  
 
In addition to enabling me to draw an overall picture for each case and to build the 
structure and direction of interviews, the documentary analysis served the role of being a 
kind of base camp for me, where I could revisit and check the validity and credibility of 
what I heard from interviewees’ recollections.  In particular, given my primary research 
activity of analytic scanning and gathering, and presenting the diverse rationales underlying 
various divisions of labour, documentary analysis not only played the role of recapping or 
examining what interviewees said, but also served the purpose of interrogating and 
positioning different perspectives in the overall map of analysis. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
current website (Accessed on 25 November 2012) appeared with the same URL address above, but 
the contents are completely different.  
 
The original URL of Science Review and the Economic Study 
(http://www.gmsciencedebate.org.uk) was accessed lastly on 25 April 2008 for this thesis. DEFRA 
has established a page, which had links for materials of  GM Dialogue in 2008. This page is archived 
in the National Archive (Accessed on 6 December 2012). Many links in that page, for GM Nation?, 
and Economic Study are not working, and most parts of Science Review are working. 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081023141438/http://www.defra.gov.uk/environme
nt/gm/crops/debate/index.htm) 
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3.2.5 Interviews  
 
Although documentary analysis provided me with an idea of what might have been 
happening in the cases, the documentary records were not sufficient to give me a detailed 
picture of the subtle relationships, tensions, struggles and interactions between actors. One 
of the important sources for documentary analysis for this study was the meeting minutes, 
which were not verbatim transcripts but were the notes taken by secretariat at the meetings. 
Although these are able to show, overall, what issues were discussed and who said what, 
the texts presented in the minutes were the result of some level of intervention of the 
writers (secretariat) of their hearings. Therefore, strictly speaking, those documents are 
limited in delivering a real or full record of the happenings.  
 
Actually, in several plenary meetings of  CoRWM, there were discussions of  how the 
minutes should be written. The conclusion was not very clear and left to the chair and 
secretariat (Plenary meeting minute, May 2004). There was a reviewing time for the 
Committee members of  CoRWM to check the previous meeting minutes at the beginning 
of  each of  the subsequent preliminary meetings. Therefore, the minutes could have 
showed if  there had been any dissent among the members. At least, in the case of  
‘significant disagreement’ on the issues, it might have been recorded in a relatively more 
detailed manner in the minutes. Nevertheless, although the minutes recorded the fact that 
there were disputes or disagreements, they did not give a full description of  how the 
ensuing conclusions were arrived at. In other words, they did not present ‘the interim 
stories between’ the arguments, such as the ways in which the final messages or decisions 
were made. In particular, at politically-uncomfortable moments of  the professional 
meetings, to be publicised, it is not difficult to suspect that writers could have been 
tempted to adjust or translate the records in a subtle manner with their slight intervention. 
Especially in both the cases of  GM Dialogue and CoRWM, secretaries of  most organisers’ 
meetings were civil servants and most of  the main meeting minutes were published on 
websites.  
 
Given these sensible considerations on the limitations of documentary analysis, and the 
subject of this research, which requires capturing the high level of political sensitivity, the 
intensive interview technique is helpful. It is useful not only to confirm what I find in 
documents, but also to seek the story behind the documents, in order to find missing 
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puzzles and to test what I find from the various documents. Bearing in mind that this study 
focuses on divergent views over the division of labour in macro-deliberation and their 
implications on the process, I included various actors for interviews, who had played 
various roles of designing, organising and deliberating during the course of each 
programme. However, the list of interviewees of this study is not exhaustive. It is not 
feasible on a practical basis to interview all participants and also conceptually inappropriate, 
for example, to have one single representative, or a few right representatives from the 
public, or from any stakeholder group, even among those who participated in the events.  
In addition, again as my specific research interest is divergent views among the actors, the 
purpose of interviewing was to demonstrate such divergent views, considering their 
implications on the deliberation process rather than to give a comprehensive account.  
Therefore, the aim of the interview was not to discover all the different idiosyncratic views 
of the participants but to show the existence of possible different perspectives and their 
contingency on the deliberation process. 
 
Intensive semi-structured interviews are useful to supplement the shortcomings of  the 
documentary analysis discussed above, such as by collecting participants’ opinions and 
experiences on the events directly from their respective various points of  view. As 
established above, documentary analysis helped me to design interviews. From various 
documents, such as meeting minutes, the press, published critiques, evaluation reports etc., 
I identified certain types of  tensions and struggles among stakeholders outside the 
programmes as well as participants within the programmes. Some of  these issues that 
emerged from documentary analysis were developed into four themes - Division of  labour, 
Integration and relationship, Principles underlying design and implementation of  the 
events and the whole programme, and Discrepancy - , which were the basis for developing 
the interview questions. These emerging issues also provided me with guidelines for 
composing the interviewee list (See APPENDIX I for the list of  interviewees). Accordingly, 
interview questions consist of  a few general questions for all interviewees and some 
specific questions for each interviewee respectively. Specific questions for each interviewee 
were elicited from the analysis of  specific events or situations which the interviewees had 
directly experienced. Each set of  questions was differently composed with combination of  
general and specific questions considering the events and issues, in which each interviewee 
was involved (See APPENDIX II for the interview questions).  
 
The triangulation technique was employed in designing interviews. I tried to look at people, 
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who were involved across different events because they might have a better understanding 
of  the different views and issues raised and constructed across these different events, and 
also the communications and interactions that took place between the events. Individuals 
involved in a single event were not able to give me this information. The one who 
organised two different events on the GM Nation? strand, for example, did not know that 
the results of  their research were used for the other strands. Interviewing someone who 
was involved in many events could also reduce the number of  interviews for cross-
checking. As well as this cross-checking of  different people, I also tried to check different 
identities of  a single actor had played and its implications in the process. In this context, 
triangulation is a particularly useful strategy as it supplements the shortcomings of  the 
interview method. Despite the benefits of  interviews, such as increasing the opportunity of  
capturing a deep and more realistic flavour of  the context for the research, the interview 
method in qualitative research has been questioned with regard to its objectivity and 
validity from the positivists’ perspective. Especially in the case of  my research, the 
challenges that I faced during the interviews, might support this question. One of  the 
difficulties was that I could not obtain all the interviews of  my initial interview design. As 
my cases were about the policy-making processes, many participants were in high positions 
in Government, universities or institutes. This was the case in particular for GM Dialogue. 
In addition, due to the long gap of  time since GM Dialogue was completed, people had 
moved to new positions or been promoted, which made it even more difficult to access 
them. It is partly for this reason that my interviews were concluded with just 19 
interviewees. However, again, my research aim is not to display all the idiosyncratic views 
but to show existing divergent views and their implications in the process that I could claim 
for the validity of  my analysis, in particular with the aid of  the triangulation technique 
established above. Here, findings with regard to the divergent notions that constitute 
reflexivity, do not depend on the cursory sketching of  a large number of  perspectives, but 
on the sensitive and detailed exploration of  a few.  
 
In the beginning of  my interviews, I was surprised by the diversity in views among 
interviewees, who were at the same event. However, at the later stage of  my interviews I 
was even more surprised by the similarity in the patterns and themes of  the issues raised by 
the interviewees who were at different events. I stopped my interviews at this point, 
thinking that this would be an indication of  having enough evidence to assure the validity 
of  my analysis. Some quotes from interviews that I used in this thesis, were even based on 
71 
 
 
 
incorrect information by definition. However, I used them as they were (as the interviewees 
said), since that is the evidence of  some kinds of  discrepancies I wanted to display 
regarding my research subject. This way of  displaying the material of  interviewees’ 
subjectivity without filtering would help to objectify my interview analysis process.  
Another important part of  my interview process was that due to the political struggles and 
tensions and heavy involvement that participants had experienced during each case, 
interviewees were very keen to share their stories with me in order for them to be known. 
Therefore, I was able to obtain a very personal level of  records and unpublished data.  
 
3.2.6 Leading to Empirical Analysis 
 
Before presenting empirical analysis in the following chapters (Chapters 4 and 5) I would 
like to clarify a few things about the research focus of  this study and the ways of  
presenting my findings. 
 
My empirical analysis explores the ways in which reflexivity is associated with the divisions 
of  labour, and inclusiveness and deliberativeness of  macro-risk deliberation.  To anticipate 
a central finding, the two qualities of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness appear in 
remarkably different ways to those which deliberative democracy theorists characterise 
through divisions of  labour in real deliberation exercises. A primary aim of  this part of  the 
discussion is not to measure the degree of  the above two qualities; rather, my empirical 
analysis proposes new thoughts on the two qualities of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness 
of  the established theories. Therefore, my conclusion will not be a verdict on the level of  
two qualities in macro-risk deliberation exercises but will shed light on the inherent 
reflexivity in macro-risk deliberation, and its implications in the divisions of  labour, and the 
two qualities of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness.  
 
My analysis in the empirical chapters presents the findings in the same format for both 
cases of  GM Dialogue and CoRWM in each chapter (Chapters 4 and 5). The primary 
arguments in the introductory and conclusive section on the Division of  Labour, 
Inclusiveness and Deliberativeness in Chapters 4 and 5 are similar to each other. However, 
it does not necessarily suggest that GM Dialogue and CoRWM are identical cases in every 
aspect. Instead, it emphasises the focusing aspects of  this research, and suggests that the 
findings on these aspects are coherent across both cases, to a certain level of  generalisation. 
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As shown in my framework of  analysis, the two main theories of  this study are deliberative 
democracy and reflexive governance. The empirical findings were presented following the 
structure of  the framework of  analysis. As the structures of  the next two chapters show, I 
display findings under the title of  Divisions of  Labour and its sub-titles of  Inclusion and 
Deliberation in each chapter. This structure clearly represents the main concepts, which are 
derived from deliberative democracy. However, this structure does not render outwardly 
the other theoretical concept of  this study, namely the notion of  reflexivity. I made it thus 
deliberately for various reasons. Firstly, considering the nature of  reflexivity as being non-
static, endogenous, discursive and inherent, it would be recognised more effectively and 
appropriately through a series of  experiences of  reflexivity over various events and 
happenings rather than with an articulation of  its definition at a specific issue or event. 
Therefore, I deliberately have omitted an explicit presentation of  reflexivity in the structure 
of  the empirical chapters, in order to suggest a way of  better understanding of  reflexivity 
during the following findings in various empirical parts. Secondly, due to the complex 
concept of  reflexivity itself  as well as the complicated scenes of  the macro-risk 
deliberation process, introducing the concept of  reflexivity directly with a certain level of  
definition may increase the level of  complexity and hinder comprehensive understanding 
of  reflexivity in the deliberation process. These are the reasons why I do not directly bring 
a conceptual explanation of  reflexivity into the empirical chapters. Instead, an occasional 
reminder of  the research question of  this study will facilitate readers’ comprehension of  
the nature and implication of  reflexivity in the deliberation process.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
GM DIALOGUE 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss how reflexivity appeared in and affected the deliberativeness 
and inclusiveness of  GM Dialogue. I will do this by exploring the emergent and designed 
aspects of  divisions of  labour in GM Dialogue and their formative role in shaping the 
process. The first section of  this chapter will explain how different rationales drove the 
birth of  GM Dialogue. The second part will discuss the ways in which various forms of  
divisions of  labour were made with different rationales of  stakeholders, describing how 
differently the actual deliberativeness and inclusiveness appeared through these divisions of  
labour against the theory.  
 
4.1 Context of  the Birth of  the Programme: Various Rationales behind  
GM Dialogue 
 
GM Dialogue was a milestone event regarding its context, where the UK science and 
technology policy was on the trend towards ‘public engagement’ in the late 1990s. ‘To have 
or not to have GM?’ – with this question, the UK society had gone through a turbulent 
debate. A wide range of stakeholder groups were interested in and got involved directly and 
indirectly in GM Dialogue, from an individual citizen to the Prime Minister, from a local 
organic farmer and supermarket chains, to the multi-national biotechnology companies 
across the Atlantic, from several relevant departments in the government to various 
research institutes, NGOs and the media. Their relationships and argumentations were 
entangled with interest and power. As various reasons lay behind the trend toward the 
public engagement in science and technology regulation, the degree of  diversity in 
expected roles attached to GM Dialogue in GM policy-making was high.  
 
4.1.1 GM Crops Policy in De Facto Moratorium (1998-2003) 
 
1996 was a big year in British policy history in general, and more specifically for science 
policy.  All the truth and confusion regarding the Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis (BSE) 
event damaged public trust in science policy and the Government.  In particular, as the 
BSE event was directly related to public health and safety, the degree of shock drew huge 
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attention and ignited a turbulent debate, not only on food policy but as far as the UK 
science policy-making process per se. Furthermore, 1996 was one of the milestones in the 
history of GM policy in the UK, as each type of GM soya bean and maize was imported 
from the US to the EU for the first time, to be sold at a commercial level alongside Non-
GM foods (Levitt 2003; Horlick-Jones 2007). This event raised concerns and tension 
among stakeholders.    
 
This tense situation drew a ‘de facto’ moratorium of GM crops in the UK. Initially, English 
Nature (the Government’s statutory adviser on wildlife and the countryside) suggested a 
frozen period of commercial planting of some GM crops (herbicide tolerant crops and 
insect resistant crops) for further research and regulation in July 1998. 
 
Environment Minister, Michael Meacher, presented his cautious approach to GM crops to 
the House of Lords Select Committee on 21 October 1998. In his statement he announced 
the industry’s decisions on the temporary cessation of the planting of some GM crops: an 
agreement between the plant breeding industry and the Government, that releasing of the 
herbicide-tolerant GM crops would not proceed further until the results of farm-scale 
evaluations were known, and a voluntary decision on the part of the industry on non-
introduction of insect-resistant GM crops for the next three years. He started the 
announcement by mentioning responses to “calls from groups such as English Nature for a 
moratorium on the commercial release of certain GM crops and to the great public 
anxiety” (House of  Commons Library 1999, p. 13)18
   
. However, he did not use the term 
‘moratorium’ in describing the current decisions. Rather, his announcement sounded as if 
he was delivering the industry’s relevant decisions. His delineation of the decisions was 
subtle and precise, which reflects exactly the sensitive context and process of the way in 
which those decisions were made: 
“Secondly in addition to the important work on revising the Directive, I have been 
considering how best to respond to calls from groups such as English Nature for a 
moratorium on the commercial release of certain GM crops and to the great public 
anxiety that surrounds this whole technology. […] I am very pleased to be able to 
announce this morning that we have reached agreement in principle with the plant 
breeding industry for a programme of managed development of herbicide tolerant GM 
crops whereby the first farm-scale plantings are strictly limited and monitored for 
ecological effects along with comparable plantings of conventional crops. […] The 
                                                 
18 Christopher Barclay is the author of this research paper published by House of Commons 
Library in March 1999 (Research Paper 99/38). 
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industry has also made the important commitment that no insect resistant GM crops 
will be introduced into the UK for the next three years.” (Michael Meacher’s 
statements to the House of Lords Select Committee on 21 October 1998, cited in 
House of  Commons Library 1999, p. 13) 
  
This was the only announcement at the official level from the government regarding a 
temporary cessation of commercial planting of some GM crops into the UK. It was not 
clear, and there were some rumours around, whether those industry’s decisions on GM 
crops were the results of a secret-deal between the government and the industry, and 
whether there was a further secret agreement.  There were just denials from the 
government over any government’s agreement on the official moratorium or any deal 
between the government and the industry, on a few occasions. The following two quotes 
cited in House of  Commons Library’s paper (1999, pp. 15-16) depicts this confusing 
stance of the government:  
 
“Shouldn’t the Government introduce a moratorium on genetically-modified 
crops? 
No.  Those that argue for a moratorium do so because they feel that there is 
insufficient information on the environmental impact of genetically-modified crops.  
We agree that more needs to be learnt in this area, but we do not believe that a fixed 
period moratorium is the answer.  The voluntary arrangements which the industry 
has agreed with us will allow us to monitor carefully larger scale cultivation of these 
crops.  We will only move to full scale cultivation when we are satisfied that we 
have enough information about the environmental impacts to be able to make a 
sound decision.” [The statement in the information pack for Parliament members on 
18 February 1999] 
 
“My hon. Friend’s question gives me the opportunity to lay another ghost to rest. It 
is not true that the Government have reached or are seeking any secret deal with the 
industries on genetically modified foods or crops.” [Jack Cunningham, the Minister 
of  Cabinet Office’s reply in PQ on 17 March 1999] 
 
Baroness Young, the chairman of English Nature wrote a letter as a confidential briefing to 
the Prime Minister in order to clarify their position on the matter in February 1999, 
following their unwelcoming statement, criticising the House of Lords’ report, which 
supported GM crops. The letter was released after Jack Cunningham quoted from it in the 
House of Commons. Cunningham was the Minister of the Ministry of  Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF)19
                                                 
19 The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) was merged into the 
 in 1997 and became a Cabinet minister in 1998, being called 
a ‘Cabinet enforcer’ by the media (The Independent). Cunningham emphasised that 
Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) in 2002. 
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English Nature’s call was for a ban on only some of the GM crops but not a moratorium 
for all GM crops, criticising the Opposition Party on the grounds of their incorrect 
interpretation of what English Nature called for and misleading the public. He was then 
criticised in return by the Shadow Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Tim Yeo, 
stating that: “The Prime Minister should sack Jack Cunningham for deliberately misleading 
the House of  Commons over the position of  English Nature and a moratorium" (The 
Independent, 12 February 1999). The following quote from the BBC news gives a 
description of that situation: 
“[…] Dr Cunningham quoted a passage from the letter in which Baroness Young said: 
"We are not asking for a moratorium on commercial release of all genetically modified 
crops". But the letter goes on to say English Nature was "very concerned about the 
effects that introducing herbicide tolerant crops would have on biodiversity". It warns 
of the "disastrous" effects of previous attempts to make farming more intensive. 
Baroness Young says: "Our advice to government has been that herbicide tolerant 
crops and insect resistant crops, not all GM crops, should not be released 
commercially until research has been completed and assessed." In the letter, she 
welcomes the one-year voluntary ban announced by the crops industry but warns: 
"This will not give enough time for the research to be done, which we estimate will 
take at least three years." (BBC News, 7 April 1999)20
 
 
Likewise, there were arguments among stakeholders about whether a moratorium was 
needed or not. Having considered the tense situation at that time, the occurrence of this 
argument among stakeholders might not be surprising. In addition, perhaps, due to the 
confusingly ambiguous position of  the government on the temporary cessation of  
commercial growing some GM crops, there were also rumours and investigations as to 
whether there would be an official moratorium or not (House of  Commons Library 1999). 
Horlick-Jones et al. (2007, p. 5) used passive sentences carefully for this kind of vague 
status regarding the way in which the temporary cessation of planting of GM crops came 
into force, “the moratorium existed in the UK between 1998 and 2003. […] The 
moratorium was sustained by a voluntary agreement between government and industry”. 
Toke and Marsh (2003, p. 236) also used the words, ‘this meant’, thus presenting this as 
their interpretation of the status rather than as a record of fact, “Over the course of the 
next year the government then negotiated with the GM crop lobby for a voluntary freeze 
[…] This meant that no commercial planting of GM crops could take place until 2003”.  I 
found, as a researcher, that tracking the information around these relatively recent events 
was a kind of puzzle search, as resources for investigating the status of the temporary 
                                                 
20 Available from BBC website: (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/277930.stm) 
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cessation were written in subtly different terms and expressions in their illustration of this 
situation. 
   
My own investigation could conclude that ‘a de facto’ moratorium existed. In other words, 
there was no official moratorium declared by the government, but there was an 
announcement on the decisions made by the industry to pause commercial planting of  GM 
crops. More precisely, it was an announcement on an agreement with the government on 
the temporary cessation of  releasing herbicide-tolerant GM crops until the results of farm-
scale evaluations, and a decision on the non-introduction of insect-resistant GM crops for 
the next three years. These decisions remained until 2003. The government denied that 
there was a moratorium. This is correct in the sense that the government, as the authority 
for regulation, did not make a statement for effectuating a formal moratorium for 
herbicide-tolerant and insect-resistant GM crops. Rather, there was an official 
announcement on the decisions of  the industry. It is not clear whether the decisions were 
made purely voluntarily or through a secret collusion or by any pressure. However, those 
decisions clearly remained effectuated as a result of  a process comprising a number of  
incremental developments.  
 
I would argue that the incumbent government, more precisely the enforcers in the Cabinet, 
generated ambiguity in the official status of the cessation of planting GM crops. They had 
to respond to political pressure, and reached the situation where they were able to 
announce a voluntary ban from the industry.  They would have found later that the de 
facto moratorium should be maintained, considering continuing political sensitivity. 
Therefore, they did not make any change in the status of the ban for further permission for 
releasing GM crops. Equally, however, they did not alter the ambiguous status of the 
moratorium later to that of the official, formal declaration. Their reluctant attitude in 
admitting of the moratorium, was clearly reflected in the absence of their ensuing action for 
the official moratorium. Therefore, the de facto moratorium was sustained with the 
government’s reluctant and passive admission.  The government might have thought this 
ambiguity would give them an incentive for the case when the industry would move to any 
legal action or the government would want to return to licensing GM crops later.  
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4.1.2 Government’s Strong Drive towards Biotechnology 
 
Government’s enormous investment and interest in developing biotechnology may support 
the argument that the government might not have wanted to have any blockage like the 
official moratorium on commercial planting of GM crops. They might have thought of an 
incentive of this ambiguity for their later resuming licensing GM crops or perhaps even 
created this ambiguity deliberately. Certainly, the government at least did not make any 
effort to remove the ambiguity on the de facto status of the moratorium, in following time 
of Michael Meacher’s announcement to House of Lords Select Committee on 21 October 
1998. 
 
The Prime Minister was a strong advocate of GM technology. He saw biotechnology as a 
kind of symbol and a key step towards the future of national wealth. In many occasions, he 
showed his firm support for biotechnology, and GM technology was often given as an 
example of  his promotion of  biotechnology in the UK: 
“Biotechnology is at the forefront of  these developments. The biotech industry’s 
market in Europe alone is expected to be worth $100 billion by 2005[…] And Britain 
leads Europe […] Britain is well placed to keep and extend its lead. (Science Matters,  
2002)” 
 
Blair argued the risk aspect is exaggerated by the media and it can be controlled. Blair’s 
strong support was projected in the direction of the government’s policy. There is evidence 
of the government’s pro biotechnology position in various statements, reports and fiscal 
investment. The following quote is part of Jack Cunningham’s statement in the House of 
Commons’ Hansard Written Answers for 17 December 1998:  
 
“[Genetic modification] has the potential to offer enormous opportunities for 
improving the competitiveness of the economy and the quality of life in terms of 
health, agriculture, food and environmental protection.” (Cited in Friends of  the Earth 
2007, p. 8) 
 
According to The Thames Valley University’s estimation, the UK Government spent ninety 
one million pounds on research funding of agricultural biotechnology between 1998 and 
2000 (Friends of  the Earth 2007). Table 4.1 shows how strong the support and 
investments were made to this sector by the government in the early 2000s. The 
Government’s investment figures on biotechnology for agriculture reflect the government’s 
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strong interest in development of agricultural biotechnology in the UK in overall, and yet 
the difference in the figures between the Department of  Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) shows that the DTI 
displayed a much stronger interest than DEFRA. It can be argued that economic benefits 
from business perspective were the main driving rationale for the direction of development 
of the agricultural biotechnology of the UK in that period more than any other aspects 
such as environment or rural affairs.  
 
Table 4.1 UK Government Departmental Research Funding in Agricultural 
Biotechnology 
(Units: Million Pounds) 
Year Total Funding 
(from available 
data) 
Funding per Govt 
Department 
Omissions and Additions 
DTI DEFRA 
2006-07 49.3 39.3 10.0 Excludes possible funding 
through responsive grants form 
BBSRC 
2005-06 50.3 37.7 12.6 Ditto. 
2004-05 N/A N/A 13.2 DEFRA figures only 
2003-04 73.2 57.1 16.1 Includes all grants through 
BBSRC and DEFRA  
2002-03 75.7 57.1 18.6 Ditto. 
2001-02 72.7 55.1 17.6 Ditto. 
(Source: Adapted from Friends of  the Earth 2007, p. 9) 
 
Friends of the Earth argues that the UK government’s ‘competitiveness-oriented’ policy 
direction resulted in an increase of public funds into research for industry. They analyse the 
fact that political choice was driven by the assumption that “for science and innovation to 
become active contributors to the competitiveness of British economy in each and every 
sector, including agriculture” (2007, p. 5), referring to the 1998 White Paper on Competitiveness. 
 
The House of Lords Select Committee presented their position on GM crops to the 
European Community on 15th December 1998. In their report21
                                                 
21 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1998), EC Regulation of 
Genetic Modification in Agriculture. Session 98-99, Second report. 
, they showed their clearly 
favoured position towards GM technology. Their concluding paragraphs presented that 
GM technology had strong potentials in every aspect by listing the recipients as being 
‘agriculture, industry, consumers and even to the environment’: 
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“172.  Biotechnology in general and genetic modification in particular offer great 
potential benefits to agriculture, industry, consumers and even to the environment. 
We consider that GM technology may offer much to organic systems, for example 
through reduced inputs (paragraphs 65-72, 78).” 
(in Part 4 : SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS) 
 
After House of Lords Select Committee’s report on GM technology, the Advisory 
Committee on Releases to the Environment (ACRE) produced a report22
 
 in January 1999 
claiming that there was no evidence that GM crops would endanger British wildlife.  
Having considered that ACRE was the statutory body to advise the government on 
biodiversity and environment, this report was seminal in supporting the government’s 
position in favour of GM technology.  
While the strong push from the UK government in one direction continued (Durant and 
Lindsey 2000, p. 9), other stakeholders, who were cautious or sceptical of GM technology, 
took various actions by representing various interest groups. One example of the fuel for 
this movement was the findings of Dr Arpad Pusztai’s research. He was a researcher at the 
Rowett Institute (funded by the Government) and was forced to resign after his claim for 
the negative effects of GM potatoes on rats’ immune system in August 1998.  In February 
1999, twenty international scientists sent a letter to the Guardian newspaper supporting the 
findings of Dr Arpad Pusztai (The Independent, 14 February 1999). Chefs and food writers 
joined the protest movement with their campaign of banning GM foods (Durant and 
Lindsey 2000, p. 9). Major supermarket chains (ASDA, Co-operative, Iceland, Marks and 
Spencer, Sainsbury’s, and Waitrose) responded to this protest by introducing a complete 
ban of GM ingredients from their own brand products at their stores. Certain interests 
groups, such as the Soil Association and the Consumer Association, contributed to this 
discussion by announcing their position, and, of course, the green groups, such as 
Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth and GeneWatch, played a kind of leading role for the 
debate. The media coverage of that time reflects how turbulent the debate was. There was a 
‘media storm’ (ibid., p. 8) over this issue in February 1999. The main newspapers and 
broadcasts covered the GM issue as their main topics. ‘Frankenstein food’ became the 
popular nickname for GM food on the media. From a retrospective viewpoint, the big role 
                                                 
22 Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment (1999), The Environmental risks of herbicide 
tolerant oilseed rape: a review of the PGS hybrid oilseed rape. 
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that the media played regarding this debate was active agenda setting, as much as it was 
called ‘campaigning journalism’ (ibid., p. 14). 
 
Therefore, despite the strong willingness on the part of the government to support and 
push towards the future of biotechnology, resistance from society - from the public, green 
groups and food supply chains - eventually garnered enough power to halt it. The 
government, perhaps, still might not have wanted to give up.  This may be the reason why 
a de facto moratorium existed instead of a formal moratorium. The ambiguity in the status 
of the moratorium, also enabled the possibility of co-existence of the contrasting rhetoric 
around the same event simultaneously. In other words, ‘there was no policy of (a) 
moratorium’ as well as ‘there existed a de facto moratorium’, both of these arguments are 
not incorrect. 
 
This turbulent period of discussion on GM policy brought some changes in the regulatory 
system for Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). As a result, the Agriculture and 
Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) was established in June 2000 to advise 
the government on biotechnology as part of a review of bio-science in 1999.23
 
 Its remit in 
particular emphasised its consideration of ‘ethical and social issues’ as well as the science on 
the matters. 
4.2 Divisions of  Labour in GM Dialogue 
 
In the context of  the de facto moratorium status of  commercialising GM crops in the UK, 
the idea of  public engagement for GM policy-making was initiated by the AEBC. Margaret 
Beckett, the Secretary of  State for the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA) announced in July 2002 that GM Dialogue would be held to inform GM 
policy. The birth of  GM Dialogue was the government’s response to the societal call for 
the broad societal input to GM policy, and there were many different stakes, expectations, 
and their respective rationales surrounding this huge project. As well as these, within the 
programme of  GM Dialogue, there were various rationales among participants for the 
nested smaller deliberation exercises. Participants exercised their power to realise their 
respective rationale, which generated dynamic interactions among themselves and outside 
                                                 
23 Office of  Science and Technology (1999), The Advisory and Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology: 
Report from the Government’s Review. 
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of  GM Dialogue. They responded to one another (including designers and organisers, and 
those outside) through their political, epistemic and ontological relations and resources. 
These dynamic interactions of  participants consequently created their new relationships 
and stakes in the context. Subsequently, the participants had to produce new rationales with 
which to respond to this newly-structured context.  Through this recursive process of  
generating and responding to a new environment, participants contested and performed 
their respective rationales over the divisions of  labour and eventually, at the significant level, 
they shaped their own divisions of  labour. Therefore, it was a process of  endogenous 
divisions of  labour, which resulted in continuous re-shaping of  the structure of  the 
programme to its conclusion.   
 
This section will shed light on this reflexive nature in the elements and dynamics of  GM 
Dialogue. Evidences for this were in various emergent and designed aspects of  the 
divisions of  labour, and their formative role in shaping the process. Recognition of  
reflexivity in the divisions of  labour in the real macro-deliberation also displays the ways in 
which actual deliberation and inclusion appeared to be in contrast to those characterised in 
deliberative democracy theory. 
 
4.2.1 Inclusiveness 
 
My empirical case of  GM Dialogue shows that the division of  labour did not actually 
enhance inclusiveness in the way that macro-deliberative democracy theorists assumed. In 
the sense of  the number of  participants, the division of  labour increased the extent of  
inclusiveness. The efforts were great to devise various divisions of  labour for including a 
wide range of  participation into deliberation process. However, apparently the systematic 
efforts for integrating the broad participants and their divergent representations (e.g. 
meanings and relationships) into the decision-making process were much less than those to 
divide up. Rather, through a reflexive process, participants’ divergent representations were 
intermingled into the decision-making process as they inter-reflected upon and influenced 
one another. This endogenous, discursive way of  inclusion appeared to be more feasible 
and effective in a real-world macro deliberation exercise. 
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Structure of  GM Dialogue 
 
After the AEBC suggested the idea of  public debate, the government added two other 
strands, namely Science Review and the Economic Study as part of  the whole programme 
of  GM Dialogue.  This framework of  a composition with three distinctive strands of  GM 
Dialogue was confirmed by the government in May 2002. This initial design had an overall 
remit as well as each strand having its own purpose separately. The overall official aim of  
GM Dialogue as a whole programme was to review the incumbent knowledge on GM 
from different perspectives.  Individually, GM Nation? officially aimed to engage the 
public in GM issues and to inform GM policy with the output of the debate; the purpose 
of Science Review was examining the current state of scientific knowledge around GM; and 
the Economic Study was due to research prospecting possible costs and benefits of GM.  
The main sponsor of  this whole programme was DEFRA and people from other 
government departments got involved, such as the Strategy Unit in the Prime Minister’s 
cabinet office, Office of  Science and Technology (OST) and other government-sponsored 
institutions, such as the Advisory Committee on Releases into the Environment (ACRE), 
the British Association for the Advancement of  Science (BA), the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA) and the AEBC, as well as people from other government-funded institutions who 
participated as individuals. 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the overall picture of  three strands and their nested smaller events of  
GM Dialogue. It presents those who were involved in various events within GM Dialogue 
as overseeing committees, discussants of  the main events and others (organisers, advisors, 
and specialists) under each strand of  GM Dialogue. As this diagram explains, the whole 
macro deliberation programme of  GM Dialogue was composed of  three big strands, each 
with their own purpose; and each strand also consisted of  diverse deliberative activities 
with their various ends and means. FSA was presented on the website of  GM Dialogue as 
part of  the whole programme of  GM Dialogue. However, soon after the beginning of   
GM Dialogue, it announced that it would proceed with its own research and later published 
its separate report Consumer Views of GM Food and submitted it to the Secretary of State for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs on 17 July 2003.  
 
GM Nation?: The government (DEFRA) appointed Professor Malcolm Grant as the chair 
of the independent steering board to organise a public debate. This project addresses its 
aim as being to “Promote an innovative, effective and deliberative programme of debate on 
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GM issues, framed by the public, against the background of the possible commercial 
production of GM crops in the UK and the options for possibly proceeding with this. […] 
provide meaningful information to Government about the nature and spectrum of the 
public's views, particularly at grass roots level, to inform decision-making.”24
 
  
GM Science Review: Professor Sir David King, the Government's Chief Scientific 
Adviser led the Science Review strand and chaired the panel with the aid of Professor 
Howard Dalton (the Chief Scientific Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs). The Science Review Panel was composed of natural and social 
scientists “to monitor the progress and credibility of the Science Review and, towards the 
end of the review, summarise the state of scientific knowledge, consensus and areas of 
uncertainty on each key issue.”25
 
 
The Economics Study: A team from the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit undertook the 
Economic Study. This study aimed to analyse “the nature and distribution of costs and 
benefits that could arise under different scenarios for the commercialisation of GM crops 
in the UK.”26
                                                 
24 The original URL (http://www.gmnation.org.uk) was lastly accessed on 29 July 2007 for this 
thesis. This original website was closed down sometime in 2008 and after a few years, the current 
website (accessed on 25 November 2012) appeared with the same URL address, but the contents 
are completely different. 
25 The original URL (http://www.gmsciencedebate.org.uk) was accessed lastly on 25 April 2008. 
The original website is archived in the National archive website: 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081023141438/http://www.gmsciencedebate.org.uk/
default.htm )  
26 Available from: 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_ar
eas/gm_crops.aspx)  (accessed on 6 December 2012) 
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Figure 4.1 Three Strands of  GM Dialogue 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Timeline of  GM Dialogue 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Month 6 9 4 5 7 9 10 11 12 1 2 4 6 7 9 10 1 3 
AEBC Set 
up 
 
 
Report 
‘Crops 
on 
Trial’ 
Advice 
to  
Gov. 
               
Gov.    Announce – 
public 
debate 
including 
two other 
strands 
Response 
to AEBC’s 
advice on 
25th 
            Report on 
Public 
debate 
Response 
report to 
GM 
Dialogue 
GM 
Nation? 
     1stSteering 
Board 
meeting on 
13th  
COI was 
appointed 
 Foundation 
Workshops 
Desk 
research  
 COI 
proposed 
3-tier 
meeting 
 Public Meetings 
Narrow-but-Deep 
Final 
report 
   
Science 
review 
        1st Panel 
meet on 
10th  
1st Open 
meeting 
on 23rd 
  All 
meeting 
finished 
1st 
report 
 FSE 
Report 
–Royal 
Society 
2nd 
report 
 
Eco. 
study 
      1st 
phase 
 
 2nd  phase  
Scenario -
Workshop 
 
 
 3rd  phase 
Shocks 
and 
surprises-
seminar 
 Report      
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As Table 4.2 shows, three strands of  the programme were taking place almost 
simultaneously.  The original official rationale of  the design of  the three strands was to 
review different aspects from the point of  view of  the public, the scientists and the 
economists around the commercialisation of  GM crops and to feed one another with the 
output of  each strand27
 
. I will discuss this issue in a later part of  this chapter.  
4.2.1.1 GM Nation? 
 
GM Nation? is the title for the public debate strand. The AEBC initiated GM Dialogue 
from the idea of  ‘broader engagement of  society’, and it was formalised into GM Nation?.  
In this sense, the public debate was the core concept of  the whole programme. The 
Central Office of  Information (COI), a government in-house communication agency 
suggested this title. COI was commissioned by DEFRA to conduct a public debate with 
the steering board, an independent body, which were in charge of  organising and managing 
the strand of  public debate.  
 
This strand of  public debate - GM Nation? - had its sub- deliberation exercises. In other 
words, this one of  the three strands of  GM Dialogue itself  was composed with its nested 
deliberation exercises. These varied in their purpose and method, such as the expert group 
meetings of  the steering board, the Foundation Workshops with recruited citizens, three 
tiers of  public meetings and focused group meetings named Narrow-but-Deep. As GM 
Nation? was the public debate strand with an aim of  gathering the public’s views to inform 
the policy, the core objective of  each sub-exercise was along the same lines, yet with its 
own specific sub-purpose and particular method. These nested exercises were developed by 
the steering board and COI as they discussed. These steering board and COI were the 
groups of  people who designed and organised the strand of  GM Nation?. However, those 
who were not directly inside these groups, also tried to have their influence on the 
development of  GM Nation?. Furthermore, those who were not directly involved in the 
designing and organising, as well as those who were inside the circle of  designing and 
organising group, had their respective, often contrasting, views on divisions of  labour. 
Therefore, as the programme developed, there were such complex interactions among 
                                                 
27This is stated in Government’s response to the AEBC’s advice  2002: 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081023141438/http://www.DEFRA.gov.uk/environ
ment/gm/crops/debate/aebc-response.htm accessed on 27 August 2012) 
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those behind the explicitly performed and emerged divisions of  labour. 
 
The Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (AEBC) 
 
As established in the previous section, the turbulent debate on GM in the UK in 1998 and 
1999 made the Government set up a strategic advisory body, the AEBC, in June 2000. The 
remit of  the AEBC was as follows: 
 
“ to provide the UK Government and Devolved Administrations with independent, 
strategic advice on developments in biotechnology and their implications for 
agriculture and the environment. It looks at the broad picture taking ethical and social 
issues into account as well as the science.”28
 
  
 
After the AEBC addressed the importance of  public engagement in GM policy making in 
its report Crops on Trial (2001), the government (DEFRA) requested the AEBC for further 
advice on this. The AEBC developed further details of  public debate and submitted them 
to the government in April 2002. As the AEBC suggested the idea of  public debate on 
GM to the government, one of  their sub- groups developed the initial framework of  GM 
Dialogue. The chair of  the AEBC, Professor Malcolm Grant, was appointed as the chair of  
the steering board of  GM Nation?. Therefore, he and a few members of  the AEBC were 
the actual designers of  the public debate strand, GM Nation?. Those who were involved in 
this initial setting up of  the programme of  GM Dialogue became the members of  the 
steering board of  the public debate strand. The rest of  the steering board members, who 
were four out of  eleven, were recruited from outside the AEBC. DEFRA suggested the 
early board members of  COI to help them to manage the programme. There were 
concerns on this issue from both inside and outside of  the early group of  the steering 
board, since COI was an in-house communication agency for the Government. Having 
considered the important element of  independence of  the programme from the 
Government in that context, it could have ruined the credibility of  the programme itself. 
However, despite the concerns raised, the early group of  the steering board decided to 
have COI for the practical reasons of  organising the programme, such as time and 
procurement.  
 
COI worked closely with the early steering board members and influenced the 
                                                 
28 Available from (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100419143351/http://www.aeb
c.gov.uk/) 
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development the programme a great deal. Even before the complete recruitment of  the 
steering board, there was already a lot of  discussion among these, on the principles of  the 
whole programme of  GM Dialogue and the relationship of  the three strands, as well as 
GM Nation?. Therefore, the AEBC was the organisers, who most heavily influenced and 
constructed the structure of  public debate and initiation of  GM Dialogue. Many 
incidences of  the AEBC meeting minutes contain the records of  their discussions on GM 
Dialogue.  
 
The AEBC had an ambiguous position in the regulatory system.  It was a strategic advisory 
body, but did not have the statutory right to legislation. As established before, mostly the 
inside of the government had a quite obviously favoured position on bio- and GM 
technology. Although the government (DEFRA) set up the AEBC, this was due to social 
pressure. What the AEBC has done since its establishment has not quite met the 
government’s expectations. It could be argued that the AEBC was strategically made by the 
government to evade that social pressure. The government might have thought the AEBC 
would be a kind of firewall to serve as a defence mechanism for protection against the 
pressure outside and expected that they could intervene as they wished.  One of the main 
actors of the AEBC in GM Nation? recalled a few moments, when the government tried to 
intervene in the steering board. The AEBC was closed down completely in 2005.  
 
The Steering Board 
 
The steering board consisted of  11 members, seven of  whom, including the chair, 
Professor Malcolm Grant, were members of  the AEBC. Although the actual activities and 
membership of  the steering board overlapped with the AEBC, the steering board was the 
official designer group of  GM Nation?. They had a total of  16 meetings to discuss the 
procedural issues of  GM Nation? in public. The first such public meeting was held on 13 
September 2002 with its members and two secretariats from DEFRA, and the final 
meeting was held on 3 October 2003. These meetings in themselves were deliberative 
activities to discuss procedural issues, which were open to the public to be observed and all 
of  the meeting minutes were posted on the official website.  
 
 
 
90 
 
 
 
Desk Research 
 
COI and an independent researcher, John Kelly, started a preliminary desk research. The 
desk research aimed to inform COI and the steering board of  the issues of  public attitudes 
and technical matters of  public engagement, and ultimately to ‘inform the programme of  
debate (Sub-group meeting minute of  the AEBC, 23 September 2002)’.  
 
The Strategic Consultancy team of COI undertook a research on the designing issues of the 
public debate programme (Desk research on strategic considerations for the debate) and John Kelly 
conducted a research on the issues related to public views on GM (Desk research on public 
attitudes to GM). As this report says, it does not specify only the issue of  commercialisation 
of  certain GM crops, but also covers the general issues of  public attitudes around GM 
covering crops, foods and commercialisation: 
 
“Attitudes to GM food are intertwined with attitudes to the commercialisation of GM 
crops, the great bulk of which are intended for the production of GM food. For this 
reason, and also because there are relatively few sources of information on public 
attitudes specific to the commercialisation of GM crops, the two subjects are largely 
treated as one in this report” (from Introduction of Desk research on public attitudes to GM ). 
 
Foundation Workshops 
 
The Foundation Workshops were another preliminary research aiming to frame public 
debate. Corr Willbourn Research and Development (independent social research company) 
carried out the Foundation Workshops and reported the results. Nine workshops took 
place across the UK (Manchester, Ludlow, London, Reading, Belfast/Co.Down, 
Edinburgh, Bromsgrove, Ruthin and Norwich) in November 2002. One group had 
participants who were ‘actively involved in the GM field’ and the rest were groups 
comprised of  the ‘general public’ who were not associated with any employment, research 
or campaigning of  GM issues (Corr Willbourn 2002, p. 5). Each workshop had 18-20 
participants and two facilitators. Participants discussed for about three hours. The general 
public groups were recruited from across four different age groups and six socio-economic 
bands,29
                                                 
29 “The standard socio-economic classification system used by the National Readership Survey 
(NRS)” (Corr Willbourn 2002, p. 7) 
 and the ‘actively involved’ group was composed of nine anti-GM participants and 
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nine pro-GM participants. This deliberation exercise was designed on the basis of a clear 
definition of the general public as per the following: 
 
“It is also important to note that the general public sample comprised people who had 
no prior allegiance with, or connection to, GM. Hence they genuinely represented 
‘grass roots’ opinions that have largely gone unheard or been ignored in the GM 
debate thus far.” (Corr Willbourn 2002, p. 6) 
 
The final report of  GM Nation? states that the results of  the Foundation Workshops were 
used for the debate feedback forms and the Narrow-but-Deep event. In addition, 
occasionally, the other two strands stated in their publication that they had considered the 
issues raised from the public debate strand. I think they meant that they had considered the 
results of  the Foundation Workshops. Otherwise, there was not much evidence of  the 
results of  public debate events to feed the other two strands at the programme level. 
Although there were inter-linking efforts amongst individual actors, nothing but the results 
of  the Foundation Workshops fed the other two strands at the explicit designing level.  
 
Public Meetings 
 
Three tiers of public meetings took place across the UK. Public meetings were open to 
anyone who wanted to attend, therefore, the participants were ‘self-selected’ (The final 
report of GM Nation?, p. 25). 
 
Tier 1 – six national public meetings were organised by the steering board and COI 
(Birmingham - 3 June, Swansea - 5 June, Taunton - 7 June, Belfast - 9 June, Glasgow - 11 
June and Harrogate - 13 June).  Each meeting had a few hundred participants. They were 
divided into tables of over 10 people to discuss the issues. They chose a facilitator among 
themselves at each table and the topics were given by the chairman at the beginning of the 
discussion. As an example, the transcript of the Birmingham meeting gives us a description 
of the process. The chairman gave the topics (risk and benefit analysis, impact and 
implication GM crops in the UK) at the beginning of each three sessions (the chairman 
having divided the debate into three sessions), but people raised many different kinds of 
issues, which they wanted to discuss. There were 28 tables divided into groups to discuss 
and at the end of each session, they were given opportunities to present the results of their 
discussion by the order of table numbers.  
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Tier 2 – the meetings on tier 2 were organised by county councils or national organisations 
in co-operation with the steering board and COI. About 40 regional meetings were held. 
There was a little flexibility for the organisers to change the format.  For example, 
organisers were free to have experts answering the questions: 
 
“[…] because in those meetings, there were no real experts. We gave them information. 
We allowed people to express their own views and respond to the information. But 
some local councils said ‘we have a professor here’. Cambridge for example, had a 
couple of  emeritus professors. And a couple of  people were opposed to it. […] 
somebody from the Friends of  the Earth […] So it was very much their choice, how 
they wanted to do that. We just supported them doing that. But when it was traditional 
theatre style public debate, it wasn’t very satisfactory.”  (Interview with one from COI) 
 
Tier 3 – voluntary organisers held their local meetings on their own. COI invited them to 
organise their own meetings by providing the ‘stimulus materials’ designed by the steering 
board and COI to aid the meetings. COI estimated that 629 local meetings were held. The 
following quote from the person from COI illustrates how freely the meetings reached out 
to the local and small communities. Therefore, the tier 3 meetings were not only a self-
selected but also self-organised type of  public discussion. COI did not even have the 
accurate number of  meetings held due to this nature: 
  
“Often in tier 3, we would supply people with materials. We sent them copies of  
brochures[…] having offered, ‘if  you want to take a part, come to us, we will give 
things’ […] so, for example, some umbrella organisations were approached, people like 
the Women’s Institutes, that have lots and lots of  branches. We said, ‘Would you be 
interested? If  you want to promote, get your people to come to us’. So, some of  those 
did.” (Interview with one from COI) 
 
Summing up together all three meetings, the final report of  GM Nation? states that the 
estimated number of  participants was around 20,000.  These three tiers of  public meetings 
were the main event, which somehow represented the GM Nation? or even the whole 
programme of  GM Dialogue, regarding its primary principle of  national dialogue being 
open to everyone. Although the main principle of  three tiers was the same, each tier had 
variances in their size, location, format and authority of  organisation. The various means 
and rationales of  three tiers were novel to the public engagement exercises of  the UK’s 
science policy history.  In a sense of  reaching out to the public across the whole nation, it 
seemed to have achieved its aim of  getting “public’s view at grass root’s level” (The final 
report of  GM Nation?). However, given the huge amount of  investment with regard to the 
designing, organising and participating efforts, there was little evidence in the efforts to 
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make the most use of  the outputs of  those investments. In other words, there was little 
designing and organising efforts to integrate the results of  variously designed deliberation 
exercises and extract the outputs from them to make them useful inputs for the decision. 
Instead, what organisers were happy with was that they reached this huge number of  
people and gave them a chance to voice their views. The following quote shows that the 
different designs of  deliberation exercises with various rationales lost their value at the end 
since what they did at the end of  the three tier meetings, was collecting survey results.  The 
survey sheets were completed by the participants who came and discussed in person at 
differently designed meetings. The organisers hired a data processing company to deal with 
these survey results: 
  
“[…] the only thing we tried to make happen with those meetings was to give 
everybody who participated a chance to feedback individually. That was very important. 
In our thinking, it doesn’t matter whether you came to a big regional event or a tier 
two event or tier three event. At the end of  your time you were given for this debate, 
you have a form that you can fill in and put in the post and register your individual 
view.” (Interview with one from COI) 
 
Narrow–but–Deep 
 
Ten focus groups’ sequential (twice) meetings, called ‘Narrow–but–Deep’ were held in June 
and July 2003. Corr Wilbourn Research and Development conducted this series of  
reconvened discussions. The aim of  this deliberation exercise was ‘to get a detailed picture 
of  the response to GM issues from a typical cross-section of  the wider population (The 
final report of  GM Nation?, p. 14)’ for the purpose of  testing the possibility of  the silent 
majority. There were discussions among the steering board and COI as to whether there 
would be a majority who did not speak out on the issues. Therefore, the convened 
discussion had the participants who were not ‘self-selected’ but recruited by the designed 
criteria to select them and financial commissions to recruit them.  77 people participated in 
the discussion twice.  
 
Each group of  eight participants met twice with a facilitator. The method of  this event had 
a similar approach to the Foundation Workshops. Four different age stages and two socio-
economic bands were used for recruiting ‘the general public’. 78 (first session) and 77 
(second session) participants were recruited, who must have not worked, done a research 
nor campaigned on GM issues.  
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1st session: participants were introduced to the issues around GM and provided with the 
GM Nation? booklet and CD-Rom prepared by the steering board and COI.  They 
discussed the issues on GM and were also asked to devise their own ways to engage with 
the GM issues and to carry out their own activities before the second meeting in two 
weeks’ time. 
 
2nd session: participants reported the results of  their own activities related to GM issues 
during the previous two weeks, such as collecting information or exploring any other 
activities, and discussed the substantive issues on GM.  
 
The steering board published its final report and submitted it to the government in 
September 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Science Review 
Box 4.1 Chronology of GM Nation? 
 
April 2002: The AEBC submitted advice to the government. 
 
May 2002: The secretary of DEFRA announced that a public debate would take place 
alongside the Science Review and the Economic Study.  
 
July 2002: The Secretary of State agreed to AEBC recommendations, budget and 
timetable and appointed Malcolm Grant to be chair of the steering board, to lead the 
debate and appoint other members.  
 
August 2002: The Government confirmed that the debate would be conducted on behalf 
of the three devolved administrations, namely Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. 
The steering board accepted the government’s suggestion of COI as a prime contractor 
to manage the debate.  
 
December 2002: The results of Desk research were published. 
 
November 2002: The Foundation Workshops (nine workshops) were organised by Corr 
Willbourn Research and Development.  
 
February 2003: The Government and devolved administrations agreed to double the 
budget for the debate programme, to extend the time to July and report to 
Government by September.  
 
June 2003: Three tiers of public meetings were held. 
 
June and July 2003: Narrow-but-Deep, a series of reconvened discussions was conducted 
by Corr Willbourn Research and Development. Its report was published in September.  
 
September 2003: The final report was published and reported to the Government by the 
steering board. 
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The aim of the Science Review strand was to review the incumbent scientific knowledge on 
GM crops. Professor Sir David King, the Government's Chief Scientific Adviser, was the 
chair of the Science Review Panel and led this strand. Officially Howard Dalton (the Chief 
Scientific Adviser to the Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs), 
was supposed to work with David King, but his presence was quite rare. The first report of 
this review addressed its aim as the following: 
 
“The aim of this review is to consider the evidence for both the real and perceived 
risks and benefits of GM crops from a scientific perspective.” (Executive summary, in 
First Report) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This strand was composed of  a few differently designed deliberative activities. These were 
Science Review panel meetings of  26 scientists, Open meetings of  scientists in public with 
specific themes, and the website was open to citizens and stakeholders to give their 
opinions.  
 
Science Review Panel Meetings 
 
The Science Review panel was composed of  26 scientists 30
                                                 
30 The initial number was 25 scientists. Carlo Leifert left the panel from the 6th meeting, and Dr. 
Bruce Pearce and Dr. Michael Antoniou joined from the 8th meeting. Therefore, the final list of 
panels published on the website of Science Review has only the latter two people but no record of 
Carlo Leifert leaving. 
 (according to the official 
website – however, there were different numbers of  members during the interim period). 
Although the range of  their interests, backgrounds and affiliations was diverse, most of  
them were bio-related scientists, who were mainly from natural science, and a few from 
social science, backgrounds. Two to four secretariats from OST also attended meetings. 
The panel had 11 meetings (the first meeting being held on 10 December 2002 and the last 
Box 4.2 Chronology of  Science Review 
 
December 2002 - December 2003: Total of  11 panel meetings in public were 
held. 
 
January - March 2003: Four open meetings were held. 
 
July 2003: First report was published. 
 
January 2004: Second report was published. 
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meeting on 22 December 2003), which were held in public so that people could observe the 
meetings. The Science Review panel published two reports (the First Report on 21 July 
2003 and the Second Report on 22 January 2004). Their remit was as follows: “The Panel 
was given two principal functions: first, to oversee the science review and ensure that it is 
achieving its stated aims and objectives and second, towards the end of  the review to 
summarise the state of  scientific knowledge, concerns and areas of  uncertainty for each 
issue, as fairly and as accurately as possible.”31
 
   
Although the panel’s role was overseeing the strand of  the Science Review as well as 
providing a summarisation of  substantive subject issues on GM crops, the panel actually 
did not work much on the procedural issues of  the strand. Many of  the procedural matters 
were already set even before the panel was composed, which seemed to have been done by 
OST. It was also because scientists- mostly natural scientists - wanted to focus their 
discussion on only ‘scientific’ matter: 
“They were mostly scientists so the atmosphere was that we had to talk about science. 
We are not here to talk about process. Scientists often say this. They wouldn’t really 
expect to talk about that.” (Interview with one of  the Science Review Panel members) 
 
The panel was divided into three sub-groups called ‘Mentor drafting groups’- GM food 
safety; Gene flow, detection and impact; and Environmental impact of  GM crops. In the second panel 
meeting, the secretary (one of  the secretariat from OST) proposed sub-grouping of  the 
panel and invited each member to join the groups according to their own expertise and 
interest. These three groups were chosen from the five themes of  discussion:  GM food and 
feed safety; Gene flow, detection and impact; Environmental Impact of  GM crops; Future Developments; 
and Regulatory process. The secretary added his explanation of  that the two left themes - 
Future Developments and Regulatory process- would be covered through by all three groups. This 
frame of  the three groups was already set and given by the secretary from OST. However, 
there were attempts of  the panel members to alter the initial given frame so as to apply it to 
finding their roles in the panel. The following quote from the meeting minutes of  the panel 
shows that somehow the panel’s self-reliant role-identifying and thus emerging 
                                                 
31 The original website (http://www.gmsciencedebate.org.uk) was lastly accessed on 25 April 2008 
and it has been archived in the National archive 
website:(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081023141438/http://www.gmsciencedeba
te.org.uk/default.htm ) 
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characteristic of  the structure was acknowledged and encouraged among the panel 
members:  
“The Review needed to be comprehensive, building on the various themes at the 
academic/scientific level (bottom-up) and considering, academically, what is required 
from the regulatory perspective (top-down). It was agreed that the characterisation of 
the drafting groups might change with time, depending on the nature of contributors’ 
comments and other inputs.” (2nd Science Review panel meeting minute) 
 
Open Meetings 
 
Within this strand, there was another type of  discussions of  scientists, which were also held 
in public. OST (whose head was David King) commissioned the British Association for the 
Advancement of  Science (BA) to organise these meetings. These exercises were a kind of  
forum, which were open to anyone to observe, and ask questions and make comments. 
Each of four meetings (GM Food safety – London, Gene flow - Edinburgh, GM animal 
feed: safety implications for the food chain - Belfast, and GM crops; gene flow and fitness 
in natural and agricultural systems – Ceredigion)32
 
 had a specific theme to be discussed. 
There were three to four speakers (scientists) to present for ten minutes and then they were 
questioned by three or four scientists from the Science Review panel. The audience could 
ask questions or make comments. 
These open meetings were somehow for providing an assortment of  various science 
personnel and the public to engage in events. Especially for the spirit of  ‘openness’ of  the 
GM Dialogue, the organiser must have experienced pressure that everything should be 
made in public. It was just one of  showcases for the Science Review strand. One of  the 
panel members said in the interview, that it was a kind of  Public Relations exercise. As seen 
in the following statement for the aim of  these exercises, there was not much difference in 
the role of  these events from panel meetings. 
 
“The aim of these scientific meetings was to explore, in public, the science underlying 
particular GM issues. In general 3 to 4 scientists were invited at each meeting to offer 
different perspectives on an issue. Transcripts, papers, speakers' abstracts etc. for the 
meetings are all set out below.”33
                                                 
32 Additionally, a discussion on GM Crops, ‘Modern Agriculture and the Environment’ was held 
separately by the Royal Society in London in February 2003. 
 
33 The original website (http://www.gmsciencedebate.org.uk) was accessed in July 2007 and it is  
archived in the National archive 
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The first report was published in July 2003. The Science Review panel submitted this to 
the ministers. The panel posted it on the official website and invited comments from 
stakeholders and citizens. The following is from David King’s foreword to the first report: 
 
“The Review has endeavoured to take an open look at the science relevant to GM 
crops and food, and to do so in a way that recognises the interests and concerns of the 
public as well as the science community. So I am sure this report will be of widespread 
interest. The Review Panel invites and welcomes your comments on the report. Over 
the summer, our Review website will be open to receive them. We also continue to 
welcome scientific contributions to the website. All contributions must be submitted 
by 15 October 2003. 
 
The Panel will then reconvene in late autumn to consider these comments together 
with the report of the GM public debate “GM Nation?”. In the light of these, we will 
wish to consider whether there are any further issues we should address. We will also 
look to see if there have been significant developments in GM science over the 
summer that we should report on, and will consider the results of the farm scale 
evaluations of GM crops if these are available.” 
 
The second report was published in January 2004. The panel reviewed the first report 
considering the comments received from individual citizens and stakeholders, and the 
results of  the Farm-Scale Evaluations (FSE) research report.34
 
 
“During this second phase, the Panel met on four occasions to discuss comments 
received on our First Report and the extent to which these altered our conclusions. We 
also examined the report of the GM Public Debate ‘GM Nation?’, to consider whether 
there were any further issues we should address and we also looked to see if there had 
been significant developments in GM science over the summer that we should report 
on. In particular, we considered the results of the UK Farm-Scale Evaluations of GM 
crops.” (from David King’s Foreword to the Second report) 
 
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) initially started as part of  the Science Review strand. 
However, it carried out a separate research in the end.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
website:(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081023141438/http://www.gmsciencedebat
e.org.uk/default.htm )  
34 FSE- A field research on the effects of  genetically modified crops (the herbicide tolerant crops) 
on farmland wildlife started in 1999. The results of  the research were published in Philosophical 
Transactions of  the Royal Society (Biological Sciences) in October 2003. 
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4.2.1.3 The Economic Study 
 
The Prime Minister's Strategy Unit undertook the Economic Study and published a report, 
Field Work: weighing up the costs and benefits of  GM crops on 11 July 2003. The report states its 
objective as the following: 
 
“The main objective of  this study has been to provide a comprehensive and balanced 
analysis of  the costs and benefits of  the possible commercial cultivation, or 
otherwise, of  GM crops in the UK. The study focuses on crops that are currently 
available, as well as possible developments in the next 10-15 years, and develops 
scenarios to explore a range of  possible futures.” (from Executive summary in the 
final report of  the Economic Study) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategy Unit Project Team 
 
The project team consisted of 10 people from the Strategy Unit.  They were mainly 
economists and had policy background, but they were not specifically experienced in GM 
policy.  
 
Expert Advisory Group 
 
The project team appointed three Expert Advisory Groups to assist with different aspects 
of the analysis (Environment Expert Group, Product Chains Expert Group, and Industry and Science 
Expert Group).  Each group of seven members met on three occasions to consider the 
scoping note, scenario development/background working papers and draft analysis papers 
respectively.  Some of them attended the Shocks and Surprises seminar and Scenario 
workshop as individual stakeholders. Many of them were also engaged in other strands of 
GM Dialogue with one or two cross membership of the AEBC, the steering board or 
Science Review panel. For example, one, who was a member of the AEBC and the steering 
board of the GM Nation?, also belonged to ‘Industry and Science Expert Group’ with his 
affiliation of a biotechnology company.   
Box 4.3 Chronology of  the Economic Study 
 
September 2002: Scoping note was published. 
December 2002: Scenario workshop was held. 
April 2003: Shocks and surprises seminar was held. 
July 2003- The final report was published. 
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Its final report summarises its structure as three phases:  
 
The first phase: the Strategy Unit team published a scoping note on 25 September 2002 
and invited comments from stakeholders and experts. They received the responses from 
organisations and individuals outside and inside of the government.  This scoping note 
was presented to the steering board in October and it was revised in response to their 
comments. 
 
The second phase: the Strategy Unit team developed a methodology through discussions 
with its Expert Advisory Groups and with stakeholders. They held a ‘Scenario workshop’35 
with stakeholders and experts on 2 December 2002. The objectives of this workshop were 
to find out ‘key issues and uncertainties’ to be addressed and to frame scenarios based on 
those. 23 experts were invited from various institutions, as broad as universities, research 
institutions, industries and NGOs. Four people from the Strategy Unit team, two civil 
servants from DEFRA and two professional facilitators (Frontline Consultants) were there. 
The output of this workshop was used for the Strategy Unit team’s developing of five 
different scenarios. The scenarios, developed on the basis of this workshop, were part of a 
wider methodology that the Strategy Unit employed to conduct its study. The Strategy Unit 
team also published an overview methodology paper and a series of working papers36 on 
30 January 2003.  They held a seminar on possible ‘shocks and surprises’37
 
 on 3 April 2003, 
which might not fit into the developed scenarios. Stakeholders and experts attended to 
discuss the possible negative and positive impacts of GM.  26 stakeholders, 6 government 
stakeholders and 6 members from the Strategy Unit team were the attendees.  
The final phase: the Strategy Unit team published its report Field Work: weighing up the costs 
and benefits of GM crops, in July 2003, analysing the costs and benefits that could arise under 
the different scenarios. 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 Available from: 
(http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_ar
eas/gm_crops.aspx)   
36 Available from: (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.
uk/strategy/work_areas/gm_crops.aspx) 
37 Available from: (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.
uk/strategy/work_areas/gm_crops.aspx) 
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4.2.1.4 Discussions 
 
Representativeness of  the experts in deliberation 
 
The experts’ deliberation process did not take place in a form of  merely rational dialogue 
with just their ‘professional expertise or knowledge’. Emphasising only the ‘professional 
expertise or knowledge’ as their explicit qualification for participation could have obscured 
the other part of  the story of  the deliberation process, such as political, personal interests 
and relationships. And consequently, that might have raised the expectation for deliberation 
to be a pure rational argumentation process among professionals. However, the other 
implicit, un-codified, informal elements of  deliberation among experts also played a 
significant part in shaping the deliberation process of  GM Dialogue. Organising groups of  
experts (such as the AEBC, the steering board, the Science Review panel and the Strategy 
Unit team) were composed to manage the deliberation exercises. Their decisions were 
expected to be independent from any political power outside of  the programme. In 
particular, at this type of  policy event, which was entangled with many stakes, the principle 
of  ‘arm’s length distance’ from the Government was often emphasised by the sponsors 
themselves. While the independence from external power had been emphasised as an 
important qualification for the experts’ deliberation, the independence from internal power 
was rather taken for granted as if  it had been there in the expert deliberation.   
 
Efforts were there in the composition of  organising groups to widen the range of  
perspectives. The AEBC, the steering board, the Science Review panel and the expert 
advisory groups of  the Economic Study all claimed reflections of  broad aspects around the 
issues. However, this claim had often been criticised, both inside and out, and had never 
received the full satisfaction from all parties. This may be natural as the members of  the 
organising groups represent different stakeholder groups’ interests. They were recruited, 
not only because of  their substantive knowledge, but also because of  their 
representativeness of  certain stakeholder groups. One of  the Science Review panel 
members said that he was recommended as representing environmentalists groups; he also 
said that no-one was supposed to represent any group or organisation on the panel. 
 
It is arguable that the composition of  an independent credible expert group to organise 
such novel public deliberation exercises reflected not only their diverse perspectives around 
the substantive issue, but also incumbent power relations in the policy networks. Therefore, 
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issues of  representativeness were raised among those who were outside as well as inside of  
those groups. The following quotation is from an interview with one of  the AEBC 
members, who was from a pharmaceutical company: 
 
“My interest was clear in that the industry did need to be represented on the AEBC. 
And it was very clear in those first two years […] it was a very lonely voice as they 
weren’t taking notice of  any submissions we made to them and they needed to have 
somebody at the table actually looking into their eyes and saying: Sorry, this is not 
actually really happening.” (Interview with one of  the AEBC members) 
 
A few interviewees pointed out that the organising groups themselves somehow 
represented public diversity in the real world. The dynamics within the groups did not 
differ much from those of  public meetings. Academics, experts and professionals did not 
have merely a rationale dialogue with publicly defensive arguments; they displayed various 
forms of  relations utilising indisputable facts and disputable arguments for their 
rationalisation and for ‘scientific decisions’: 
 
“The AEBC was a sort of  strange body, because it didn’t have regulatory powers but it 
was there to advise the government on the strategic matters. My understanding is that 
someone in the government or some group of  people within the government thought 
it would be a good idea to, the term I am using is ‘encapsulate’ the microcosm of  the 
debate, which was going on in society about genetic modification; so, in another words, 
there is a debate, and there is politics and these things are contested in society. If  you 
get certain key stakeholders from different groups, we put them together in the 
committee, perhaps to sort this thing out between them, they will work through the 
tension which exists in society as a whole. My understanding of  that was thinking 
which of  them was behind the reason the AEBC had the particular structure and 
composition that it did […]” (Interview with one of  the evaluation team members) 
 
 
“I think the most important role of the public or stakeholders was in the constitution 
of the panel because if you look at this panel, it’s a very broad panel for looking at 
science. […] they [The government] were keen to make sure it looked fair. And they 
would have been forced into that position because they were on the defensive of GM, 
They were losing the argument. So they needed to have a group that was constituted 
broadly and the stakeholder achieved that because they were creating the pressure, 
political pressure, so it was crucial, even before it began, to make it happen in a certain 
way.” (Interview with one of the Science Review panel members) 
  
Who is the public? 
 
It was quite obvious that majority of  the attendants of  the public meetings of  GM 
Dialogue were from NGOs and certain groups of  people who had specific interests and 
stakes to come and have their say. Who should be the legitimate representatives of  the UK 
public for GM policy; contrasting views on the representation of  the public were 
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inherently confronted by one another in the designing of  public engagement. 
 
There was discussion within the steering board about whether there would be the other 
public  who did not come to participate in the meetings but had a different view, as many 
participants who attended the public meetings were ‘self-selected’ and had a strong desire 
and opinions on the issues to come to the meetings.  They were often from NGOs. 
Whether these participants would represent the general public was a debate among the 
organisers. Therefore, they designed ‘Narrow-but-Deep’, which was a kind of  experiment 
to see the possible different opinions between the self-selected and GM-interested, and the 
recruited and not specifically GM-interested. This discussion relates to the representative 
issue of  public deliberation: who would be the legitimate public to be involved in policy-
making process; and what would be the legitimate process of  deliberation? Therefore, 
behind certain explicitly designed public engagement events, people’s opinion had been 
diverged on this fundamental issue: 
 
“We [the steering board] recognised from the start that all of  the activities in the open 
debate might provide evidence of  views from only a certain seam of  British society – 
broadly speaking, people who are regularly engaged in public issues. As we note below, 
it is quite unusual for people to attend a meeting on a public issue or to write a letter 
about it (especially one such as GM which has not played a big part in everyday life). 
We therefore decided to commission a parallel research based on a series of  
reconvened discussion groups [...]” (The final report of  GM Nation?, p. 14) 
 
Especially in the context of  science policy making, there were radically different views on 
the role of  the public for the policy making: 
 
“The obvious problem is that those people who come forward, the people who tend 
to have a view of these things, either about GM specifically or because they are very 
interested in democracy, […] But it seems unlikely that people just drift in off the 
street unless they have some specific reasons, which suggests that you have to be 
careful about what information you gain from them over what status it has, and 
obviously it has a status of the people who are stakeholders in a strong sense. […] It 
would be quite wrong, I think, to suggest that such people shouldn’t have a say [...]” 
(Interview with one of the evaluation team members) 
  
For the example of  the case Narrow-but-Deep event, organisers had to pay the participants 
money to make them come back to the second meeting.  The designer of  these events 
pointed out that it was hard to anticipate ‘people’s goodwill’ for them to attend the public 
meetings, in particular the second meeting.  
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“Yes, it is in a standard commercial research that participants have a financial incentive. 
For the simple reason that’s why it gets you a high turn-out and a high number of  
people coming back. If  we have to rely on people’s goodwill, it wouldn’t have 
happened. My perception of  the public events is that they are largely populated by 
people who already work in engaged debate and want another chance to express their 
views. The great silent majority - you have to pay them. That’s just the reality of  life.” 
(Interview with the one of  Corr Willbourn Research and Development) 
 
Voluntary public participation is not just a matter of  ‘goodwill’ to come to discuss public 
issues for the common good. It is also a power issue around public engagement. Since 
participation requires resources for attending the meeting and deliberating upon the issue, 
there might be people who could not come due to the lack of  resources they had. An 
organiser from COI told a story of  a young woman that had a child in her buggy who 
passed by the event venue showing her interest, but could not participate as the venue did 
not have baby-sitting facilities.  
 
Voluntary participation is not just a matter of  an indifferent or ignorant public. It was true 
that most participants of  the public open meetings were from NGOs. It is, therefore, 
reasonable to debate whether NGOs are representative of  the public or at least whether 
people who have specific interests could be called ‘the public’: 
“[…] when we went to Swansea the local police said to me over 70% people in the 
room, we had about 250 people turned out, had been arrested by the police for 
destroying GM crops, and the police were worried there would be trouble at the event 
[…] Well, they recognised them. They looked at them and said […] yes, they were all 
from GeneWatch38
 
 or […]” (Interview with one from COI) 
Little designing efforts to integrate divided labours, but endogenous inter-linking 
of  participants  
 
There were a lot of  efforts to divide the whole programme to make different spaces with 
diverse rationales. However, there was little designing effort to integrate all the outputs of  
the divided deliberative exercises and to make the most use of  those diverse parts of  
participation for decision making. However, instead of  systemic efforts to integrate the 
various divided deliberation exercises, it seemed that participants tried to be inter-linked 
and inter-fed by themselves so that they were intermingled into the programme.  
                                                 
38 It needs to be clear that given that GeneWatch is not a mass membership organisation and never 
itself undertook direct action, this is by definition a false statement, or incorrect memory on the 
part either of the Police or COI. 
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Government’s the ideal suggestion of  integration and inter-feeding between three strands 
actually did not happen. In fact, the three strands went on rather on their own way. They 
failed in systematic integration at all. For example, the three strands were operated by 
different institutions and there was no committee or any group of  people responsible for 
overseeing the whole programme of  GM Dialogue. 
  
The government explicit rationale for the design of  the three strands in GM Dialogue was 
to be informed via three different perspectives around the GM issues. In contrast to this 
explicit rationale of  gathering the three different perspectives for GM policy, the 
government’s implicit rationale for having three strands was actually the opposite. In other 
words, instead of  being for the purpose of  including three different perspectives on the 
issues for the policy inputs, the government used the composition – or division – of  three 
strands for the purpose of  breaking up the source for decision making so as to prevent  
GM Dialogue from providing one solid but undesirable answer to the government. 
Therefore, division of  labour was used in order to disperse voices rather than to include 
different voices by the government. 
 
“The whole process, having three separate pieces of  work in parallel, I suppose, is very 
unique. I had certainly never come across this before and I haven’t come across it since. 
I suspect the origins of  that approach were pretty political. […] Obviously it is largely 
DEFRA’s policy area. I know that Number 10 was quite heavily involved in setting this 
up. What I am not clear about is the exact thought processes that decided that it 
should be three separate studies. But I know this was sounded out pretty early on […] 
also if  you wanted a sort of  neutral public debate, you don’t like to have the Prime 
Minister’s strategy unit involved. It came with a sort of  certain amount of  baggage 
with it.   
[…] In very simple terms, nobody was asked to bring those together. We were each 
asked without being given a role on the specific project. […] But I look at it now, 
perhaps with hindsight, in kind of  programme management terms - you had three 
projects, which constituted a novel programme. There was no overall senior 
responsible in a way of  taking the interests in the programme. There was no 
programme manager there, who was looking at the interfaces between them.”  
(Interview with one of  the Strategy Unit Team members) 
 
“The economics and the science strand, I mean we had never built as an integral thing 
really to start with because the public dialogue was sort of  agreed to, and then, because 
there was such a political nervousness about it. They had to bolt on some other things. 
You know they had to bolt on to economics and the science.  
[…] Yes, the government was nervous because if  they just had a public dialogue and 
then they came up with the wrong answer, then they wouldn’t have any other political 
support to fall back on really. So that’s why they had to have the other strands going.”  
(Interview with one of  the AEBC members) 
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Likewise, it is not certain whether the idea of  increasing the inclusiveness by divisions of  
labour, creating all the glossy, glittering looks of  diverse deliberative exercises, actually did 
perform its fundamental function. As discussed in this chapter earlier, comparing the 
efforts to create all the different range of  deliberative exercises, it lacks clearly designing 
and organising efforts to integrate them into decision process. 
 
Another example of  this argument is the way of  using the website.  Most of  the meeting 
minutes and official reports of  the three strands were on the websites.  In particular, the 
first report of  the Science Review was submitted to the ministers and published on the 
website to invite stakeholders’ and citizens’ comments to reconvene the report. GM 
Nation? website also got lots of  hits and  the organisers of  the GM Nation? were proud 
of  the large number of  the visitors to the website. However, the website was used for 
delivering the information and message from each side than a venue for real two-way 
communication. As even though it was used for the public to post up their comments, it is 
not clear how these were actually read and thus passed on to the deliberation process. The 
organiser had to admit that they had not been able to read all the comments on the website. 
It was a tool for one-way communication and a tool for public relations.   
 
Therefore, I argue that there was a lack in systemic designing effort for integrating the 
outputs of  variously designed and organised deliberation exercises. Instead, there was a 
clear upstream effort made by participants endogenously to be inter-linked and inter-fed 
with other parts of  the programme. Despite this lack in evidence that the divided labours 
were explicitly and formally included into the process, my analysis of  GM Dialogue 
suggests a new way of  including widely-divided labours into the deliberation process. 
People of  certain deliberation exercises tried to have their influence not only on the inside 
of  their event but also different deliberation exercises, where they did not directly belong. 
In doing so, they got to know the happenings in other parts of  the programme. As well as 
this, they took the issues of  their event to the other parts of  the programme.  
 
Within the programme, in particular, people had cross membership over the different 
organising groups of  the three strands and delivered the message from one to another. For 
example, Phil Dale was almost everywhere. He was a member of  the AEBC, the steering 
board and the Science Review panel. He was even on the list of  all three sub-groups of  the 
Science Review panel. He also attended events of  the Economic Study strand, such as the 
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Scenario workshop, and the Shocks and Surprises seminar. He played a very important role, 
inter-linking and inter-feeding different parts of  the programme voluntarily and individually. 
The following quotes from the meeting minutes of  the Science Review panel tell us how he 
brought information from one strand to another and made it influential: 
 
“43. Professor Phil Dale who has overlapping membership with the Public Debate 
Steering Board, conveyed the Board’s thoughts on the Science Review to the Science 
Review Panel. The Board felt that it was important the Panel did not give the 
impression of being self-serving or that the Review was too deep for the public to 
understand. Their questions should be taken seriously and with genuine empathy. 
 
44. Professor Dale mentioned that the results of the foundation discussion workshops 
would be published on 17 December 2002 and would give an indication of “grass 
roots” GM issues of interest to the general public which would provide a valuable 
resource for the Science Review. 
 
45. The Panel agreed to include the outcome of the foundation discussion workshops 
in the Review process.”(1st Science Review panel meeting minute) 
 
In addition to endogenous inter-linking among participants, the issues in the discussion 
themselves were entangled with one another. Therefore, despite various designs of  
deliberation exercises for different issues, participants often introduced all sorts of  issues 
into their discussion. 
 
4.2.2 Deliberativeness  
 
Internal elements of  individual participants’ attributes as well as external elements of  the 
wider context of  the programme shaped the deliberation process. 
 
A variety of  participants brought not merely knowledges but also their respective identities, 
convictions, and networks into the process. These respective participants’ attributes were 
the internal elements of  the programme, which constructed dynamic relationships among 
participants within the programme. In addition to these, political discourse, governmental 
and non-governmental institutions and policy networks outside of  the programme also 
played their powerful part in the deliberation process, as external elements. 
 
There were dynamic inter-reflections among the internal elements of  the participants 
inside the programme, and also dynamic inter-reflections between those internal elements 
and external elements outside the programme. Through these inter-reflections of  the 
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elements, deliberation turned out to not be a form of  rationally argumentative reasoning, as 
theorists assumed; rather, the scenes of  deliberation were much more a case of  dynamics 
among participants, such as segmenting, aligning, competing, negotiating and networking. 
Therefore, the deliberation process was a complex picture of  various forms material, social 
and political relations among participants, which this thesis calls ‘discursive relations’.  
 
4.2.2.1 Internal Elements: Plurality in Identities, Convictions and Networks, as well 
as Knowledge of  Participants  
 
Including a large number of  people and their views was one of  the essential criteria for 
designing public engagement, such as GM Dialogue, and knowledge is often the most 
legitimate qualification for the participants of  deliberation exercises, especially for science 
policy making. In addition to this explicit, codified qualification of  knowledge, participants 
also brought many different respective attributes to the deliberation process, such as 
identities associated with social perception and their institutions, their personal convictions 
from their philosophy, preference and experience, and their personal networks. Therefore, 
they did not just participate alone as an independent deliverer of  his/her own knowledge. 
Instead, participants' personal attributes came together and got involved in the deliberation 
process. Participants’ identities, convictions and networks, as well as knowledge, were 
materialised and influential in shaping the deliberation process as internal elements of  the 
programme of  GM Dialogue. These inter-reflections generated new sets of  interests, 
identities, roles, networks, and relationships of  participants in the process, which 
constructed the new context of  deliberation. Next part of  this chapter discusses the ways 
in which these kinds of  material, social and political relations of  participants took place 
and shaped the deliberation process, by presenting detailed evidence. 
 
Knowledges 
 
Different types of knowledge that are required for the decision-making process are one of 
the most common rationales, upon which designers relied for their decision on making a 
list of participants in public engagement programmes.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, knowledge is not constructed in a politically neutral 
manner, but the way of  its construction and use is deeply associated with people’s various 
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values. This is even the case for scientific knowledge. It is even more so for the case of  
technological risk-related decision-making due to its nature of  uncertainty. However, 
knowledge was one of  the most popular and explicit rationales for participation in such a 
politically-sensitive debate as GM Dialogue. It was so, as if  knowledge was free from 
politics and was self-reliant so that it was fair to be used as the explicit rationale for 
determining participants.  Designers might have thought knowledge would be politically 
expedient to be an upfront rationale for participation. 
 
In particular, for the experts’ deliberation exercise, their specified knowledge and expertise 
constituted the most legitimate rationale for their recruitment. For example, the organising 
groups, like the AEBC, the steering board and the Science Review Panel, were recruited as 
independent expertise, which was explicitly claimed to be assured by them and by their 
sponsors. Under this claim, experts are expected to bring only their neutral knowledge for 
rational decision making, excluding their personal or institutional interests. However, my 
case shows that many experts acknowledged the fact that the reason for their requirement 
was not only their knowledge but also the more direct reason, being the political one: 
 
“Because I have done a lot of  work about precaution […] and they liked the way I was 
defending the precautionary principle […] they liked the way I was working on 
uncertainty […] More than that[...] I know the people from the organisations who 
nominated me [Person A, Person B...]  so I knew them personally. That must be an 
issue also.” (Interview with one of  the Science Review Panel members) 
 
“Yes, Michael Meacher asked me to apply. He was the minister in charge. We wanted 
some more sceptics on the commission so he asked me to apply, basically. […] Well, a 
sceptical position but probably having some scientific knowledge and insight and I 
suppose just knowing all sorts of  arguments around GM.” (Interview with one of  the 
AEBC members)  
 
The recruited experts must have had their established identities and specialties, which 
cannot be detached nor should they be, since those were also part of  their recruitment 
reasons. Although the attributes of  broad specialties and networks of  experts were 
considered for their recruitment criteria for composing experts groups, these might also 
have been an issue for the credibility of  their independent decisions. Therefore, knowledge 
was the official and ostensible rationale for the experts to come to deliberations and there 
were implicit rationales behind them, as the ‘broad perspectives’ of  the experts group, 
which was claimed for the rationale for the wide range of  areas of  experts, could have been 
used for the moderate term of  different interests. 
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Identities 
 
Identities that were attached to the participants influenced the deliberation. Participants’ 
identities were often associated with their institutions - where they came from, and also 
social perception on the institutions. As discussed above, participants did not just bring 
their expertise but also their institutions’ interest, which was reflected in their identities. 
These identities built bias or aspiration to each other among them.  Therefore, they shaped 
the relationships between participants and, eventually, the deliberation itself.  
 
In particular, this kind of  technological risk-related discussion built unique group 
relationships amongst participants. One can say that scientists, especially those from 
academia, are generally exempted from suspicion of  their political interests, while people 
working in related industry play often the role of  greedy exploiters or the most unfair 
beneficiaries of  the technology; and NGO people are the activists who fight for the public 
good and are often anti-technology. These stereotypes worked vibrantly and shaped the 
dynamics of  the deliberation. For example, the one who was a member of  the AEBC and 
the steering board recalled how his previous affiliation with NGO influenced his current 
relationship and work in the programme of  GM Dialogue: 
 
“I was the chairman of  Greenpeace, so they were concerned. You know they 
[interviewers for recruitment in Whitehall] were worried. On the one hand, also they 
thought ‘Mm, that looks good.’ One person asked about conflicts, Greenpeace policy. I 
persuaded them that it was not an issue but it helped me to be honest. Although I 
never used Greenpeace explicitly, I had no doubt it helped people listen to me because 
they knew that [...] but it worked against me as well because scientists were so 
suspicious of  me.” (Interview with one of  the AEBC members) 
 
In general, scientists from academia have more credibility in their contribution to the risk 
deliberation while people from industry have negative image as they cause the problems 
but take most benefits.  However, interestingly in a few instances of GM Dialogue, 
participants coupled science with industry. In this presentation, science was not located in 
neutral position between pro- and anti-GM technology, but explicitly positioned in pro–
GM technology. For example, the Strategy Unit team composed three the expert advisory 
group for the Economic Study strand-Environment, Product chain, and Industry and Science. This 
is interesting that although the other two groups had scientists who were university based, 
industry and science were in the same basket. The following quote is another example of 
this coupling of science and industry from the House of Lords’ report. 
111 
 
 
 
 
“Public interest in science in the United Kingdom is high. Survey data reveal, how
ever, negative responses to science associated with Government or industry, and to
 science whose purpose is not obviously beneficial. These negative responses are e
xpressed as lack of trust.” (in Chapter 2 of House of Lords 2000 ). 
 
It is also interesting to see how participants were perceived and presented by one another. 
Many interviewees often keep attaching the relevant institution in front of  people as a 
prefix, like ‘industry guy’, ‘NGO person’ and ‘government man’. Interestingly, the identity 
ascribed to someone was different depending on different people. Professor Phil Dale was 
a member of  the AEBC and the steering board attended many different events across the 
three strands of  GM Dialogue. He was referred to as a ‘pure scientist’ as well as an 
‘industry person’ by different participants: 
”[… ] Phil Dale from John Innes, industry guy basically.” (Interview with one of  the 
Science Review panel members) 
“I think most of  them [steering board members] thought I was the son of  the devil 
[laugh…] No, Phil worked for the John Innes institute. So he was a pure scientist 
working at a university. He had an interest in GM and I think he worked in the GM 
scientific community but he wasn’t an industry member. He was a scientist.” (Interview 
with one of  the Steering Board members) 
 
Convictions: Philosophical difference towards, in particular, science and the public 
 
Participants were not just from different areas and expertise; they also had different 
philosophical bases. Therefore, the degree of difference in their views was as deep as their 
widely divergent ontologies. The issues raised for GM policy, therefore, were very 
fundamental. Participants themselves sometimes found their underlying beliefs indisputable, 
such as about who the public is and what their role should be in GM policy making; and 
what science is and what science should do in GM policy making. This was the case, not 
only between different areas, but also amongst those who were in the same area. 
 
 “[…] but the real thing about GM is that all sorts of  social  phenomena […] new 
technologies, globalisation and  nature  were sort of  somehow condensing into this 
phenomenon of  GM crops; so what the controversy was about was more than just 
immediate issues of  safety. It was about regulations, mistrust of  government [...] all 
sorts of  issues […] You know as a democrat, you want to embrace all these, discuss it, 
and explore it collectively to find a way through. That was always of  my attitude to the 
AEBC and that was what the AEBC was there for. Nobody would predetermine what 
the outcome would be.” (Interviewee A from the AEBC) 
 
 “[…] the social interactions and everything else, ok we could do this and do that to 
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help the lay people‘s fears perhaps. But science is still science. So there was never ‘Ok, 
we’ll accept that and we will build on that.’ There was always ‘We are here; you are 
there.’ So everything written was a fudge […] The scientist’s role was to provide the 
facts to the debate […] That’s a sort of  fact and the information is pure. Scientific fact 
cannot be disputed, that’s it. That what I saw as the scientist’s role - to put in, or 
whether there is something; Phil always argues peer review data.” (Interviewee B from 
the AEBC) 
 
Networks 
 
Just as participants did not leave their institutions and convictions behind to come to the 
deliberation, they also brought their personal networks into the deliberation. Participants’ 
personal networks were explicit and influential to the deliberation process. Participants had 
their personal associations with certain groups, alliances and communities. They reported 
the process and the issues inside to the outside and brought concerns and opinions outside 
to the inside.  Although it would be natural to expect that participants inside of  the 
programme must have been informed and influenced by the outside, the informal and 
personal relationships of  participants with their colleagues and friends outside of  the 
events played a big part in the deliberation process. Therefore, participants, although 
having been recruited as individual independent participants, did not actually play alone 
inside. Rather, they worked with their invisible groups out there.  
“There was a little mafia [...] we were always talking together […] the network I was in 
which was [person A, B and C], myself  […] a little bit of  an operating environmental 
[…]” (Interview with one of  the Science Review panel members) 
 
People who were in this group of  the quote expressed their trust in, and expectation of, 
that person’s role to represent their perspective in the Science review strand. In this way, 
they did not directly participate in the other event, but they got involved in an indirect way. 
 
“Well, with economics studies we were much more long distance, you know. We were 
much more kind of  formal and submitting and commenting. The Cabinet Office 
things were much more difficult to penetrate, we didn’t have any friends at all. And the 
science strand, you know [one of  their network members] was on the thing so, it was 
only through [him] really […] and helping [him…]” (Interview with one of  the AEBC 
members) 
 
“Our relationship with Science Review was rather difficult because the two people 
from the AEBC, who were on the Science Review, were [person X and Y ]. And that 
meant we didn’t have a direct relationship with Science Review as a steering board. […] 
but that didn’t matter in a way actually, because [one mentioned by above interviewee] 
113 
 
 
 
- we had such a confidence in him - he had produced the original framework 
[…] ”(Interview with one of the Steering board members) 
 
In addition to this informal way of  role-playing through certain networks, participants used 
their networks at more explicit and codified level. Inside of  the programme, participants 
had cross membership across different groups of  the three strands. They were, therefore, 
messengers linking different deliberative exercises, groups and strands. As well as this, some 
of  participants had cross membership of  different institutions of  the regulatory system. 
For example, Professor Bainbridge was a member of  ACRE (Advisory Committee on 
Releases into the Environment) and the chair of  ACNFP (Advisory Committee on Novel 
Foods and Processes) at that time. She also directly participated in the Science Review 
strand as a panel member and attended the Strategy Unit team meetings as Advisory group 
member.  
 
People who were outside, on the other hand, sent their message in both formal and 
informal ways to the inside through the person with whom they had networks. Participants 
inside reported what was happening inside to the outside. Therefore, people who were not 
invited to participate in the deliberation inside could know the happenings inside and tried 
to intervene in various ways. 
 
4.2.2.2 External Elements: Political Discourse, Governmental and Non-
Governmental Institutions, and Policy Networks 
 
There were also external elements outside of  the programme, which interacted with 
elements inside to shape the deliberation process. For example, political discourse, 
governmental and non-governmental institutions and policy networks played their power 
over the deliberation process. The programme had been developed as internal elements of  
the programme interacted with these external elements.  The programme was intervened 
by, and responded to, these external elements.  
 
Political discourse, like the BSE event and Iraq War 
 
As established earlier in this thesis, the BSE event was seminal in the history of  UK science 
policy, especially food regulation system. The trauma of  a precedent political event was still 
inherited greatly in the GM discussion. Lord Philips published a report of  the BSE inquiry 
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on 26 October 2000. This reminded the public of  an example of  ill-governance of  food 
regulations. This report joined the new wave in the science governance by suggesting 
‘openness of  and inputs from broad perspectives into (the) regulation system’. As 
discussed before, the BSE event was one of  the big triggers that brought public 
engagement into the UK science-related policy making and brought about changes in the 
food regulatory system of  the UK and elsewhere. 
 
Like the BSE case, GM policy was not the domestic matter of  the UK. EU members of  
states were obliged to respond to the primary legislation for the deliberate release of  
Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs). The European dimensions directly and 
indirectly influenced GM Dialogue: 
 
“Because overall, Margaret Beckett very directly saying to Simon and to Malcolm […] 
you know EU was about to […] was a new directive going to be implemented. [He 
could not remember what was exactly] […] this was shaping, this was the pressure we 
were under to have a deadline for actually having the public debate.” (Interview with 
one of  the Steering Board members) 
 
GM Dialogue was also affected by the Iraq War at that time. In general, there was 
antagonistic atmosphere to the U.S. in UK society due to their relationship and the invasion 
of  Iraq. In particular, a few American bio-technology and pharmaceutical companies, who 
were leading producers of  GMOs, were seen as a kind of  public enemy. Therefore, 
American multi-national companies, the Iraq War and the Labour Government’s 
relationship with the US Government often emerged in discussions: 
 
“The one I remember most vividly was one in Scotland […] I think it also happened 
around the time there was something else going on and became hugely influential to 
the way the people were thinking about the thing – it was the Iraq War. So people, I 
think, because there was the influence of  the Iraq War didn’t really believe the war. 
Yeah, they saw this was something done by America which was forcing upon Britain, 
so GM got involved in the same thing. And there was a huge anti-American ground 
as well at these meetings and I do remember […] all fifteen tables said that this 
technology is not good for this country or whatever.” (Interview with one of  the 
Steering Board members)  
 
The Government 
 
Diverse departments of the government had different interests with regard to the 
programme, GM Dialogue and thus practised their power. Blair’s strong advocacy of 
biotechnology, the DTI’s concerns about the economy and industries, and most 
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interestingly, different perspectives on GM technology within DEFRA between the 
Secretary Beckett and the Environment Minister Meacher, all together co- existed within 
the UK Government. The Prime Minster, relevant ministers, David King, Howard Dalton, 
a few heads of related advisory committees, civil servants from DEFRA, OST and the 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit were individuals from the government  who got directly 
involved in the programme.  
 
Given the political sensitivity surrounding the GM policy, the independence of the GM 
Dialogue programme was emphasised from the outset. However, the government got 
involved heavily with three strands, both explicitly and implicitly. Different departments, 
advisory committees and the cabinet office were the stakeholders to the organiser groups 
of each strand. These stakeholders tried to intervene in the deliberation process both 
directly and indirectly. One of the AEBC members recalled an unpleasant moment, when 
civil servants from DEFRA suggested a meeting with Margaret Beckett to enforce their 
views on the matter. An interviewee from COI also admitted that although they claimed 
their professionalism in their work, their main stakeholder was DEFRA, who funded them 
and thus was the one they responded to:  
 
“COI was working with all of  those groups. So our primary client was the steering 
board, but also working on behalf  of  DEFRA. That’s the other complication - that 
you know DEFRA had actually commissioned and paid us. So we had a kind of  dual 
thing of  working for the steering board, the public debate, but also our ultimate client 
was DEFRA.”(Interview with one from COI) 
 
Margaret Beckett and Michael Meacher were in the same department, DEFRA. They had 
quite different perspectives on the GM issue.  One of the Strategy Unit team said that they 
had to understand and respond to stakeholders’ expectations recalling the different 
perspectives among them: 
 
“Most of  this project we had a joyous situation because of  having Margaret Beckett 
and Michael Meacher in the same department. That was interesting and had pros and 
challenges. […] On a range of  issues, they had different views. Some of  them very 
strong differences, GM was one of  them. Michael Meacher was quite strongly against 
it, Margaret Beckett was strongly supportive […]” (Interview with one of  the Strategy 
Unit Team members) 
 
Michael Meacher was the Environment Minister between 1997 and 2003. This period, as 
discussed before, was when the new wave of  public engagement in the science policy-
making system took place. He got involved in recruiting the AEBC members. His position 
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was quite clear as being sceptical about GM technology. Michael Meacher was sacked in 
June 2003. It was commonly understood that he was sacked because he criticised in public 
the government’s GM policy and the invasion of  Iraq. 
 
Established Policy Networks 
 
There were already established policy networks around the UK GM policy. People used the 
existing networks to exercise their power. The existing established policy networks worked 
quite influentially in terms of  dynamics in the organising groups of  GM Dialogue. In 
particular, the established networks amongst high profile figures in the regulatory system 
reflected a sort of  power structure of  that community.  This power structure was brought 
into GM Dialogue through the networks. One of  the social scientists on the Science 
Review Panel experienced a senior academic in the British GM regulatory system trying to 
dismiss him from an advisory committee for a participation study at the European 
Commission, upon which he was also working at that time.  The social scientist got to 
know this from an informal source and discovered evidence that the senior figure sent a 
letter to the organisers of  the committee arguing that the social scientist should not be on 
the committee, based on the grounds of  his opinion that the social scientist’s work was 
troublesome on the Science Review Panel of  GM Dialogue. The senior figure was not on 
the panel, but he had a close colleague on the panel who did not seem happy with what the 
social scientist was trying to do on the Science Review Panel.  The following quote is from 
the interview with the social scientist stating his concerns regarding the influence of  this 
kind of  power relations: 
 
“I am sure I’m not the only one. Imagine implications of  this happening to biological 
scientists, who depend upon these life science people for their funding. […] and also I 
think it is important because the individual concern was that he was in a senior 
position of  the British regulatory system. […] He [A scientist who had quite an anti-
GM technology stance, left the Science Review Panel] left because he was dissatisfied 
with the way the committee operated. […] My case was in the paper, on the front page 
of  the Daily Mail. It was a big story just for a short time. After that he said to the press 
that he had been also threatened because he had a big research centre on organic 
farming funded by the EU. He said he was worried about funding for his centre. And 
he had been threatened. If  he carried on, he would cause trouble.” (Interview with one 
of  the social scientists in the Science Review Panel) 
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4.2.2.3 Deliberation is ‘Discursive Relations’ rather than a Rational Reasoning 
 
Dynamic inter-reflections among internal elements, as well as inter-reflections between 
internal elements and external elements of  the programme, shaped the deliberation process 
through recursive generation of, and response to, their new representations (interests, 
identities, roles, relationships, networks etc.). Due to this characteristic of  reflexivity, my 
observation of  GM Dialogue provides a very different picture here to that which 
deliberative democracy theorists presume.  
 
Public deliberation according to deliberative democracy theory is supposed to be a rational 
reasoning with publicly defensible arguments and it should be protected from any political 
interest or power. Instead of  these characteristics, the deliberation, in reality, was not only a 
communicative form of  rationally argumentative reasoning but was also a complicated mix 
of  various forms of  ‘discursive relations’.  
 
Participants displayed their complex, dynamic interactions and relationships, which 
constructed the deliberation process with their material, social and political elements in a 
discursive way.  In other words, participants employed and materialised various internal and 
external elements of  the process such as their knowledge, identities, personal relationships, 
policy discourse and networks to be influential in the process.  Beyond mere rational 
argumentations, participants dynamically interacted with one another through their various 
forms of  social and political relationships. Participants sometimes segment or align with 
certain people for power relations, compete or negotiate with one another strategically or 
cooperatively, and use or make their networks as a resource of  their power to influence the 
deliberation. Deliberation, in my analysis, therefore, was a space for the participants to 
deliver their arguments, by forming and employing their various material, social and 
political relations in a discursive manner.   
 
Segmenting and Aligning 
 
Difference in knowledges, convictions and affiliations of  participants resulted in interesting 
grouping and politics amongst them. In particular, in the context of  technological risk-
related policy, like GM issues, participants often had to face confrontation with one another. 
The issues were contrasting and often polarised, such as the dichotomies of  social science 
or natural science, and anti-technology or pro–technology stances. These contrasting views 
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generated group dynamics in the deliberation process.   
 
This was an obvious case in organising groups of  GM Dialogue. As organising groups 
were normally groups of  experts, they were supposed to have rational argumentation 
professionally. However, the real deliberation scene was quite different. Diversity in 
backgrounds, convictions and interests of  participants segmented the group into several 
smaller gatherings, or participants allied together with others who shared their interests and 
views to make their voice louder: 
 
“There were a couple of meetings with Julie [Hill], Brian Johnson and myself […] and 
also with Mark Avery [the others…] and we did have meetings among ourselves […] 
because we were kind of more environmentally concerned.” (Interview with one of the 
Science Review Panel members) 
 
“But I mean two key people, I mean I am talking about in the AEBC, if  you like, Sue 
and me were in one wing and Phil and Ed and the others were in another wing. I mean 
this is simplified. And there were a lot of  opinions in the middle, perhaps less-
developed, positions on their own.” (Interview with one of  the AEBC members) 
 
Confrontations between divided groups generated unique group dynamics. It was 
interesting to see that the quite similar, but opposite, political atmosphere was developed 
both in the AEBC and the Science Review panel due to the difference among group 
members’ view. Within the AEBC, on account of  its background of  being establishment-
orientated, many members had quite sceptical views on GM technology. On the other hand, 
most members of  the Science Review panel were based in natural science and quite pro-
GM technology. People made their own group with the people who shared their views on 
the matter. This resulted in the emergence of  smaller, nested groups. Then there were 
power relations built up amongst smaller nested groups. In both cases of  the AEBC and 
the Science Review panel, people who were in the minority group expressed their difficulty, 
feeling marginalised or intimidated by the majority of  the group during the deliberation: 
 
“I didn’t know that circle […] I didn’t know hardly anyone there. I know Julie Hill. So 
when I came into the room, I probably was feeling quite daunted with the unusually 
large membership. I was very aware of  being in a minority[…] Well, because that I 
knew that I was a social scientist and I knew from the other committees that it often is 
a quite problematic role to be in because you generally have to go through a tough 
battle right from the beginning. This did happen in Science Review too […] I feel I 
intervened quite a lot because I was in a minority and the types of  things I was saying 
were […], otherwise there was no-one to say those kinds of  things” (Interview with 
the one, social scientist, who was in quite a sceptical position with regard to GM 
technology on the Science Review panel). 
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“My interest was clear in that the industry did need to be represented on the AEBC. 
And it was very clear in those first two years that it was a very lonely voice as they 
weren’t taking notice of  any submissions we made to them.” (Interview with the one, 
from industry, who was in the AEBC)39
 
 
Competing and negotiating  
 
Participants also competed and negotiated with one another to deliver their message into 
the deliberation. It was not an argumentation process with publicly defendable reasons only. 
Instead, participants strategically developed and employed their rationales. Therefore, 
participants experienced a lot of  power struggles, in their rationalisation of  their 
argumentations, implicitly and explicitly. While participants were contesting their rationales, 
they identified and established their position in the deliberation process. They fought for 
them as well as sometimes they were compromised with the power structure.  
 
The rationales behind competition and negotiation were sometimes due to their 
discrepancy in perspectives, which could be explicitly made, for example, the relationship 
between the Steering Board and COI. The Steering Board and COI were the designers and 
organisers of  the GM Nation? and also affected the structure of  the other two strands 
initially. To do so, they had worked closely, but they had quite different expertise and 
perspectives on public engagement. While the Steering Board, which was mostly comprised 
of  scholars, clearly focused on the principle of  ‘public framing’ for GM Nation?, COI was 
the professional communication agency which had expertise on matters like PR, publicity 
or promotional events etc. This gap in their expertise resulted in an uncomfortable 
situation quite often, especially in the beginning. However, the official relationship between 
them was clear as being that AEBC was the client of  COI. Therefore, COI had to listen to 
what the client said.   
 
In addition to this publicly claimable rationale, like different expertise or conviction, there 
were rationales, which were not arguable explicitly in public, such as institutional turf  war 
or professional jealousy amongst them. The following quotes show that there was 
competition with the not-publicly defendable rationale between professionals in the 
process: 
 
                                                 
39 This quote has been used repeatedly here. 
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“I mean they [the Evaluation team] were critical about it. I am sure there was lots of  
professional jealousy going on as well, around some of  them, you know, who was 
involved and who wasn’t. I think they modulated their criticisms over time as well.” 
(Interviewee A from the AEBC) 
 
“I found him overbearing. You know, the ACRE didn’t like the AEBC […] You know 
they were the regulators. We were […] they had to work with us but they regarded us 
as suspicious.” (Interviewee B from the AEBC) 
 
Networking 
 
Networking was a critical part of  deliberation, as already established in previous sections, 
describing how individual participants’ personal networks and policy networks affected the 
deliberation process. People did not only use their networks as a resource of  their power to 
influence the deliberation but also made new connections with people outside as well as 
inside. As evidenced in the previous sections, individual participants, such as specialists or 
stakeholders, who were involved in the programme, played a role as a messenger and an 
informal representative of  their communities. The following quotes from different 
positions in the programme showed how well they were aware of  the importance and 
influence of  networks and thus used them in the deliberation: 
            
“I mean I was very well informed about what was going on, so I always knew what 
was going on and things to bring from outside. I also used to see my role as trying to 
make sure that from my view, you know, things on report, things we had represented 
for perspectives […] and I still do a lot of  networking both outside and inside.” 
(Interview with one of  the AEBC members) 
 
Especially, the following quote shows how a specific group of people who were not at an 
officially responsible position of a specific matter, actually influenced that significantly. 
Those within their network, used their power to intervene and influence the process.  
“When GM Nation? was commissioned, and then changed its remit and let the 
contract go to COI, a group of  social scientists was very angry about it[…] they wrote 
a letter complaining about it.[...] twice. One occasion was when there was a meeting 
with COI. In the end, it slightly worked, but it didn’t work that well. And we also wrote 
to the Cabinet Office. [Person A] and I were invited to talk to them about their cost 
benefit study. We criticised it. [Interviewer questioned: As a panel member?] No, I was 
just an academic. To our amazement, they completely changed their plan. They picked 
up what we were saying about the scenario analysis then [Person B] was engaged on 
the scenario analysis [...] so, yes, I was part of  this group doing things.” (Interview with 
one of  the Science Review Panel members) 
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4.3 Conclusion 
 
Analysing GM Dialogue, as an example of  macro-risk deliberation exercise, suggests the 
important level of  influence of  reflexivity in the process and outcome of  this extended 
public deliberation programme for GM crops policy. Due to the inherent reflexive nature, 
divisions of  labour, and inclusion and deliberation of  the programme, unfolded in contrast 
to the ways in which they were depicted in deliberative democracy theory. 
 
Various parts of  the stakeholders around the GM policy shaped the context of  the birth of  
GM Dialogue, by producing their discourses, arguments, networks, institutes, interests etc. 
Their respective expectations for the role of  GM Dialogue in GM technology regulation 
system were so diverse. In addition, among the participants within GM Dialogue, there was 
also a wide range of  divergent views on the roles of  GM Dialogue as a whole programme, 
of  each nested small deliberation exercises, and of  various individuals and groups of  actors, 
within the programme and in its wider context. Their rationales regarding how to define 
and divide ‘labour’ varied. These divergent rationales for the divisions of  labour reflected 
their widely various interests, identities, knowledges, convictions, relationships, networks 
etc., and these entailed very complex and dynamic material, social and political relations 
among participants. It was through these participants’ discursive relations rather than a 
structured form of  argumentative communication that their diverse rationales engaged 
with one another and their embedded representations (i.e. meanings and relationships) 
were intermingled into the deliberation process in a kind of  bottom-up fashion. 
 
In brief, the inherent reflexivity in GM Dialogue shaped the way of  inclusion of  such 
diverse representations of  participants as a kind of  ‘fermentation’ process; and broadened 
the definition of  deliberation as a form of  ‘discursive relations’ rather than as a narrowed 
definition of  rational reasoning. Divisions of  labour for enhancing inclusiveness and 
deliberativeness, therefore, also took place in an endogenous way, and developed through 
to the end of  GM Dialogue. 
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CHAPTER 5 
COMMITTEE ON RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 
 
5.1 Context of  the Birth of  the Programme: Various Rationales behind 
CoRWM 
 
5.1.1 Radioactive Waste Management Policy in Moratorium after History of On-
going Battle with the Public up to 2002 
 
From 1978 until 1997, the history of radioactive waste management (Low Level Waste, 
Intermediate Level Waste and High Level Waste) in general in the UK could be 
summarised as a victory of the relentless public protest after continuous battle with 
governance institutions (Blowers et al., 1991). Only one drilling testing for a disposal site 
searching for High Level Waste (HLW) was able to be carried out in Caithness in 1978 and 
the rest of the applications for planning were all rejected due to critical public opposition 
(including planning of land disposal of Low Level Waste(LLW) and Intermediate Level 
Waste(ILW)) (Blowers et al., 1991). Since then, it had been in moratorium until 2002, when 
the discussion of the establishment of CoRWM started.  
 
Until the mid 1970s, nuclear waste issue in the UK society was recognised more as 
technical matter than as political one (Blowers et al., 1991). For the first time, the existence 
of problematic radioactive waste, the somehow under-recognised by-product of nuclear 
materials (for the usage of the military, electricity and hospitals) was raised among 
governance institutions in 1976 when the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
published a report nicknamed the Flowers report (the Sixth Report of  the U.K. Royal 
Commission on the Environment, Nuclear Power and the Environment). It drew attention to 
fallen ‘stewardship’ (Mackerron and Berkhout 2009) of the industry and the government 
towards the management of radioactive waste. In response to this, the Department of  
Environment became the responsible government department of  radioactive waste 
management, and the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee 
(RWMAC) was established in 1978 to advise the government (Blowers 1996).  
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In the mean time, British Nuclear Fuels plc (BNFL) proposed building a new spent fuel re-
processing plant at Windscale in 1977 (Blowers et al. 1991). Although it drew public 
opposition through a public inquiry, the proposals were approved in 1978. This event 
raised distrust among the public against the government’s position towards the overall UK 
radioactive waste management policy (Mackerron and Berkhout 2009). When the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) started searching for sites for dumping 
HLW in 1978, the long fierce battle between the public (local residents with action groups), 
the nuclear industry, and the government had started.  
 
Until 1981, the way of dealing with radioactive waste was either disposing of it in the sea or 
underground, or storing it at generation site. All proposals from 1978 to 1980 for 
permission to carry out test drilling at the sites for HLW disposal made by the UKAEA40
 
 
were refused as a result of  strong public protest (CoRWM 2006) except for one site, 
namely Caithness. All the refusals were followed by public inquiry, which ignited huge 
public protest against the government’s radioactive waste disposal programme. The 
government finally prohibited shallow underground disposal of  HLW in 1981. Instead of  
underground disposal, it was decided that HLW would be stored for 50 years to cool down 
before being placed underground (RWMAC 1981). 
On the other hand, to deal with LLW and ILW, the Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste 
Management Executive (Nirex)41
 
 was established in 1982 following the RWMAC’s advice. 
Nirex was due to develop ‘a long term solution’ for the disposal of  LLW and ILW. Its 
primary tasks were to locate, build and run disposal facilities for LLW and ILW (CoRWM 
2006, p. 20). 
In the meantime, the nuclear industry relinquished the sea-disposal of radioactive waste in 
1983. This was as a result of the National Union of  Seafarers’ refusal with remarkable 
pressure from NGOs’ campaigns, which were led by Greenpeace (Blowers et al., 1991). 
This event is one of  the most high profile global environment NGO campaigns of  the 
                                                 
40 NERC took over the responsibility for waste research from the UKAEA in 1980. 
41 “The Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Management Executive (Nirex), initially as a 
co-ordinating committee of the four major organisations in the UK nuclear industry 
(Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB), 
UKAEA, and British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL). This later became UK Nirex Ltd, charged 
with the main task of locating, building and running disposal facilities for LLW and ILW.” 
(CoRWM 2006, p. 20) 
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twentieth century. Despite the absence of any immediate action from the government, even 
after the agreement of a two-year moratorium at the London Dumping Convention, 
dumping radioactive waste at sea actually stopped in 1983 (Blowers et al.,1991).  
 
Following the actual abandoning of sea dumping, land disposal became more attractive as 
an alternative solution for the waste. Nirex proposed to build facilities for shallow disposal 
of LLW and ILW in Elstow and Billingham in 1983, (with three more sites later: Bradwell, 
Fulbeck and South Killingholme) but it faced strong opposition by the public (Morton et al. 
2009). Consequently access to the Billingham site was refused by the official survey team in 
1985 and the rest of the sites were officially abandoned by the government in May 1987. 
 
Then, Nirex conducted studies for the possible sites42
 
 for deep disposal of LLW and ILW 
in 1988. It submitted an application for an underground laboratory at Sellafield in 1994 but 
the proposal was rejected by Cumbria County Council.  To respond to this decision, 
Nirex appealed to the Secretary of State for the Environment. A public inquiry followed 
from September 1995 until February 1996. Finally, in March 1997, the Secretary of  State 
for the Environment rejected Nirex’s application. This endorsement by the government 
rested on its concerns regarding the forthcoming general election (Mackerron and 
Berkhout 2009); UK radioactive waste management had been in moratorium since it was 
halted in 1997.  
The government had to admit this strong opposition against its policy and accept the 
societal demand of public engagement in radioactive waste management policy making.   
 
5.1.2 Acknowledgement of a New Approach to Public Engagement 
 
Following this series of events, the government realised that it would have to rethink the 
policy making process for radioactive waste management. It should admit, in other words, 
the policy failure over the preceding few decades of its approach based on the “closed, 
expert-dominated process” (Mackerron and Berkhout 2009, p. 999). As the debate on 
radioactive waste management policy was in deadlock, the government had to find a 
different approach. The direction of change it chose was quite the opposite of previous 
technocratic decision making strategy, seeking legitimacy by opening the debating arena to 
                                                 
42 The sites being studied were not open until 2005. 
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members of wider society, which was also much promoted in other areas of ST policy 
making. 
 
An important step towards the breaking of the deadlock in the governance of nuclear waste 
management was taken by the House of  Lords Science and Technology Committee in 
1999. They reviewed the status of  the UK’s nuclear waste policy and published a report. It 
suggested a phased deep disposal emphasising the need of consultation with the public 
(Lidskog and Andersson 2002; CoRWM 2006; Kemp et al. 2006). It recommended the 
government to set up an independent body to be in charge of  its nuclear waste policy, and 
that the public and stakeholders should be involved in the process of  decision making from 
the beginning, diverging from the previous path of  policy making, the so-called DAD 
(decide, announce and defend) (Mackerron and Berkhout 2009) to overcome the breach of  
relationship with the public: 
 
“The House of  Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology addressed the 
issue of  radioactive waste in its report in 1999. It recognised that ‘openness and 
transparency in decision making are necessary in order to gain public trust’ and that 
mechanisms to include the public in decision making would be necessary.” (CORWM 
2006, p. 4) 
 
In the same year (1999), the UK Centre for Economic and Environmental Development 
(UK CEED)43
“[…]Finally, while the industry has in the past had a well-deserved reputation for 
secrecy, we /have in the course of  the conference noted a welcome shift in culture 
and a new feeling of  openness in dealing with these difficult issues.” (UK CEED 
1999) 
 conducted a consensus conference over the issues of radioactive waste and 
it noted in its Executive Summary the need for change in the way of dealing with 
radioactive waste in the UK: 
 
The responsible government department (DEFRA) itself also held a consultation with 
stakeholders on the way to develop radioactive waste management policy and in 2001 
published Managing Radioactive Waste Safely. In this document, the government proposed a 
                                                 
43 The UK Centre for Economic and Environmental Development (UK CEED) was established as 
a non–profit-making organization by a group of people from the business, government and 
scientific communities in order to “support, co-ordinate and monitor implementation of the 
Conservation and Development Programme for the UK” in its response to the recommendations 
of the UN World Conservation Strategy in 1984 (Available from: http://www.ukceed.org/about-
us/). 
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widely-engaged consultation process (Kemp et al. 2006) and on 29 July 2002, it announced 
to Parliament a plan to set up an independent body to oversee the process of reviewing 
options and to make recommendations for radioactive waste management (DEFRA 2002; 
CoRWM 2006). The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (RWMAC) 
also joined this promotion by setting out principles for policy making process: “early 
involvement of  the public, adequate time to take decisions, openness and transparency, and 
a deliberative, accessible approach to decision making” (CoRWM 2006, p. 4). 
 
5.1.3 A Further Possible Government Intention: Strategic Instrument for Possible 
Re-opening of the Discussion on New Build Nuclear Power 
 
In addition to the acknowledgement of government agencies – the responsible department, 
Defra, in particular – of the need for societal pressure on democratically legitimate decision 
making, I suspect (but cannot prove on the basis of the present evidence) that some part of 
the Blair Government might have had another underlying motive for supporting a new 
approach to radioactive waste management policy making. This may remain a mere 
suspicion forever unless the relevant people declare it. However, my suspicion rests on the 
grounds that there seemed a consideration within the government at the time – on the 
parts of  the Prime Minister himself  and senior officials at the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) in particular – to implement a new nuclear build (Dorfman 2008). For this 
possible case of  new nuclear build option, removing policy uncertainty about radioactive 
waste would have been helpful. Yet the waste management deliberations were effectively 
decoupled from new nuclear build, so this impression would be given with little risk of  
disruption of  this suspected underlying motive. There follow a few examples of  various 
government statements that support this suspicion. 
 
Mackerron and Berkhout (2009, p. 1003) point out that the new nuclear build issue seemed 
to be off  the political agenda when CoRWM was initiated but it later gained some attention. 
However, both arguments – that it seemed not to be on the political agenda and that there 
seemed an intention for it from the parts of  the government – can be equally valid. The 
Prime Minister and DTI might have thought that the eventual breaking of  the deadlock 
over the radioactive waste management policy with an innovative form of  decision making 
would lend support to their new nuclear build aims, especially if  legitimacy could be 
achieved in respect of  the former issue. The desire of  them to reinstate nuclear power 
grew more apparent as the CoRWM 1 period (2003–06) approached its completion 
127 
 
 
 
(Mackerron and Berkhout 2009; Lehtonen and Martiskainen 2010).  
 
When the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR, previously 
DTI) ran the Energy Review consultation on the issue of  future UK energy policy in 2006, 
it was strongly criticised as a failed consultation process, in comparison to CoRWM 
proceedings in particular (Lehtonen and Martiskainen 2010; Greenpeace 2007; Dorfman 
2008). Indeed, in the wake of  Greenpeace criticism of  the procedure, the review was 
judged to be ‘flawed’ and ‘misleading’ in the High Court by Mr Justice Sullivan (Dorfman 
2008;  Mackerron and Berkhout 2009; Lehtonen and Martiskainen 2010). Yet, the Prime 
Minister’s stance at the time was so resolute that, in response to the High Court verdict, he 
announced the return of  nuclear power: “this will change the consultation, this won’t affect 
the policy at all” (Dorfman 2008, p.12; Lehtonen and Martiskainen 2010, p.18). 
 
Retrospective observation of this series of behaviours may speculatively argue that some 
part of the government would have been supportive of removing a serious obstacle to the 
reintroduction of the discussion on new build nuclear power into UK society. While 
proposals were being made for the need for public engagement in the radioactive waste 
management decision making process by various stakeholders, it seems that some sections 
of the government might have considered possible policy options for new nuclear build. A 
close analysis of relevant documents -The Energy Review (PIU 2002) and Our Energy Future – 
Creating a Low Carbon Economy (DTI 2003) - published around this time by the relevant 
government departments indicates that such a suspicion cannot be ruled out.  
 
The Energy Review, which was conducted and published in February 2002 by the 
Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU in Cabinet Office) to review the UK energy issues, 
hinted at the possibility of the new build of nuclear power. Energy security was the main 
issue with climate change (security preceded climate change)44
                                                 
44 It is obvious to see that Prime Minister’s first concern was energy security: “It is striking that 
both security of supply and climate change issues are[…]” (Foreword by the Prime Minister, PIU 
2002) 
 with a hint of the possibility 
of the new build of nuclear power and the report recommended a national public debate 
on energy issues. The following quote was the final line of ‘key points’ of the Executive 
summary of the report: “In the light of this review, the Government should initiate a 
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national public debate about sustainable energy, including the roles of nuclear power and 
renewables” (PIU 2002, p. 6). 
 
Following this review, DTI published an energy white paper, Our Energy Future – Creating a 
Low Carbon Economy (February 2003).  The tone of the issue was focused on ‘climate 
change’, as its title showed. The first priority of the issue, as the challenges that the UK 
energy policy faced, was changed from energy security to climate change. This change of 
prior issue was ostensibly presented in the Prime Minister’s foreword in the report and was 
welcomed by the House of Commons in their response to the white paper: “we welcome 
the priority which it gives to environmental objectives […]” (House of Commons 2003, 
para.10). Therefore, climate change became the hottest issue as the direction for ‘low 
carbon economy’ in the UK’s energy policy (Mackerron 2004). This sounded as if the UK 
government’s energy policy considered the ‘environment’ to be most important, which was 
politically powerful and legitimate.  
 
The discussion was directed to the need for ‘a new energy policy’ (DTI 2003, p. 6). The 
report addressed the three challenges that the UK energy situation was facing: climate 
change, over-dependence on imports and the need to update much of the UK’s energy 
infrastructure. The first challenge was emphasised with bold letters, i.e. “[…] the first 
challenge we face is environmental. Climate change is real […]” (ibid., p. 6) The second 
challenge was “the decline of the UK’s indigenous energy supplies” (ibid., p. 9). Then it 
discussed the importance of energy diversity, citing examples of “renewables and smaller-
scale, distributed energy sources” (ibid., p. 9), by arguing that it would help to solve the 
problems of the UK’s over-dependence on imports and security issues. The third challenge 
“the need to update much of the UK’s energy infrastructure” led the discussion towards 
nuclear power:  
“In the absence of new build or life extensions, nuclear power’s share of electricity 
production will shrink from its current level: there would be only one plant still 
operating by 2025.” (DTI 2003, p. 10)    
 
The condition of ‘in the absence of’ hinted at the possibility of the presence of nuclear new 
build with a threat of what would result from the absence of that. Then, the discussion 
revealed their preparation for the case of bringing back nuclear power. In the discussion on 
any future energy policy, nuclear power was mentioned as “currently important carbon-free 
electricity” (ibid., p. 12). This was followed by the nuance of ‘regret’ of the fact that 
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“however, its current economics make it an unattractive option for new, carbon-free 
generating capacity and there are also important issues of nuclear waste to be resolved” 
(ibid., p. 12). It explicitly mentioned that although the white paper did not propose the new 
build of nuclear power plant, they did not deny the possibility of its return: “We do not rule 
out the possibility that at some point in the future new nuclear build might be necessary 
[…]” (ibid., p. 12). Therefore, it is clear that nuclear waste was one of two hindrances to 
new build nuclear power that needed to be resolved (Mackerron 2004).  
 
Having established this evidence, I would suspect that there could have been attached in 
the explicitly agreed decision-making process – public consultation – of CoRWM another 
implicit reason by other part of the government for supporting the inauguration of 
CoRWM. Formation of CoRWM was necessary to meet a societal need for democratically 
legitimate decision making, but it also might have been used later by some part of the 
government to strategically support their interest in new build nuclear power.  
 
When discussion on the possibility of a new nuclear build started to become explicit, 
concerns were raised among members of CoRWM about the implications of new build to 
the operations of the Committee. They decided to put out a statement proclaiming that 
CoRWM held no position on new nuclear build (Plenary meeting minutes, November 
2005). In the meeting minutes, they emphasised that their priority was the legacy of waste 
management, quoting the Terms of Reference of CoRWM: 
“Whatever decision the Government takes, there is a large and growing legacy of  
highly radioactive waste with no long-term management strategy. That is why 
CoRWM was set up, and not in anticipation of  any new-build programme. Although 
CoRWM’s Terms of  Reference require it to take account of  possibilities including a 
new build programme when making its recommendations, its priority task is clearly 
spelt out: 
 
CoRWM’s priority task is to recommend what should be done with the wastes for 
which no long-term management strategy currently exists – that is, high and 
intermediate level waste now in storage or likely to arise over the next century or 
two[...]”(Terms of  Reference) 
   
(Plenary meeting minutes, November 2005) 
   
Committee members were concerned and repeatedly made a point of distancing themselves 
from new nuclear build both during the period of the process and after the completion of 
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the process (Dorfman 2008; Mackerron and Berkhout 2009). However, the fact that most 
members themselves believed that the Committee was intended to deliberate only on 
legacy waste notwithstanding, interestingly, there was no mention of such a restriction in 
the terms of reference.  
 
Indeed, regardless of the commitment of CoRWM to find a legitimate solution to the 
management of legacy waste, after the submission of its final recommendations, the 
government used its recommendations explicitly for the purpose of arguing for new build 
nuclear power (Dorfman 2008; Mackerron and Berkhout 2009; Lehtonen and Martiskainen 
2010). Indeed, the government strategically utilised the achievements of  CoRWM – public 
trust in the decision making process and confidence in decisions concerning currently 
limited knowledge in particular – in pursuing its nuclear ambitions.  
 
I cannot state unequivocally that the above evidence demonstrates that an additional 
intention of  the government in setting up CoRWM was as a strategic instrument for 
introducing new build nuclear power. However, it may be sufficient to suspect the possible 
existence of  another motive from other relevant members of  the government to support 
CoRWM on the grounds that government policy direction in respect of  new nuclear build 
hinted at such an agenda on a number of  occasions, bringing to bear the “infection effect 
of  Government’s conflation of  legacy and new build waste issues” (Mackerron and 
Berkhout 2009, pp. 1004–5), which continued to be evidenced in subsequent government 
behaviour.  
 
5.2 Divisions of  Labour of  CoRWM 
 
At this point, CoRWM was born to meet the above-mentioned expectations in the context 
of  the UK radioactive management policy. In addition to the rationales of  the whole 
programme, there were also various respective rationales for the nested divisions of  labour 
within the programme, which various participants wanted to realise. These various 
rationales were often found to be contrasting to each other, and consequently there were 
dynamic interactions between them. These interactions were their responses to one another 
with political, epistemic, and ontological tensions and struggles. These generated new 
relationships and stakes that constructed the new environment wherein the participants 
had to respond to, and in so doing, produced new rationales. This recursive process of  
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generating and responding to a new context continued and was reflected in the formative 
process of  the various divisions of  labour within the programme. And through this 
recursive process, the divisions of  labour developed endogenously within the programme. 
Participants inside and stakeholders outside of  the programme had been through a process 
of  various interactions with their rationales, and these interactions formed their own 
divisions of  labour by contesting and performing their rationales. Consequently, the design 
of  the whole programme was continually re-shaping its structure until the conclusion of  
the programme. 
 
This section will show the inherent reflexivity in the elements and dynamics of  CoRWM: 
with evidence of  emergent and designed aspects of  the divisions of  labour with their 
different rationales; and how radically different the actual deliberation and inclusion 
appeared through this reflexive process against the characteristics depicted in deliberative 
democracy theory.  
 
5.2.1 Inclusiveness 
 
Macro-deliberative democracy theorists expected inclusiveness to be fostered by using 
various forms of  divisions of  labour, since they believed that the division of  labour would 
allow more people and more values to be included in the deliberation. Therefore, the 
division of  labour was claimed as a means, in theory, for enhancing inclusiveness. 
Regarding its scale and scope, CoRWM was an unprecedented public engagement for 
radioactive waste management policy in the UK. A huge number of  people got involved 
and a wide range of  issues were discussed by them.  However, the systematic efforts to 
integrate all the results of  the discussions were clearly short compared to the efforts to 
devise and organise various discussions. Instead of  a kind of  mechanical formalised 
downstream efforts to collect and sort out the entire list of  divergent meanings of  
participants for decision making, my analysis of  CoRWM suggests a new way of  inclusion. 
It is, namely, reflexive endogenous efforts for participants to engage themselves with one 
another. Different participants had diverse rationales over the divisions of  labour, which 
caused various dynamic interactions among them. These dynamic interactions increased the 
degree of  diversity in rationales over the said divisions of  labour as they generated their 
new relationships and stakes into the programme. They then produced new rationales to 
respond to this new context. Through this recursive process of  generating and responding 
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to the new context, participants’ divergent representations (interests, identities, roles, 
relationships, networks etc.), cross-reflected and influenced one another, and were 
intermingled into the process.  
 
Structure of  CoRWM 
 
CoRWM started with a design of  a staged decision-making process. It was composed of  
four main sequential phases. Across these divided phases, there were three main groups of  
actors, who participated in all phases with different roles and influences at each stage. This 
initial design was made by the Committee with consultation with specialists. The ensuing 
detailed designs of  divisions of  labour within this frame were developed through various 
forms of  interaction of  the Committee members with specialists and stakeholders outside, 
as well as inside, in the course of  the programme.  
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Figure 5.1 Key Steps in CoRWM’s Process 
 
(Source: CoRWM 2006, p. 35)
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5.2.1.1 Four Phases 
 
Since CoRWM had a clear aim of  producing recommendations for policy options, the 
initial formal design of  the programme followed one of  conventional decision making, i.e. 
a staged process. Therefore, the biggest and most apparent level of  formal division of  
labour of  CoRWM was the structure with sequential stages of  the decision-making process. 
The rationale behind this design was, as Morton et al. (2009) analysed, that this sequential 
structure is one of  the rationalist models of  the decision process. The programme was 
divided into several phases according to the tasks to be performed in order to complete the 
process of  reaching a decision: 
 
“Allan Ashworth presented a programme model which was intended to help 
CoRWM to think systematically about the programme including key stages in 
devising it. This was broken down into key activities and linkages to show how each 
component contributed to another” (Plenary meeting minute January 2004) 
 
This process was formally divided into four phases: Phase 1 - information gathering, 
identifying a long list for potential options and designing the methods for short listing; 
Phase2 - short listing; Phase 3 - assessing the short listed options; and Phase 4 - 
formulating recommendations and drafting a report (CoRWM 2006, p. 34).  According to 
the different stages of  decision making, the role of  different groups of  actors varied and 
sub Working Groups under the Committee evolved as the phases progressed. Three main 
groups of  actors (the Committee, Public and Stakeholders, and Scientists and Specialists) were 
involved in all these stages. However, their roles also differed from each other at each 
different stage. Consequently their influence on the decision process varied at these 
different stages. 
 
In this light, it was, on the other hand also a process of  concurrent divisions of  labour. 
Within each stage of  the sequential structure, simultaneous examples of  division of  labour 
were taking place. While this four-phase process was formally designed in the beginning, 
detailed tasks and participants were left to be discussed and were developed during the 
course of  the programme by the Committee, and two other groups of  actors. In addition, 
although the process was presented formally as sequential phases, some tasks were carried 
out in parallel. For a clear example, I could not define a certain period of  Phase 3 and 
Phase 4 in the following Box. This is because there were not always clear cut gaps between 
phases, due to this concurrent division of  labour. 
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(Source: CoRWM 2006, pp. 34-6) 
 
Phase 1 (November 2003 - September 2004) 
 
The first phase was broken down into several tasks to be completed. As it was a framing 
stage of  the process (Morton et al. 2009), it was involved with information gathering, 
identifying a long list of  potential options and designing the methods for shortlisting. By 
the end of  March 2004 the Committee had to present its draft programme to ministers 
(Plenary meeting minute March 2004).  
 
The Committee collected information, like lessons on public and stakeholder engagement, 
from other events of  Brent Spar (issues around oil platforms) and GM Nation? (issues of  
GM crops). It tried Deliberative Mapping (DM), which is a participative method employing 
the multi-criteria optional appraisal. Although it was not adopted entirely, the Committee 
claimed that it learned ‘how to interface with specialists, stakeholders and the public’, and 
also several techniques used in the DM trial were adopted into the programme later. The 
Committee also commissioned a review of  the methods for PSE. 
Information gathering and pilot testing - basically about PSE (public and stakeholder 
engagement) 
 
Box 5.1 Overview of  the Process of  CoRWM 
                                                          
Phase 1 (November 2003 – September 2004) 
1. Information gathering and pilot testing 
2. Identifying the waste to be managed 
3. Identifying a long list of  options  
4. Integrating ethical issues  
 
Phase 2 (September 2004 – July 2005) 
5. Shortlisting   
 
Phase 3 (July 2005 –   )  
6. Assessing the shortlisted options  
7. Studying implementation issues  
 
Phase 4 ( – July 2006)  
8. Integrating and drawing up recommendations  
9.Drafting recommendations and submitting its final recommendations to 
Government on 31 July 2006 
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The Committee had to identify the quantity and location of  radioactive waste and materials.  
It consulted specialists and made a draft inventory of  waste. Public and stakeholders were 
invited to comment on this draft inventory.  
Identifying the waste to be managed 
 
The Committee drew up a long list of  options for the long-term management of  
radioactive waste, which was based on the previous project report
Identifying a long list of  options 
45 (2002) to DEFRA with 
advice from Nirex 46
 
. It was first reviewed by the international scientific community, and 
then was published for comments from the public and stakeholders and for checking 
whether anything had been omitted by the specialists. 
The Committee organised a two-day workshop for themselves on the issues regarding 
ethics and radioactive waste with four ethical experts.  
Integrating ethical issues 
 
Phase 2 (September 2004 - July 2005) 
 
While reviewing the long list of  the options and ethical issues, methods of  short listing 
were considered. The Committee gathered relevant existing scientific knowledge by 
commissioning studies. The public and stakeholders were also asked for their views on 
shortlisting criteria and methods (PSE 1) and a proposed shortlist (PSE2). The Committee 
drew up a shortlist. 
Shortlisting 
 
Phase 3 (July 2005 -   )47
 
 
The Committee developed methods for assessing the shortlisted options based on Renn’s 
Assessing the shortlisted options 
                                                 
45 Wilkinson Environmental Consulting Limited, Information Needs Research Project - Identification of 
Information Needed to Decide with Confidence on the Long Term Management Options for Long Lived Radioactive 
Waste, DEFRA Report DEFRA/RAS/02.014. 
46 UK Nirex Limited, Description of Long-term Management Options for Radioactive Waste 
Investigated Internationally, Nirex Report N/050, May 2002. 
47 Since most of the work of Phases 3 and 4 was carried out simultaneously, the dates cannot be 
specified. 
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the Co-operative Discourse Model48
 
 : a Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) process 
and a holistic assessment process. PSE comments were invited for the proposed outline of  
the process in PSE2. The Committee involved about 70 specialists in scoring the options 
against the criteria for MCDA that had been drawn up with inputs from various methods 
of  PSE3. The public and stakeholders added their input to the weighting of  the criteria for 
MCDA and provided their preferences for the options and reasons for the holistic 
assessment. Comments were invited on the specialist scores through the CoRWM website.  
In parallel, the Committee commissioned external experts for the study of  implementation 
issues and organised a workshop themselves. 
Implementation issues 
  
Phase 4 ( – July 2006) 
 
The Committee formulated the recommendations based on the outputs from the two 
methods of  option assessment, considering scientific, ethical and PSE issues. The public 
and stakeholder comments were invited. The final recommendations were submitted to the 
government on 31 July 2006. 
Integration and drawing up recommendations 
 
Evolution of  design: replacing of  settled divisions of  labour with newly-emerging 
divisions of  labour  
 
As these phases were developed according to the tasks to be done, within each phase, there 
was also development of  nested tasks with various participants and methods. For example, 
sub-working groups for specific tasks and various PSE events were developed as phases 
progressed. This evolution was the result of  dynamic interactions among the Committee 
members by responding to participants of  the programme, such as stakeholders, the public 
and specialists, as well as stakeholders outside of  the programme, such as various 
institutions and the media. Therefore, development of  the programme was a continuing 
replacement (or addition/omission) process of  emerged, and then settled, incumbent 
divisions, with newly-emerging divisions. In other words, divisions of  labour took place 
                                                 
48  Renn, O. (2005), Analytical-deliberative Process of Decision Making. Linking Expertise, Stakeholder 
Experience and Public Values, University of Stuttgart. 
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‘sequentially’ as well as ‘simultaneously’. The recognising (or arising) of  a newly-formed 
division of  labour is based on the winning rationale, which was the result of  the contesting 
of  divergent rationales over divisions of  labour in different groups and at different stages:  
 
“People were able to choose which working groups they went into. This is the benefit 
of  hindsight. We could have done with a clear process of  allocating people to 
working groups to make sure that we were properly utilising people’s skills and 
experiences and to make sure that we weren’t over burdening certain individuals. So it 
was all a bit ad hoc, but I think quite often in this process that’s the way it does work. 
And it was very difficult to sort of  plan and organise it rationally […] we did have to 
sort of, to an extent, design the process as we went. But we had a sort of  a broad 
shape of  the programme established pretty early on. It was more to do with filling in 
the detail.  
[…] because you have to be flexible in both process and in terms of  the way you 
respond to what people tell you. A traditional project manager may have seen it as a 
problem. Also you have to remember that in our period of  PSE, there were elements 
of  it, which were about asking people what they thought about plans for the next 
stage. So you can’t have those plans for the next stage set in stone. So I think that 
was a strength.” (Interview with one of  the Committee members) 
 
Significantly less efforts to integrate the results of  divided labours than the efforts 
to divide labours 
 
Although a huge amount of  effort was made to engage the public and stakeholders in the 
process of  ‘consultation’, it was not clear how these results of  engagement actually made a 
difference as regards to input to the decision. In other words, comparing all the efforts 
made to design and implement these various forms of  PSE, the efforts to make the most 
use of  the outputs of  those various PSE events for decision making were relatively less. 
Decision-makers (the Committee members) must have been influenced by the results of  
various PSE events at certain level through both formal and informal channels.  In 
addition, it was practically difficult for them to consider all details of  the outputs of  PSE 
events and specialist meetings.  
 
Having acknowledged all of  this, however, it was clear that the formal designing efforts 
made to integrate the voices heard were definitely less than the efforts made to make more 
voices heard. This lack of  designing attention with regard to integration was evidenced in 
many occasions. The official evaluation report of  CoRWM in particular raised this 
integration issue in several places:  
 
“Nevertheless, we were left at the time with a sense of  unease.  Because short listing 
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was completed before the majority of  the PSE reports were finalised, stakeholders 
could well be left with an impression that Members had formulated their positions 
and taken their decisions without adequate consideration of  the views expressed.” 
(Faulkland Associates 2006, p. 19)49
 
 
“CoRWM argues that the MCDA and HA were comparable, in that they were both 
structured analysis that incorporated inputs from specialists and cross-cutting 
activities and allowed insights to be distilled and integrated in a transparent manner 
into the decision-making process.  The MCDA programme was well documented 
and discussed in detail at plenaries so there was no doubt about what it involved and 
how it would work.  However, the same cannot be said for the HA programme and 
it is therefore easy to see how stakeholders came to think of  it as a label for a 
programme of  events rather than an integrated assessment strand in its own right.” 
(Faulkland Associates 2006, p. 24) 
 
Sub-contractors were hired to design and conduct various PSE events. However, the chair 
of  the PSE Working Group undertook all summary reports of  the results of  the PSE. A 
huge number of  issues from various meetings were reported to him for reviews and 
summaries. The chair of  the PSE Working Group himself  was confident to say that he 
made sure the results of  PSE were fed into the decision-making process. However, at 
official level, it was not clear how systematically he was able to have gone through all the 
reports, integrated them and transferred them to the other members of  the Committee. As 
the evaluation report’s points out above, therefore it is in particular not transparent that 
how those outputs of  the PSE events had been under the Committee’s thorough 
consideration and into the final decision. The Committee members had been under time 
pressure and often the next phase had to be planned while the previous phase was being 
carried out. Comments made via the website were not used as an important source of  
inputs from the outside either. It was rather a way to give outsiders a chance to have a say, 
whether or not they be heard; and to let the outside know what was happening inside: 
 
“I suspect that our web-based activities were probably not fully reflected, being more 
difficult to summarise.” (Interview with one of  the Committee members) 
 
“I saw my role making the PSE programme work and making sure the outputs of  
PSE were fed into other decision-making processes and that’s absolutely critical. I 
had been concerned in the past in other processes where what organisers of  PSE 
were being told wasn’t fed into their decision-making processes [...] We put a huge 
amount of  effort into trying to do that. In a way I saw myself  as a champion of  
trying to make sure that happened.” (Interview with the Chair of  PSE Working 
Group) 
 
                                                 
49 This report was written by David Collier, who was hired as an official evaluator of CoRWM 
from Faulkland Associates. 
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The Integration Working Group was formulated at quite a late stage before producing the 
report. One of  the Committee members said that although the Committee had recognised 
that integration was important, it was not necessary to have a group until they needed to 
write a report, as integration was believed to be part of  ‘the sequence of  the activities’. It 
implied that integration was believed to take place naturally as the phases went forward. 
Integration was understood as the efforts to present the decision made to the outside 
rather than the efforts to make a decision itself: 
 
“Well, I think we all believed, without necessarily saying it, that integration was 
necessary, but we didn’t set up a specific group to think about integration until we 
got close to reaching a conclusion, because, until we knew what to integrate, it wasn’t 
necessary. It was just the sequence of  the activities. It didn’t require a group of  that 
kind until we reached a point of  thinking about how we were going to present our 
recommendations to the world.” (Interview with one of  the Committee members) 
 
In short, the formal, codified way of  devising various divisions of  labour for PSE is 
apparently great. However, compared with this, it is equally clear that formal designing 
attention to integrate the wide spectrum of  various PSE events and thus to enable the 
actual values of  the public and stakeholders to be engaged with the decision relatively less.  
  
5.2.1.2 Three Groups of  Actors 
 
In spite of  the fact that there was a wide range of  different actors involved in the 
programme, with various roles at different stages, knowledge is arguably one of  the biggest 
and most explicit rationales for framing the main groups of  actors in CoRWM. The 
aforementioned Figure 5.1 Key Steps in CoRWM Process in the CoRWM’s final report 
(2006) illustrates the main groups of  actors - ‘the Committee, Public and Stakeholders, and 
Scientists and Specialists’- and their roles. Its simplified job description of  them was: Public 
and Stakeholders were supposed to “comment on and observe CoRWM’s work via mail, 
website, attending  plenary meeting etc.”; Scientists and Specialists were due to continually 
“engage with scientific community/specialists for information and advice on specific 
technical matters and other specialist  matters”; and the Committee, which was in the 
middle of  the picture was responsible for making the final “recommendations to 
Government” (CoRWM 2006, p. 35). The underlying assumption of  this division of  labour 
was that these three big groups of  actors contributed to the decision with different ‘inputs’ 
(ibid., p. 33).  
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This categorisation resonates with the summary of Collins and Evans (2002)’ typology of 
expertise: scientific specialist expertise (core-set scientists); contributory expertise (non- specialists from the 
general public); and interactional expertise (i.e. facilitator) and translation expertise (communicator) in 
Chilvers (2007, p. 202). Kemp et al. (2006) also categorised three types of participants for a 
Public and Stakeholder Engagement (PSE) process according to the knowledge they have: 
Specialist knowledge – scientific, technical, socio-economic expertise etc.; Procedural knowledge – knowledge 
of due process, legal and institutional frameworks; and Lay knowledge – knowledge of a particular 
community and locality (2006, p. 1021). ‘Expertise’ still sounds as if restricting its attributes to 
specialists only, while ‘knowledge’ seems to be comprehensive enough to be applied to 
non-specialists. This is maybe why knowledge is the more common qualification for 
participants in public engagement literature, as well as practice. Nevertheless, the term 
perhaps needed to be qualified by the adjective ‘lay’, which has the meaning of being 
unqualified.  
 
Therefore, knowledge is one of the most acceptable rationales for making a list of 
participants for public engagement and inviting them in. This was also the case for 
CoRWM. Knowledge was convenient for those who designed the programme, to employ 
as an explicitly-codified rationale for the composition of the main actors of the CoRWM 
programme. Therefore, knowledge was a main official rationale for DEFRA officials (with 
OCPA) to recruit the Committee members (CoRWM), and for the Committee themselves 
to decide the initial framework of three main groups of actors of the programme and 
further composing of each group.  
 
Consequently, this typology of  participants, based on their knowledge, also brought 
expectations of  the pre-determined roles for the participants. However, participants played 
their part far beyond this given, formally-codified division of  labour. There were much 
more implicit rationales to this politically expedient, and thus explicit, rationale - knowledge 
- in CoRWM. Therefore, this formally-codified, given division of  labour between the 
Committee, Public and Stakeholders, and Scientists and Specialists did not continue as they 
were supposed to be, during the course of  the programme. Instead, it was a much more 
complex picture in terms of  the role, power and relationship between actors, which shaped 
the divisions of  labour through their contesting and performing their respective rationales 
over divisions of  labour:  
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“He suggested three key questions.  What did CoRWM want to get out of  the public 
and stakeholder engagement process? How should the outputs contribute to 
CoRWM's decisions?  And what would be the role of  the Committee itself ?” 
(Plenary meeting minute, May 2004) 
 
The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management  
 
The Committee ended its work with 11 members, who were appointed jointly by Ministers 
of  the UK Government and the devolved administrations. The first Chair, Katharine Bryan, 
resigned at the beginning and Gordon Mackerron took over the position. One member 
(Keith Baverstock) was dismissed and replaced by new member (Fiona Walthall), and 
another member (David Ball) resigned at the end of  the first phase. Their remit was “to 
oversee a review of  options for managing solid radioactive waste in the UK and to 
recommend the option, or combination of  options, that can provide a long term solution, 
providing protection for people and the environment” (CoRWM 2006, p. 154). There was 
a variety in expertise and background of  the members such as “scientific, social, economic, 
environmental and public perspectives on the issue of  radioactive wastes” (Faulkland 
Associates 2006, p. 3).  
 
Representative of  Expertise Community 
 
The Committee members, who were the experts in the specific area necessarily, had their 
own pre-established networks and relationships. Therefore, their contributions were not 
only from their knowledge and expertise, but also their connections and networks from 
which they could get resources: 
 
“They were not there to ‘represent’ a constituency, but Members were chosen for 
their spread of  backgrounds and perspectives, for (in some cases) their previous 
involvement in this area, and for their good contacts with a wide range of  
organisations.” (Faulkland Associates 2006, p. 8) 
 
“I have worked across a huge spectrum of  people, so I was constantly in contact 
with very large and diverse communities. And that’s my job and that’s going to be my 
contribution to the Committee.” (Interview with one of  the Committee members) 
 
This diversity of  expertise implied that they could informally represent the communities to 
which they belonged. Although members of  the Committee were not elected as formal 
representatives of  their communities or organisations, they played double roles as a kind of  
informal representative of  their community and an independent expert working for the 
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programme. Diversity in areas of  the Committee’s expertise was appreciated as a strength. 
Members however, were aware of  political elements in recruiting as well:  
 
“It was also very clever to get me involved in particular, because it was an eclectic 
group of  people […] (Interview with a Committee member who had been working 
in NGOs) 
 
Contrasting perceptions over each other’s role  
 
Individual members were recruited, based on their diverse individual attributes, from 
various backgrounds as well as collective attributes as a team:  
 
“Any public body wishing to set up has to publish the specifications of  what the 
organisation has to do and what type of  person it is looking for. So you publish the 
collective attributes the organisation has to have and the individual attributes that you 
want to see in members.” (Interview with one of  the secretariat of  CoRWM) 
 
Therefore, they were supposed to contribute to the team by playing a complementary role 
to one another. However, there was sometimes a discrepancy in members’ perceptions over 
each other’s role. Their ascribed attribute and their own perception on their roles were 
different. This discrepancy in perceptions resulted in different expectations and different 
interpretations on each other’s role and position in the programme. Therefore, this 
discrepancy in members’ perceptions on themselves and on fellow members’ roles 
generated disputes and affected group dynamics. Also, the ground for criticism of  others’ 
roles in the Committee was often coupled with the accusation of  ‘being political’, 
expressing suspicion on the fundamental issue of  recruitment: 
 
“We believed that some of  the people of  the Committee were politically 
appointed.”(Interview with one of  the Committee members) 
 
Different Understandings of  the Committee’s Role  
 
There were not only different understandings on each other’s role in the Committee but 
also different understandings over the role of  the Committee itself  in the programme. 
Although there were terms of  reference given to the Committee, many occasions showed 
that members of  the Committee had different ideas of  their collective role:  
 
“Well, at the end of  the day, the Committee would make a decision. Yes, they should 
make a decision. But they should have been appointed to […] They were open to 
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receive the wisdom of  the stakeholders and they were open to listen to the concerns 
of  the public.”(Interviewee A from the Committee) 
 
“The role of  CoRWM was very clearly set out to be to listen to what the public had 
to say. Part of  our terms of  reference was to increase public confidence in the 
programme.”(Interviewee B from the Committee) 
 
“He said at a meeting that we should consider ourselves to be in the same position as 
doctors diagnosing illness and as we diagnose illness we propose to the patient the 
best solution and we persuade the patient […]” (Interviewee C from the Committee) 
 
“I think they resigned over a misunderstanding of  what the original CoRWM was set 
up to do. But the minister wasn’t asking for hard recommendations. He was asking 
for a framework recommendation […] He encouraged CoRWM to carry out their 
mission, which was designing the process rather than designing the technical 
solution.” (Interview with an independent consultant) 
 
Therefore, the Committee had identified and established their own role as the programme 
progressed. There was a moment when members discussed what their role would be in 
terms of  decision making: what if  they hear very different opinions from others. They 
concluded that they were not simply a conduit for others’ views and that they would make 
their own independent decision on what to recommend: 
 
“Summing up, the Chair said that there was general agreement that public concerns 
should be identified at the start of  the process.  CoRWM would be more than just a 
channel for public and stakeholder views.  The engagement process might not yield 
clear and unambiguous answers.  One challenge would be to inform the process while 
minimising any unintentional bias in information provided by the Committee.” 
(Plenary meeting minute, May 2004)  
 
The initial role of  the Committee, which was overseeing the process, was gradually changed 
to that of  direct decision maker on the substantive matters. There was a awareness of  this 
change among the members, and the members themselves sounded proud of  what they 
had done:  
 
“CoRWM in some senses operated more like a consultancy project team than the 
‘one day a week’ oversight and decision-making committee that appears to have been 
the original intent.  The main factor driving the shift away from ‘oversight’ to ‘doing’ 
was the determination on the part of  both a majority of  members and the 
sponsoring department to deliver to programme despite being constrained by tight 
timescales, delays in appointing the Project Manager and pressure on resources at 
critical points.” (Faulkland Associates 2006, p. 8) 
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Public and Stakeholders 
 
As this programme was called ‘public deliberation’ or ‘public consultation’, public and 
stakeholder engagement (PSE) was actually a main entity of  the programme. The public 
and stakeholders were involved in every phase as PSE 1, 2, 3 and 4 with various methods. 
There were various methods of  PSE used in the programme: through face-to-face 
meetings, documented consultation or web-based comments: Discussion Groups, Citizens’ 
Panels, Discussion Guide, Schools Project, National Stakeholder Forum, Nuclear Site 
Stakeholder Round Tables, Open Meetings, Bilateral Meetings, Consultation Documents 
and Web-based (See Table 5.1). These diverse methods of  engagement were used for 
different purposes with different participants at different stages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: CoRWM 2006, p. 47) 
 
Different Definitions of  the Public and Stakeholders, and Their Role in the 
Programme 
 
As the wide range of  different approaches in PSE programmes shows, designers (the 
Committee and specialists from The Environment Council, The Centre for the Study of 
Environmental Change at Lancaster University, Dialogue by Design, Public Space Ltd and 
Wayne Talbot Associates), used diverse characteristics to categorise people under ‘Public 
and Stakeholders’, as these were obviously not homogeneous. In addition to this 
Box 5.2 Four Phases of  Public and Stakeholders Engagement 
• PSE 1 (November 2004 – January 2005) 
To seek views on the inventory of radioactive waste and materials, a long list of long-
term radioactive waste management options and the criteria that should be used to 
screen out options 
• PSE 2 (April 2005 – June 2005) 
To seek views on the proposed shortlist of management options, the criteria that 
should be used to assess them, participatory processes for options assessment, and 
implementation issues   
• PSE 3 (October 2005 – February 2006) 
To enable participation in the assessment of shortlisted options, including the 
expression of views on the importance of different criteria, on specialist judgements 
of option performance (‘scores’), and preferences for long-term management options 
• PSE4 (May 2006) 
To seek comments on CoRWM’s draft recommendations, including proposals on 
how they should be implemented, and the ways of increasing public confidence 
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heterogeneity in the real public and stakeholders around the radioactive waste management 
issue, people who were in the position of  designers or participants, had a different picture 
in their head for categorising groups of  actors for the radioactive management policy. The 
discrepancy in people’s perception was as deep as the fundamental level of  their different 
concepts over ‘the public’ and ‘the stakeholders’: who does belong to the category of  the 
public and who belongs to the stakeholder group. This was the case for both people who 
were outside of  the programme and direct participants inside of  the programme. The 
following quotes showed the different views on the roles of  the public and the 
stakeholders in the programme: 
 
“I think there is a sort of  fairly standard definition, but it is prevalent […] which is 
essentially that a stakeholder is anybody who perceives themselves to have an interest 
in the issue. I tended to distinguish stakeholders from members of  the public. A 
member of  the public is someone who essentially does not perceive themselves to 
have a particular interest in the issue […]  
Well […] The public is everybody. We are all members of  the public. Maybe we need 
a different terminology but the way in which I looked at PSE was - stakeholders, they 
had an interest. Members of  the public - they may actually have an interest at some 
point down the line but …they don’t have a particular interest in it. (Interview with 
the Chair of  the Committee) 
 
“Oh, I think there is no situation where you can say there is a public out th
ere. I mean, you could go to a football match and ask 40 thousand men and
 boys and girls, what their views were. That’s the public, as we generally mea
n it. But you wouldn’t get an answer, would you?” (Interview with the chair
man of a site stakeholder group). 
 
The Committee discussed this issue amongst themselves at a plenary meeting, with the    
questions ‘Who should be involved? What do we mean by ‘the public’? (Plenary meeting 
minute April 2004)’. The designers had different ideas over the categorisation of PSE, 
although ultimately, whatever the winning rationale was among the designers, the 
categorisation for PSE methods (Table 5.1) was confirmed by the Committee. In this sense, 
the list of diverse groups of actors in the category reflected the winning rationale of the 
Committee for PSE. However, this does not necessarily mean that it reflects the real world 
as a composition of these mutually exclusive, different groups of people: 
 
“We defined the public separately from stakeholders as those people who had no 
particularly strong view about the subject matter because our conviction, which I 
think was fairly well substantiated by evidence that most people don’t have a strong 
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view. The public as defined here may have some vague enthusiasm and some vague 
suspicion but are open to argument and persuasion.” (Interview with the Chair of  
the Committee) 
 
Extensive and Intensive: Different Approaches to the Public and Stakeholders 
 
Although the public and stakeholders were coupled together into a group of  three main 
actors of  the programme, there was a clear difference between these two categories among 
participants’ views. This different definition between the public and stakeholders became 
the rationale for a different approach to these two groups. Despite co-existence of  
divergent views on the public and stakeholders, the Committee defined the public and 
stakeholders as that the public have neither a specific interest nor information on the issue, 
while stakeholders do. This became the rationale for the design of  PSE events. CoRWM 
used the concept of  ‘extensive and intensive’: extensive methods for the public and 
intensive methods for the stakeholders. This shows that the different expectations of  the 
contributions from these two groups shaped the design of  the methods: 
 
“The public’s role is precisely there. I mean we had two types of  approaches. We had 
extensive and intensive […] What we were trying to do with stakeholders was to get 
some very informed views about technical and scientific arguments. What we were 
trying to do with the public was to get their values […] What sounds about right as 
far as the public is concerned from ethical and moral points of  view […] What 
would they feel about it? […] So that was the distinction that we used.” (Interview 
with one of  the Committee members) 
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Table 5.1 PSE Methods  
 
(Source: CoRWM 2006, p. 45) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activity Participants Main Aims 
Discussion 
Groups 
Eight groups of  8 recruited citizens at 
different locations across the UK. 
To elicit basic views and concerns 
about radioactive waste 
management (PSE1). 
Citizens’ 
Panels 
Four panels of  12-16 citizens met three times.  
The panels covered Scotland, Wales, North and 
South England. Citizens were recruited to 
ensure a mix of  gender, age and social class, 
but to avoid people who work for the nuclear 
industry or belong to an anti-nuclear group. 
To participate in shortlisting, 
options assessment and review of  
draft recommendations (PSE2, 3 
and 4). 
Discussion 
Guide 
568 self-selecting groups from across the UK, 
including community groups, environmental 
groups, older people and schools. 
To discuss issues relevant to the 
assessment of  shortlisted options 
and provide feedback (PSE3). 
Schools 
Project 
1305 students (aged 11-18) from 15 schools in 
Bedfordshire. 
To identify and discuss the issues 
considered important to the 
assessment of  options and provide 
feedback (PSE3). 
National 
Stakeholder 
Forum 
20-25 participants from national bodies, 
including Government Departments, Non-
Departmental Public Bodies, the nuclear 
industry, the regulators, local government and 
campaigning groups.  The NSF met four 
times. 
To participate in shortlisting, 
options assessment and review of  
draft recommendations (PSE1, 2, 3 
and 4). 
Nuclear Site 
Stakeholder 
Round 
Tables 
Meetings in eight locations for stakeholders 
from local organisations around a total of  14 
nuclear sites (covering civil and military, public 
and private sector and different types of  
facilities).  The RTs met three times, with a 
fourth round of  events for nominees from 
each area. 
To participate in shortlisting, 
options assessment and review of  
draft recommendations (PSE1, 2, 3 
and 4). 
Open 
Meetings 
Two rounds of  open meetings were held in 
eight areas close to nuclear sites. 
To identify views and concerns 
about radioactive waste 
management, including shortlisting 
(PSE1 and 2). 
‘Bilateral’ 
Meetings 
A series of  meetings between CoRWM 
members and representatives from stakeholder 
organisations. 
To obtain information and discuss 
issues as appropriate to the aims 
of  each period of  PSE. 
Consultation 
Documents 
Various stakeholders and members of  the 
public. 
To seek views on a formal 
consultation document over a 
three month period (PSE1 and 2). 
Web-based Various stakeholders and members of  the 
public. 
To provide opportunity for 
comment on consultation papers, 
specialist judgements of  option 
performance, and draft 
recommendations (PSE1, 2, 3 and 
4). 
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Who were in the stakeholder group: Representativeness  
 
Who are the participants in stakeholder group meetings is associated with the issue of  
representativeness. For example, it was the case of  a parish councillor who claimed himself  
to be a legitimate representative of  the site, which was in contrast to the accusation by local 
campaigners: 
  
“THE leader of an independent watchdog body set up to monitor Oldbury nuclear 
power station has written to Prime Minister Tony Blair calling for a new atom plant 
on the Severnside site and says he has the people of South Gloucestershire behind 
him. Malcolm Lynden, chairman of the Oldbury Site Stakeholders Group, says there 
is overwhelming local demand for the replacement of Oldbury’s nuclear reactors 
when they shut down in 2008 after 40 years of power generation. […] Fellow 
stakeholders group member Alan Pinder - also a member of South Gloucestershire 
Friends of the Earth - said: “I have no objection to him writing as an individual as 
long as he does not claim to be representing the stakeholders group or, come to that, 
the people of South Gloucestershire.” 
Thornbury Gazette, Front page 9, December 200550
“So I responded to that with a long email, where I set out my position and I also said 
in it that I am firmly convinced that I have represented the views of  the majority of  
the community […]Yes, I am the parish council representative on the site stakeholder 
group.” (Interview with the councillor - Chairman of the Oldbury Site Stakeholders 
Group) 
  
 
 
Different methods were used for stakeholder engagement, such as the National 
Stakeholder Forum, the Nuclear Site Stakeholder Round Table, ‘Bilateral’ meetings and 
comments through documents and websites. Some participants were delegates from certain 
sites, organisations or groups, but some of  the participants were self-selected. Therefore, 
whether they were entitled to be representatives was in question. An interviewee referred to 
a quote of  someone’s view on community representativeness that ‘I would rather have a 
bunch of  aliens to represent my community than a local councillor’. 
 
Scientists and Specialists  
 
Role of  science and scientific experts in risk decision making 
There were a lot of  specialists, who were involved in the process directly and indirectly 
including the members of  the Committee, some participants from PSE and those who 
                                                 
50 Available from: (http://www.glosgreenparty.org.uk/content/view/927/2/) 
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were involved in designing and conducting actual processes.  In particular, although it was 
acknowledged that radioactive waste management was not only a technical issue but also 
social and ethical issues, technical expertise on the radioactive waste was highly appreciated:   
   “If  the Committee’s recommendations are to offer protection to people and 
the environment, they need to be based on the best available scientific and 
technical knowledge.  CoRWM engaged with the scientific community in a 
variety of  ways. For example, it used expert knowledge in a specific context 
in shortlisting options; it deployed much more intensive application of  
scientific knowledge to the detailed assessment of  shortlisted options in 
assessing option performance within the framework of  formal Multi-Criteria 
Decision Analysis (MCDA); and it used broader scientific assessments to 
examine the critical question of  confidence in the long-term safety of  
geological disposal.” (CoRWM 2006, p. 6) 
 
As discussed in the previous section, different definitions of  the public and stakeholders 
relied on people’s various perceptions, and they contradicted one another. Likewise, the 
definition of  scientific knowledge and its role in radioactive waste management policy-
making were divergent depending on different people. These contrasting views on the 
fundamental issue produced much disagreement among stakeholders inside and outside of  
the programme, and brought about a split within the Committee. The House of  Lords 
(2004) accused CoRWM on the ground of  insufficiency in scientific inputs to the decision-
making process and two members of  the Committee also criticised CoRWM as taking an 
insufficient scientific approach. The following quotes showed that the Committee members 
had contrasting views on science and its role in the risk decision-making process: 
 
“We [the Committee] broadly took the view that most of  us scientists should be on 
tap but not on top; he [one of  the two Committee members who criticised the 
process] particularly criticised this view […] (Interviewee A from the Committee) 
 
“But there were many people on the CoRWM who proved themselves to be very 
antagonistic to technical input. They were what I would call ‘social relativists’. They 
didn’t believe technical input because they didn’t trust it or they were politically 
against it. Combined with that, they were all anti-nuclear.” (Interviewee B from the 
Committee)  
 
“Radioactive waste management […] should be based on the absolute truth […] 
Technicality was not considered […] Public can’t answer to the technical issue […]”  
(Interviewee C from the Committee) 
 
In short, there were such contrastingly divergent rationales for divisions of  labour among 
participants inside and stakeholders outside. These divergent rationales over divisions of  
labour reflected various attributes of  participants, and complex context of  the programme. 
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The way of  embracing these widely divergent rationales was not played out in a formalised 
manual. Instead, it would be better understanding that a wide range of    rationales were 
somehow encompassed through a complex, implicit and rather discursive way. 
 
5.2.2 Deliberativeness  
 
A wide range of  different participants did not merely bring knowledge, but also introduced 
their respective identities, convictions and networks into the deliberation process. These 
respective participants’ attributes played their part as internal elements of  the programme 
and these generated various meanings and dynamic relationships within CoRWM. 
Furthermore, political discourse, governmental and non-governmental institutions and 
policy networks were the external elements outside of  CoRWM, which influenced their 
power in the deliberation process. There were dynamic inter-reflections between these 
internal and external elements of  the programme. As well as this, there were inter-
reflections amongst internal elements of  the participants in the programme. For the 
duration of  these continuing inter-reflections of  the elements of  the programme, 
deliberation appeared as a complex form of  various ‘discursive relations’ among 
participants. It was not simply a communicative form of  rationally argumentative reasoning 
as characterised in theory. Instead, participants experienced various material, social and 
political relations, such as segmenting, aligning, competing, negotiating and networking. 
 
5.2.2.1 Internal Elements: Plurality in Identities, Convictions and Networks, as well 
as Knowledge of  Participants 
 
Plurality in the number and views of  people is an important value for designing a public 
engagement programme, such as CoRWM. In particular, knowledge is one of  the most 
common and legitimate qualifications for the participation of  public engagement. As 
established before, it was also the case for CoRWM to use knowledge as one of  its most 
explicit, official rationales for inviting participants.   
 
Participants, however, did not only bring this official, explicit qualification - knowledge - 
but also introduced many different respective attributes to the deliberation process. These 
attributes were, for example, participants’ identities that stemmed from social perception 
and their institutions; their personal convictions on the basis of  their philosophy, 
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preference and experience; and their personal networks.  Reflections amongst these 
internal elements also generated new sets of  knowledge, interests, identities, roles, networks 
and relationships of  the participants, which shaped the new context of  their deliberation.  
The ensuing part of  this chapter, presents the ways in which these various attributes were 
inter-reflected by participants, and materialised in divisions of  labour of  the deliberation 
process. 
 
Knowledges 
 
Different participants brought different types of  knowledge into the deliberation. The 
three main groups of  actors of  CoRWM were the Committee, Public and Stakeholders, 
and Scientists and Specialists. As argued earlier in this chapter, the rationale for this 
categorisation was the type of  knowledge they had: knowledge for decision making for the 
Committee, the experiential or local knowledge of  Public and Stakeholders, and scientific 
and technical knowledge from Scientists and Specialists. It was a mostly common typology 
shared in the literatures and practices (Kemp et al. 2006). Various types of  knowledge were 
the main attributes expected from the participants, which was the same within each group. 
In particular, for the science-related policy-making, like CoRWM, ‘knowledge’ is the non-
disputable qualification for participation.  
 
For example, the Committee was composed of  various experts, such as an economist, risk 
experts, an NGO person, social scientists, environmental scientists, decision-making 
process experts, etc. They had established experience and knowledge in their areas, which 
were able to be explicitly recognised and thus often became the reasons for recruiting them. 
This attribute of  ‘knowledge’ entitled participants to have legitimate participation in the 
deliberation process. Particularly this would be the case for the experts’ group discussion 
for science-related policy-making. For instance, when the government had to set up the 
Committee (CoRWM) to manage the programme, it stressed the Committee’s independent 
authority on its decision-making. This independence from the government was explicitly 
emphasised as an important principle. In addition to that, Committee members had to 
declare their interests clearly in the Committee, for example, any financial or personal 
interests in the issues discussed.  This was the device with which to protect the decision 
process from possible criticism of  contamination of  its decisions by members’ personal 
interest. Therefore, the forefront rationale of  knowledge for recruitment may have raised 
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expectations that the decision would be independent, not only of  the 
Government/industry but also of  any interest of  the inside that made the decision. In this 
light, emphasising only knowledge for the constituting element for deliberation would be 
misleading as if  knowledge is the only constituent for decision-making process, ignoring 
the other parts of  the deliberation process: 
 
“They were not there to ‘represent’ a constituency, but Members were chosen for 
their spread of  backgrounds and perspectives, for (in some cases) their previous 
involvement in this area, and for their good contacts with a wide range of  
organisations.  Criticism of  members for potential bias because of  their background 
therefore seems misplaced.” (Faulkland Associates 2006, p. 8) 
 
Since in reality, in addition to this explicit and forefront attribute of  participants, there were 
actually much more, contributing to the shape of  the deliberation process. These other 
parts of  the deliberation process were rather implicit, and yet materialised to be influential 
elements, which made the deliberation process ‘discursive relations’ rather than rational 
argumentation. 
 
Identities of  the Participants 
 
Participants had their identities, which were generally associated with their institutions or 
expertise. These were useful indicators with which to recruit people into the programme. 
However, they also played a critical role in shaping the deliberation by forming stereotypes 
or sometimes biased views, and affecting the relationships among participants. These 
personally perceived identities generated a discrepancy between the ascribed identities by 
others and own perceived identities, which resulted in different expectations over their own 
and others’ roles. Interviewees characterised themselves and others in contrasting ways. 
Taking the example of  the chairman of  a site stakeholder group (who used to be a local 
councillor), he claimed his legitimate representation of  the local residents of  the site, but 
local environmental groups argued that he was self-elected and should not have claimed for 
being representative of  his local site. 
In addition, there were antagonistic relationships between different kinds of  groups within 
the participants, such as pro- and anti-nuclear; industries and NGOs; or natural and social 
scientists. Interviewees easily employed pro- and anti-nuclear stances to categorise 
participants. The narrative was simply divided into ‘pro’ or ‘anti’: 
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“[…] somebody said to me at that time when the appointments [of  the Committee] 
were made, they were all made by OCPA51
 
 and then referred to the minister. They said 
that Michael Meacher would have been pleased with the Committee, because we’ve got 
four people on that Committee out of  the thirteen, who were presumed to be anti-
nuclear.” (Interview with one of  the Committee members) 
Particularly, participants often coupled the pro-nuclear stance with industry people, and 
these industry people and NGO people were a kind of enemy to each other. One of the 
interviewees, who had been working in an NGO background exemplified this antagonistic 
relationship between them: 
 
“I mean I was inside. There were lots of  NGOs on the outside who had far less 
impact than I did. I always had this problem, you know, people say you are working 
with industry.”   
(Interview with one of  the Committee members) 
 
Another interviewee, who was the chairman of  a site stakeholder group described NGO 
people as those who ‘were difficult to work with’, and ‘the single-minded’, while 
considering industry people to be those who ‘knew substantive matters and thus were 
entitled to make a decision’: 
 
“They were difficult to work with. Work does not progress with those. They don’t 
tackle the issue […] I will call them the single-minded […] Industry, people who 
knew all about nuclear would conclude […]” (Interview with the chairman of  a site 
stakeholder group) 
 
Convictions 
 
Contradicting views of participants were not necessarily the result of their wide areas of 
expertise, but were sometimes due to their fundamentally different convictions. These 
participants’ respective beliefs on the issues created contrasting ideas over the deliberation 
process.  In particular, a different philosophy towards definitions and roles of science and 
the public in the policy-making process for technological risks was critically influential to 
the dynamics between participants. People who were dealing with the same issue had very 
different definitions of science and the public. Consequently, their opinions on the role of 
science and the public in risk decision-making were very different. This fundamental 
difference appeared to be a difficulty or intractable discrepancy beyond the possibility of 
deliberation. This discrepancy in fundamental philosophy became one of the main reasons 
which caused the departure of two members of the Committee and brought about a 
                                                 
51 OCPA is an acronym for the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments. 
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change in the process of CoRWM. Two members, who left the Committee at a quite early 
stage, criticised CoRWM for being not sufficient in scientific input. They rather had a 
different point of view on the role of technical experts and the public in radioactive waste 
management. The following quotes show these contrasting views among the Committee 
members. The first and the second quotes are from the two members who departed from 
the Committee: 
 
“It [scientific knowledge] comes in very useful, if  you are concerned with a specific 
kind of  hazard like [...] that’s where the technical knowledge comes in […] you 
couldn’t expect the lay people to know that, but technical people will be able to tell you. 
[…] Because CoRWM had only three years to do its job, there was no way to start 
doing good science. After two years, especially, several people on the Committee who 
had the most influence due to their personalities, were antagonistic to science […] 
[one of  the Committee member] said things like: Science is as changeable as politics. 
Today I have been teaching my MS students about risk management.  We were talking 
about the different beliefs that people have: they are a range from the naive positivist 
and the cultural relativist.  She is the cultural relativist. She thinks anybody’s opinion is 
as good as anybody else’s, even on technical matters, because the day of  science is 
over.”  
(Interviewee A from the Committee)52
 
 
“That was the very seed of  all our disagreements. Because this group on the 
Committee were relativists. Because they thought that relativism was a respectable 
academic position to take[…]But there were other things, like how rapidly radioactive 
waste will leak from a containment constructed. In this way, which is based much, 
much more on absolute truth.  Things, which we can measure and predict, so these 
two kinds of  truth came into conflict […]” 
(Interviewee B from the Committee) 
 
“We broadly took the view that most of  us scientists should be on tap but not on top; 
he [one who departed the Committee] particularly criticised this view […]”   
(Interviewee C from the Committee)53
 
 
“And I think he [one who departed the Committee] felt that placing so much emphasis 
on PSE was going to deliver to us technically ill-informed recommendations […]” 
(Interviewee D from the Committee) 
 
Networks 
 
As established before, participants’ personal networks played such an important part in the 
deliberation process. Participants inside of  the programme reported the process and the 
issues to the outside and took concerns and opinions from the outside to the inside. The 
                                                 
52 Part of this quote was used in other place of this chapter. 
53 This interview material is used in previous part of this chapter. 
156 
 
 
 
influence from these informal and personal relationships of  participants with their 
colleagues and friends outside of  the programme was quite remarkable in relation to 
transferring their message beyond the formal communications like set meetings. 
 
Therefore, in this sense, these people, who had personal association with the participants 
inside of  the programme, also got involved in the deliberation process, although they were 
not officially invited. People who were outside, sent their messages in formal and informal 
ways to the inside through the person with whom they had network. Participants inside 
played the role of  building a bridge between the outside and the inside.  A good example 
was that of  an expert having  a personal network with some Committee members had a 
close look at the process and influenced it by his personal links.  He was an NGO 
associated, but independently working, consultant and academic. He had a strong 
relationship with two members of  the Committee of  CoRWM. He said that he had 
discussed CoRWM issues with them a lot while the programme took place. They had been 
working together on other occasions as well. His argument over the government’s response 
to the CoRWM’s recommendation was the same as that expressed by one of  the two 
Committee members with whom he had a link:  
 
“I am a personal friend of  two members of  the Committee, [Person A] and [Person 
B]. I also met a number of  the members because I participated as a representative of  
an NGO called SERA, which stands for the ‘Socialist Environmental Resources 
Association’[…] So I knew quite a few of  the CoRWM representatives, who were in 
that stakeholder dialogue as well. So I had friendship with some and a professional 
relationship with others.” (Interview with an independent consultant) 
 
Participants inside reported what was happening to the outside. Therefore, people who 
were outside of  the deliberation could know the happenings inside and tried to intervene in 
various ways. For example, when two members had conflicted with the idea of  scientific 
inputs and public engagement in the programme, they raised this issue to the outside 
through their networks:  
 
“They were able to talk to their scientific colleagues saying that CoRWM was 
corrupted and scientifically weak etc. […] Corrupt, no one would believe really for a 
moment, but scientifically weak, yes, they believed that. So it took a long time for 
CoRWM then to build up kind of  peer-review quality control mechanisms.” 
(Interview with one of  the secretariat of  CoRWM) 
 
Transferring the ideas and opinions between the inside and the outside took place through 
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informal and formal networking routes, which were sometimes more visible and sometimes 
on a very personal level. In addition, the multiple networks outside of CoRWM made a 
coalition to make a louder voice and influence their power over the deliberation. Therefore, 
the networking in fact, enabled more people to participate than the actual number of the 
participants inside:  
 
“You are only able to see a limited number of  people but especially in the 
stakeholders community, they have links with many, many more people. Our hope 
was that they would report back face-to-face experiences [...]” (Interview with one of  
the Committee members) 
 
“What I did at the end was to produce the critique of  the process [...] But 
stakeholders were saying to me ‘I don’t think this process is working’ or ‘I really 
worry about their plans for this.’ Then I wouldn’t wait till the end to tell people. I 
wrote monthly reports. […]Yes, because it went on for many years. I was working in 
this area. I might have been working for another project as well [...] You would find it 
in the nuclear area, a lot of  people know each other very well.” (Interview with one 
of  the evaluators of  CoRWM) 
 
Networks enabled multiple, fragmented individuals and communities to be connected and 
to transfer their views. Therefore, as some scholars suggest, this could work for a new 
mode of  representative democracy. However, there are also concerns of  legitimacy of  this 
kind of  representativeness, as often the self-elected or -selected was the case. Both sides of  
networks regarding representativeness were shown in this case.  There were various 
occasions which showed networks helped to include more views than the actual number of  
participants inside. However, there also sometimes, questionable representativeness was 
claimed by un-authorised representatives (Hendriks 2009), such as the previous example of  
the chairman of  one site stakeholders group who confidently claimed the legitimacy in his 
representing of  his site.  
 
5.2.2.2 External Elements: Political Discourse, Governmental and Non-
Governmental Institutions, and Policy Networks 
 
In addition to these elements of  the insiders, things outside of  CoRWM, such as political 
discourse, governmental and non-governmental institutions and policy networks exerted 
their power in the deliberation process. These external elements outside CoRWM 
interacted with internal elements of  the programme. CoRWM had been developed through 
its continuing process of  responding to as well as being intervened by these external 
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elements. 
 
Nuclear policy: Climate Change and Energy Security Discourse 
 
In the previous section on the birth of  CoRWM, I established the role that the UK nuclear 
energy policy played in radioactive waste policy-making.  Putting it the other way around, it 
was a discussion about how important the UK radioactive waste management solution was 
for the UK nuclear energy policy discussion.  This section will now discuss how discourses 
around it actually contributed to the nuclear new build discussion with the examples of  
climate change and energy security.   
 
It is interesting to see how the same environmental discourse was deployed with 
contrasting rationales by different stakeholders in the context of  nuclear power policy-
making. Nuclear power has been one of  the main issues to be tackled by environment 
activists over the last few decades. It was claimed as being environmentally-unfriendly.  In 
this argument, the equation of  anti-nuclear to environmentally-friendly worked.  However, 
since climate change took a great attention on the planet, the pro-nuclear stance emerged 
legitimately from some stakeholders to support the argument of  environmental concerns. 
This was the case in CoRWM. In the discussion on the new build of  nuclear power in the 
UK, the discourse on climate change played as important a role as low-carbon policy. It 
was discussed as the way to go forward.   Climate change was not only a UK government 
argument, but a globally confirmed norm. It was, therefore, a politically powerful, and thus 
useful, means for legitimising the nuclear new build policy. Although there were different 
arguments, climate change discourse was very fit for purpose.   
 
Mark Higson (Chief  Executive, Office for Nuclear Development, Department of  Energy 
and Climate Change) argued that ‘reducing carbon emissions’ was the core issue that the 
government faced and the government’s role was to follow ‘a coherent and practical suite 
of policies’ in his answer to defend the criticised nuclear new build policy-making process: 
 
“I think that comes down to the heart of  what is the role of  the government and 
what is it that should be done by broadened consensus. And I have got a view that 
the government is responsible for a coherent and practical suite of  policies, which 
unrealistically fit together. That’s what the government is basically responsible for.  
So if  you take the view of  the government, we’ve got the most enormous challenge 
of  reducing carbon emissions […]” (Mark Higson, at a seminar held at SPRU, 
University of  Sussex on 1 February 2010) 
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Energy security discussion was another useful means to support the new build of  nuclear 
power, although the priority was changed from energy security to climate change in the 
government’s official documents (see the discussion in the section of  the context of  this 
chapter). Failure in electricity control, which resulted in a blackout in the summer of 2003 
in the UK and other countries, supported the argument of the need for nuclear power 
(Mackerron 2004; Watson 2007). The following quote from The Guardian pointed out the 
efforts of the UK nuclear industry using this event to build their claim of additional nuclear 
power: 
 
Terry Macalister, The Guardian, Monday 29 September 200354
“But rising incidents of power shortages around the world will be welcomed at one 
source: the British nuclear industry, which has been trying to convince the 
government that the UK needs a new generation of nuclear power stations. Some 
observers argue that without additional nuclear power, the UK could find itself 
depending on "unpredictable" wind power, or even gas imports from such unstable 
political regimes as Algeria.  
 
This week British Nuclear Fuels peppered the pages of the left-leaning New 
Statesman magazine with adverts promoting its new-found "responsibility" and the 
vital role it thinks it should have, addressing future energy needs.  
BNFL's tactic seeks to convince Tony Blair and the rest of the Labour party meeting 
in Bournemouth this week that nuclear should get a second chance. The nuclear 
industry has always admitted privately its best chance lay in a growing fear of power 
cuts.”  
 
Michael Meacher and Elliot Morley: Environment Minister(s) 
 
Michael Meacher,55 who was Environment Minister (1997-2003) and his successor, Elliot 
Morley56
                                                 
54 Available from (
 (from June 2003) were important figures in CoRWM. They had been influential in 
the birth of  CoRWM and during its period of  CoRWM 1 (2003-2006). Michael Meacher, in 
particular was involved in the initiation of  CoRWM and had a significant role. Although he 
was sacked in June 2003 even before the Committee of  CoRWM actually started its work, 
his influence was still inherited by his successor. Meacher’s influence on CoRWM was not 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2003/sep/29/italy.climatechange) 
55  Michael Meacher was believed that he was sacked because he criticised in public the 
government’s GM policy and invasion of Iraq. 
56 Elliot Morley had been a junior minister in DEFRA since 1997 until he succeeded Michael 
Meacher as the minister in DEFRA. 
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visible, but was substantial: 
 
“I'm not without my own environmental credentials," Morley says. "I've worked with 
Michael for many years. In fact, he told me that if he were to leave the department he 
hoped I would be his successor." (Interview with Elliot Morley, by John Kampfner, 
New Statesman, 30 June 2003)57
 
 
Michael Meacher was sacked in June 2003 and replaced by his old colleague, Elliot Morley.  
Although during CoRWM 1 (2003-2006) Morley was the minister, interestingly 
interviewees spoke a lot about Meacher as they remembered him as the minister. It was 
interesting that when many interviewees talked about the minister, they referred to 
Meacher rather than Morley. The following quote showed that one of  the interviewees 
mentioning Meacher instead of  Morley in explaining the important role of  minister in 
CoRWM:  
 
“A very important actor was Michael Meacher. He was the environment minister. He 
was important because he encouraged, despite the Lords’ criticising CoRWM. He 
encouraged CoRWM to carry out their mission, which was designing the process 
rather than designing the technical solution. So he was very important politically 
because he legitimised the mission and therefore they didn’t change around because 
of  the criticism outside. [...] They were frustrated because CoRWM wasn’t doing 
what they wanted CoRWM to do but CoRWM was doing what the minister wanted 
CoRWM to do, because the minister asked them to look at a policy-making process, 
not an engineering solution.” (Interview with an independent consultant) 
 
The following quote from the interview with the Chair of  CoRWM on the question of  
criticism: 
 
“There were an outsider view that we had insufficient expertise, and that we were 
politically biased in favour of  Michael Meacher, we were called once a friend of  
Michael Meacher.” (Interview with the Chair of  the Committee) 
   
One of  the interviewees (CoRWM member) genuinely thought Michael Meacher was 
actually on his side in an anti-nuclear position saying that ‘we had a very sympathetic 
government at the time, and the minister was Michael Meacher, he was definitely anti-
nuclear’. 
 
House of  Lords 
 
The House of  Lords Science and Technology Committee criticised the CoRWM process in 
                                                 
57 Available from(http://www.newstatesman.com/node/145770) 
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that it was not scientific enough (House of  Lords, 2004). They published a report in 
December 2004, sounding as if they pressured the government to ‘correct’ CoRWM, 
particularly in terms of ‘being scientific’ and also pushed to achieve speed:   
  
“There has clearly been a great deal of  debate about the adequacy of  the 
Committee’s approach, a critical report by a House of  Lords committee and adverse 
comment in national newspapers. Two ex-Members whom we consulted and whose 
views we take seriously, said that their departure was because of  disagreements over 
this and related issues.” (Faulkland Associates 2006, p. 35) 
 
When the Committee was accused of  not being scientific, this provoked a change in the 
process. The Committee had to show to the outside that they had considered the criticism:  
 
“The problem is that it generated the very complex peer review process.  It went to 
such lengths to prove that there were scientific inputs to everything.  It almost didn’t 
work. It seemed to me so. It was too complicated. So sometimes, it didn’t have the 
scientific input you would have had. Everything was formalised so that you could 
trace it […]” (Interview with one of  the evaluators of  CoRWM) 
 
The following quote is from the plenary meeting of  the Committee in January 2005, after 
the House of  Lords published the report and government responded to it: 
“The Chair mentioned three developments relating to science and quality assurance.  
These involved the Royal Society, the House of  Lords Science and Technology 
Committee report and the Environment Department (DEFRA) proposed response, 
and a meeting with DEFRA's Chief  Scientific Advisor.” (Plenary meeting minute, 
January 2005) 
 
The Royal Society 
 
Learned societies influenced the process in a way of  advising with specific expertise. 
However, in some cases they intervened directly in the process. For example, the Royal 
Society was directly involved in the process in particular for advice for the Quality 
Assurance group when the criticism of  scientific inputs arose.  The following quote is 
from the plenary meetings: 
“The Quality Assurance group's agenda would also need to cover finalisation of  the 
pool of  peer reviewers, the possibility of  an external expert panel with a remit 
extending to quality assurance of  proposed work (in relation to which the secretariat 
had been asked to arrange a meeting with the Royal Society)[…] 
Action 18. To arrange to meet representatives of  the Royal Society to examine the 
scope for providing assistance with CoRWM's quality assurance/peer review work. 
Chair, Secretariat.” 
(Plenary meeting minute, December 2004) 
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“He had met Professor Sir David Wallace, Vice President of  the Royal Society (RSL), 
to discuss ways in which the Society could contribute to CoRWM's work.  This could 
include informal comment and nomination of  people who could advise or 
contribute in a personal capacity, say as peer reviewers or on CoRWM's quality 
assurance group.  RSL would retain its independence and its ability to comment 
freely on CoRWM's work.” (Plenary meeting minute, January 2005) 
 
Professor Geoffrey Boulton from the Royal Society joined the Quality Assurance group of 
the Committee from May 2005. The Royal Society published reports on the issues of  
CoRWM. One of  them was How should the UK manage radioactive waste?: 
 
“As we have previously outlined, and has been raised by the House of Lords Science 
and Technology Committee (House of Lords 2004), we have concerns over the low 
level of scientific representation on CoRWM, especially in the field of Earth Sciences. 
[…] 
In the next phases of CoRWM’s work, especially in the final decision-making process, 
there is a continued (and possibly stronger) need for robust scientific and technical 
input. It may be necessary to set up a technical committee or sub-committee that 
includes CoRWM members, to assess and summarise the scientific literature, which 
CoRWM members cannot be expected to do alongside all their other duties. 
Purchasing pieces of advice from external contractors is no substitute for continuous 
input from experts with extensive experience of the relevant technology.” (RS Policy 
document 13/05 June 2005) 
 
Another report The long-term management of radioactive waste: the work of the Committee on 
Radioactive Waste Management (CoRWM) (Policy document 01/06 January 2006) was 
published after they held a seminar to ‘identify science-based issues that are of particular 
importance in the crucial final phases of CoRWM’s work, prior to its report to 
Government in summer 2006’ with CoRWM and DEFRA. Recommendations were made 
to CoRWM and DEFRA.  
 
NGOs 
 
NGOs have been important actors in particular nuclear issues in general and perhaps 
necessarily they have always been present in the history of  UK radioactive waste 
management. In many of  the public oppositions in radioactive waste management history 
in the UK, NGOs have played a big part by supporting and leading the local protesters as 
discussed in the previous context section.  People from NGOs were involved everywhere 
inside of  the programme such as a member of  the Committee, specialists and stakeholders. 
In addition, outside CoRWM, they were monitoring and intervening by aligning with other 
local campaigners and approaching the media:   
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“When I finally saw the final report and heard how it was being interpreted, I wrote a 
very long letter to the sponsoring ministers, which I also copied to all the NGOs 
saying that this is wrong in the following area and since then I am campaigning as 
hard as I can.” (Interview with one of  the Committee members) 
 
5.2.2.3 Deliberation is ‘Discursive Relations’ rather than Rational Reasoning 
 
Dynamic inter-reflections between these internal and external elements, and inter-
reflections among internal elements, shaped the deliberation into a complex picture. 
Participants generated and responded to new representations (interests, identities, roles, 
relationships, networks etc.) through these inter-reflections of  the elements of  the 
programme. This reflexive process was the way that deliberation in the real world was 
played out.  
 
Deliberation, in theory, should be a form of  rational reasoning and be protected from 
political and strategic interest or power. Some scholars have more flexible position 
regarding the forms of  deliberation, as Dryzek (2000) argues that other forms of  
communication should be allowed, like rhetoric or storytelling. Rational reasoning however, 
is the characterisation for deliberation process shared by many deliberative democracy 
theorists 
 
Contrastingly, deliberation in practice was not a mere communicative form of  rational 
reasoning as suggested in theory. Rather, it was such a complicated mix of  various forms 
of  ‘discursive relations’. Participants employed various personal and contextual elements of  
the programme in order to realise their interests and values in the process.  Participants in 
other words, interacted socially and politically, with one another in various relationships, 
materialising their knowledges, identities, relationships, policy discourse, and policy 
networks to be influential in the process. Participants for example, segmented or aligned 
with others for their power relations, made strategic competition or negotiation with one 
another, and employed their networks to influence the deliberation. In doing so, 
participants displayed and experienced various forms of  material, social and political 
relations. Deliberation process comprised these various relations rather than merely the 
argumentative form of  public reasoning. 
 
 
164 
 
 
 
Segmenting and aligning 
 
Committee members generated their various informal and formal dividings, such as 
segmenting and aligning. Committee members were recruited, based on ‘the collective 
attributes the organisation wished to have and individual attributes (from an interview with 
the Secretariat of  CoRWM)’. This job attribute is the skills they have, which includes 
experience and knowledge in their expertise. However, as I discussed in the previous 
section, their different, even sometimes radically contrasting convictions did not allow 
them to have only rational reasoning. It was sometimes impossible to compromise with 
each other’s views.  They, therefore, naturally and strategically banded together with certain 
people who shared their conviction, and the Committee was segmented by these emerging 
‘wings’. Issues in CoRWM were often divided as between those anti- and pro- nuclear, or 
social scientists and scientists: 
 
“Some people who were in CoRWM were ‘antagonistic to science’ […] 
They were what I would call ‘social relativists’. They didn’t believe technical input 
because they didn’t trust it or they were politically against it.” (Interview A from the 
Committee)58
 
 
“In terms of  colleagues on the Committee, naturally I was sympathetic with those 
who were anti-nuclear.” (Interview B from the Committee) 
 
Two of  members left with the disparity in their position over the process from the others. 
One of  the main reasons was the discrepancy in their ideas over, in particular, scientific 
inputs and public engagement in the process. The two members worked closely, sharing 
their opinions with each other: 
   
“I feel that most of  the Committee members were intimidated by the ferocity of  the 
attack from [Person A, B and C]. They were intimidated by this group of  people, 
[Person A and B], aided by [Person C]. (Interview with the member who resigned 
from the Committee) 
 
“I can remember how [the one with whom he shared opinions] and I became friends, 
because I didn’t know him. On the second day of  our meeting, I saw [him], and I 
went to up to him and I said: […], do you feel that you are at a party to which you 
haven’t been invited?. He said: Exactly how I feel. Quite honestly from then onwards, 
[he] and I referred to this to as an ‘Alice in Wonderland’ experience. We just could 
not believe that the things that were happening in the way they were happening, 
because it was so conflicting to our philosophy of  dealing with risk.” (Interview with 
                                                 
58 This quote was used in other part of this chapter. 
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the member who was sacked from the Committee) 
 
Competing and negotiating 
 
When people had different ideas, they had to compete or negotiate with one another. The 
decision made was not only the result of  pure publicly-defendable reasoning. Instead, 
political pressure often affected the decision, implicitly and explicitly.  For example, one of  
the Committee members did not agree with deep disposal. Instead, he insisted and believed 
in storage as the better solution. He tried to persuade other members but finally had to 
compromise with the option of  deep disposal, or had to accept that decision: 
 
“There were differences of  view between me and a few others. […] Well, I just spoke 
up […] I was always outvoted. I mean, I could have left but my view is that if  you are 
on the inside, you have a lot better opportunity to influence than being outside. So I 
stayed in. I thought there were a lot of  good things about the process. You were able 
to argue your point and you were able to do so in public […] I was feeling that I was 
getting into a position of  being in the minority more and more.” (Interview with one 
of  the Committee members) 
 
When CoRWM was accused of  being not-scientific, the Committee had to respond to the 
criticism. This criticism made the government apply pressure on the Committee to show 
something to the outside. The Committee, therefore, had to meet their various stakeholders 
to discuss what to do to meet their demands. Therefore, sometimes they had to compete 
for their argument as well as to negotiate for compromise. The quote below was from the 
Committee meeting minutes after that pressure from outside CoRWM:  
 
“9. The Chair mentioned three developments relating to science and quality 
assurance.  These involved the Royal Society, the House of  Lords Science and 
Technology Committee report and the Environment Department (Defra) proposed 
response, and a meeting with Defra's Chief  Scientific Advisor.   
10.  He had met Professor Sir David Wallace, Vice President of  the Royal Society 
(RSL), to discuss ways in which the Society could contribute to CoRWM's work.  
This could include informal comment and nomination of  people who could advise 
or contribute in a personal capacity, say as peer reviewers or on CoRWM's quality 
assurance group.  RSL would retain its independence and its ability to comment 
freely on CoRWM's work. 
11. He had met Defra to discuss its proposed response to the report published in 
December by the House of  Lords Science and Technology Committee.  Many of  its 
recommendations were for Government.  But some - especially relating to the 
"blank sheet of  paper" review of  options, CoRWM's use of  science, its meetings and 
its public engagement - were more relevant to the Committee and would be 
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discussed later in this meeting.  He planned to write an article explaining why 
CoRWM had been set up and how it was going about its work. 
12. He had also met Professor Howard Dalton, Defra's Chief  Scientific Advisor, 
who planned to set up an expert advisory panel to enable him to assist CoRWM in its 
work.  The implications for CoRWM were not yet clear and discussions were 
continuing.” 
 
(Plenary meeting minute, January 2005) 
 
Networking 
 
As evidence previously provided showed, networking was a critical part of  deliberation. 
Individual participants were very well aware of  the power of  networks, and thus made the 
most use of  their existing networks and also created new ones to affect the deliberation 
process. The following quotes tell us how widely networking was used for deliberation by 
participants from various positions in the programme, such as chairing of  the Committee, 
evaluation of  the process, and participating in a stakeholder deliberation: 
            
“I appointed Geoffrey Bolton who was a fellow of  the Royal Society [...] to be an 
inside member to look at the scientific issues and Quality Assurance generally, and  
he then reported informally to his colleagues in the Royal Society and elsewhere 
about whether we were doing a good enough job.  
[…]You only are able to see the limited number of  people but especially in the 
stakeholder community, they have links with many, many more people. Our hope was 
that they would report back face-to-face experience […] (Interview with the Chair of  
the Committee) 
 
 “What I did at the end was producing the critique of  the process […] But 
stakeholders were saying to me ‘I don’t think this process is working or I really worry 
about their plans for this.’ Then I wouldn’t wait till the end to tell people. I wrote 
monthly reports […] Yes, because it went on for many years. I was working in this 
area. I might have been working for another project as well. [...] You would find it in 
the nuclear area, a lot of  people know each other very well. (Interview with one of  
the evaluators of  CoRWM)59
 
 
 “Yes, I am the parish council representative on the site stakeholder group. I report 
back to them regularly at the meetings, any issues and things which happened.” 
(Interview with a participant of  the Nuclear Site Stakeholder Round Table)60
 
 
On the other hand, consequently, participants themselves were influenced by others’ 
networks. In particular, established policy networks brought their existing power structure 
                                                 
59 This material was repeatedly used. 
60 This part of interview was used in the earlier section of this chapter. 
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from the outside into the process. When the criticism of  two members of  the Committee 
over the process emerged contrasting to others, they reported their arguments to the 
outside for aid of  auxiliaries.  A member of  the secretariat of  CoRWM recalled that those 
efforts were sufficiently influential to bring about the change in the CoRWM process of  
setting up a peer-review mechanism.  
 
5.3 Conclusion 
 
One specific and important element found in my empirical examination of  CoRWM is 
inherent reflexivity. Recognition of  such a nature in a real macro risk deliberation exercise 
provided me with a better understanding of  the divisions of  labour in such a practice for 
radioactive waste management policy-making.  A close analysis of  real-world macro 
deliberation revealed a way of  the division of  labour, inclusion and deliberation that took 
place in contrast to that of  deliberative democracy theory. 
 
Various actors around CoRWM had very divergent views on the role of  CoRWM (here, 
referring to the programme) in the radioactive waste management policy-making, as well as 
roles of  its nested small deliberations within the whole programme. They also showed their 
different views over the roles of  individual participants and stakeholder groups within the 
programme. Consequently, they had diverse design preferences and tried to exert their 
influence in order to realise their preference in developing CoRWM. In doing so, they had 
employed and been through various material, social and political relations, which I would 
call ‘discursive relations’. This was a different picture to deliberation of  theory defined as a 
kind of  rational reasoning. Through the participants’ discursive relations, a contrastingly 
wide range of  rationales and their embedded presentations (i.e. meanings and relationships) 
were cross-reflected and integrated into the deliberation process. This was a kind of  
endogenous, upstream way of  inclusion, such as a kind of  ‘fermentation’ process. That is 
also different to what the theorists presume the inclusion to be achieved, as such a 
mechanical aggregation by certain premeditated design. 
 
To conclude, recognising the influence of  reflexivity in shaping these ways of  inclusion and 
deliberation in CoRWM, also improved understanding of  the ways in which the divisions 
of  labour took place. It was an instrumental approach that macro-deliberative theorists 
attempt to maximise two qualities of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness by providing 
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various designs of  the divisions of  labour in public deliberation. However, the divisions of  
labour in the real exercise of  public deliberation - CoRWM, were played out in an 
endogenous way and developed throughout the course of  the process. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
I interrogated divisions of  labour in two UK macro-deliberation exercises (GM Dialogue 
and CoRWM) regarding their inclusiveness and deliberativeness, and reflexivity. I now 
summarise the empirical findings displayed in the previous two chapters on GM Dialogue 
and CoRWM. This chapter begins with a discussion of  reflexivity in divisions of  labour of  
two real macro-risk deliberation exercises, GM Dialogue and CoRWM. It then draws 
attention to new thoughts on the notion of  deliberative democracy, and finally concludes 
with the relevance of  the two deliberative exercise cases to decision making for ST 
Governance. 
 
6.1 Reflexivity, and Divisions of  Labour of  GM Dialogue and CoRWM
   
Division of  labour in deliberation stemmed from the idea that it would improve the degree 
of  inclusiveness without compromising the quality of  deliberativeness in deliberation. To 
maximise these two essential qualities of  deliberative democracy - deliberativeness and 
inclusiveness in their implementation - the division of  labour is claimed to be useful by 
those who support macro-deliberative democracy. However, the importance of  another 
element – ‘reflexivity’ in the deliberation process - has not been fully considered. 
Reflexivity in this thesis refers to the property arising during subjects’ continuing reflections. 
Understanding of  the reflective, endogenous, self-contingent, self-influential, discursive 
nature of  reflexivity lies in observation of  the ways in which subjects’ responses to their 
environment return and influence the subjects themselves. In other words, it is about the 
contingent ways in which subjects’ representations of  their environment re-structure this 
environment and thus re-condition their next representations. This study specifically 
focuses upon the implications of  this reflexivity in divisions of  labour. It does so by 
investigating how divergent participants’ representations of  the divisions of  labour are 
generated, and the ways in which these representations of  the division of  labour have 
influence on shaping the nature and outcome of  deliberation. 
 
In order to elaborate upon this process and elucidate the implications of  reflexivity in the 
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divisions of  labour of  the deliberation process, I revisit the two dimensions of  process and 
outcome of  reflexivity, which were established in Chapter 2 (Theoretical Considerations) 
of  this thesis. This creates a link between the theoretical concepts to empirical evidence in 
GM Dialogue and CoRWM in the ensuing section. 
 
6.1.1 Process Dimension of  Reflexivity: Endogenous Divisions of  Labour in the 
Evolutionary Process 
 
The process dimension of  reflexivity in the divisions of  labour explains the evolving 
characteristics of  the process. There were winning, and thus explicitly-formed (decided) 
divisions of  labour out of  contrasting divergent rationales, and these formed divisions of  
labour were also followed by the newly-emerging divisions of  labour. These two interacted, 
and then formulating process moved on to its next stage of  determining an explicit design. 
This kind of  sequential, continual change took place within, and across, different stages 
and groups of  the whole programme; and, as a whole process, the design has evolved. 
 
For instance, the newly-generated relationships and interests of  the participants, as a result 
of  the interaction of  participants’ various rationales, became the new context to which 
participants themselves would respond.  The examples of  new networks of  participants, 
group dynamics, the development of  new sub-deliberation exercises, new sets of  sub-
groups, the new involvement of  certain institutions and new sets of  decisions, were the 
results of  the participants’ interactions; and these newly-generated responses re-
conditioned the ways in which the participants again interacted with one another. This 
continuing process therefore kept re-formulating the shape of  the programme over time. 
Through this recursive process, the programme has evolved. The next part of  the 
discussion demonstrates this characteristic with the detailed examples of  both cases - GM 
Dialogue and CoRWM. 
The background of  the birth of  both cases reflects a reflexive process in the level of  the 
national ST system. In both contexts, there were downstream policy directions on the one 
hand, such as the incumbent government’s strong interest in biotechnology in the GM 
regulation system and nuclear new build in the radioactive waste management regulation 
system; whilst on the other, there was also strong upstream resistance against those 
directions from various actors in society. And interestingly both cases had a moratorium 
status. Moratoria of  both cases were prompted by strong resistance from the public, by 
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their coalition with other stakeholder groups and these moratoria actually brought about 
the macro-deliberation exercises - GM Dialogue and CoRWM. The incumbent responsible 
government department, DEFRA (formerly DETR, until 2001), had to respond to the 
societal demand for a new mode of  ST regulation by setting up independent bodies and 
public engagement practices.  The establishment of  the independent new bodies of  the 
AEBC and the CoRWM (which here refers to the Committee, which organised the 
deliberation programme) was the result of  this context. Stakeholders (the government, 
NGOs, institutes etc.) then reacted to this new environment with their roles, stakes and 
power. In other words, stakeholders reacted and responded to this newly-set up context by 
attempting to intervene in the deliberation programmes, with direct participation in, or 
indirect influence upon, the programmes. For example, various policy networks emerged 
and influenced the discussion within these bodies and programmes.  
 
This was the way by which those stakeholders gave themselves opportunities to have their 
voices heard in the process of  the regulation of  technology of  GM crops and radioactive 
waste management. Whether their voices had a real influence on the final decision of  each 
deliberation programme is another story though; both cases show the ways in which those 
stakeholders’ interactions among themselves, and their reactions to the context, 
constructed the new environment of  the regulation system. And this newly-constructed 
environment again became the new context, in which the stakeholders are situated. 
 
In short, the dynamic interactions of  the various actors in the governance system of  each 
technology resulted in the birth of  both GM Dialogue and CoRWM (the deliberation 
programme), as other examples of  new institutional bodies like the ABEC and the 
CoRWM (the Committee, which ran the programme), discourse like new mode of  ST 
governance with public engagement, various policy networks through formal and informal 
relationships, and so on.  These again became new constituents of  the regulation system 
of  each technology. In this way, those stakeholders in the governance system re-configured 
the rules and resources of  ST governance by performing and re-setting rationales of  their 
role and the procedure. In other words, it was a reflexive process of  the development of  
each technology system, presenting its nature of  recursive endogenous evolution. 
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Developments in the structures of both programmes also displayed characteristics of a 
reflexive process – comprising continually emerging reconfigurations in divisions of labour 
over the evolution of the programmes. Being born from societal pressure for public 
engagement in regulation, each case of deliberation started with a different role in the ST 
regulation system. GM Dialogue faced the question of whether the UK should have GM 
crops on their land and had to review different perspectives on that matter, while CoRWM 
faced the question of how to deal with the legacy of radioactive waste in the UK and had to 
find policy options for it. The structure of each programme reflected the different roles and 
rationales for their divisions of labour. For example, GM Dialogue comprised three strands 
concerned with reviewing the issues from different perspectives: GM Nation? (public 
debate), Science Review (an examination of current scientific knowledge), and the 
Economic Study (economic analysis of costs and benefits). On the other hand, CoRWM 
set its basis of four phases of the decision-making process to find the options with which 
to provide the government: Phase 1 - information gathering, identifying a long list of 
potential options and designing the methods for shortlisting; Phase2 - shortlisting; Phase 3 
- assessing the shortlisted options and Phase 4 - formulating recommendations and drafting 
a report. In addition, three different groups of actors - the Committee, the Public and 
Stakeholders, and Scientists and Specialists participated in each phase with their different 
roles.  
 
These formed the initial and overall structure of  programmes as formal divisions of  labour. 
These divisions of  labour were made by those who were involved in initial designing such 
as the AEBC and DEFRA officials for GM Dialogue and the Committee for CoRWM. 
However, each programme had been developed, as were the diverse rationales of  
participants of  the programmes, and the participants competed with each other with their 
respective rationales. Therefore, further development of  programmes was the evolutionary 
process of  a series of  newly-emerging divisions of  labour, such as development of  
additional groups or sub-groups of  actors and nested smaller deliberation exercises out of  
the competition between participants’ diverse rationales. For instance, participants were 
invited with their initial given role in the process; as an example, the main groups of  actors 
in CoRWM were composed of  different knowledge holder groups, like the category of  the 
experts for overseeing the programme; the public and stakeholders; and scientists and 
specialists in the sequential decision-making process. However, participants played their 
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part far beyond this given, formally-codified division of  labour.  Along with this kind of  
explicit, given rationale for the divisions of  labour, different understandings of  the 
category for divisions of  labour also existed among different participants. The different 
rationales had gone through the process of  participants’ dynamic interactions and then 
certain rationales had emerged for certain divisions of  labour. Therefore, the evolutionary 
development of  each programme took place through reflexive interactions among 
participant’s different rationales over the divisions of  labour. 
 
The overall official aim of  GM Dialogue was to review the incumbent knowledge on 
commercialisation of  GM crops from different perspectives. It started with the initial 
design of  three strands of  GM Nation?, Science Review and the Economic Study. Each 
strand had its sub-deliberation exercises. These varied in their purpose and method. GM 
Nation? for example, had the experts’ kind of  committee meetings of  the Steering Board, 
the Foundation Workshops with recruited citizens, three-tiered public meetings, and focus 
group meetings, named Narrow-but-Deep. These nested exercises were developed by the 
Steering board and COI as a result of  their discussions. Almost simultaneously, the other 
two strands - Science Review and the Economic Study - had developed their own nested 
deliberation exercises. In addition to the development of  sub-deliberations through 
interactions among designers, there were also attempts to intervene and change the given 
rationales of  these nested deliberations from participants themselves. Therefore, 
development of  these nested deliberations of  GM Dialogue has been made through 
various interactions between the designers’ and the participants’ rationales, as well as 
interactions between divergent rationales of  the designers. As the programme developed, 
therefore, there was a complicated scene behind these explicitly-performed and emerging 
divisions of  labour.   
 
CoRWM, on the other hand, developed a design of  a staged decision-making process; it 
was composed of  four main sequential phases. Across these divided phases, there were 
three main groups of  actors (the Committee, the Public and Stakeholders, and Scientists 
and Specialists), who participated in all phases with different roles and influences at each 
stage. This initial design was made by the Committee following consultation with specialists. 
The ensuing detailed design of  the divisions of  labour within this framework was 
developed by interactions of  the Committee members with specialists and stakeholders 
outside, as well as inside, the programme. Within each stage of  the sequential structure, the 
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division of  labour were also concurrently taking place.  
 
The programme’s evolution comprised continuous change (or addition/removal) of  
emerged, and then settled, incumbent divisions, with newly-emerging divisions. These were 
the results of  the attempts of  participants to realise their own rationales and sometimes to 
alter the initial given framework so as to apply it to identifying their roles and positions 
within the process. This kind of  endogenous development of  divisions of  labour and thus 
the emerging characteristic of  the structure, were acknowledged and encouraged among 
participants. The development of  new divisions of  labour was through the contesting of  
participants’ divergent rationales over the divisions of  labour in different groups and at 
different stages. In this way, the development of  the programme took place through a 
series of  the recognition (or arising) of  a newly-formed division of  labour.  
 
6.1.2 Outcome Dimension of  Reflexivity: Multiple Rationales over Divisions of  
Labour 
 
The outcome dimension of  reflexivity explains why there were so many divergent 
rationales over the division of  labour among different participants. A wide range of  
participants in macro-deliberation had such differing ideas over the issues (both procedural 
and substantive issues) and interacted with one another, which generated complex, diverse 
relationships and stakes among them. This generation of  new relationships and stakes 
resulted in setting a new condition where the participants produced new sets of  responses 
(relationships, stakes and rationales for divisions of  labour). This continuing recursive 
process resulted in the generation of  multiple rationales over divisions of  labour. The 
following paragraphs bring detailed examples for this argument from both cases of  GM 
Dialogue and CoRWM. 
 
The huge scale and scope of  both macro-deliberation programmes necessarily brought a 
high degree of  plurality and diversity in the types of  participants’ roles, identities, interests, 
knowledge, values and relationships, and of  course, their ideas over the programmes’ 
divisions of  labour. Subsequently, through the reflexive process, participants’ rationales for 
the divisions of  labour were multiplied. For example, certain forms of  divisions of  labour 
were made through interactions of  these different rationales, and after that, there were 
different interpretations and responses regarding these formed divisions of  labour.  In 
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addition, due to participants’ divergent ontologies, there was a significant degree of  
ambiguity in the boundaries of  ‘labour’ in programmes. In other words, participants 
projected different frame to define others’ identities in specific contexts, their performing 
roles in the process, their relationships with one another, and substantive issues for them to 
discuss. These participants’ subjective boundaries of  the issues (both procedural and 
substantive issues) formed the ways in which participants saw the programmes’ divisions 
of  labour. These subjective boundaries increased multiplicity and complexity in rationales 
over the programmes’ divisions of  labour. Therefore, the reflexive process, being 
associated with participants’ divergent ontologies, produced multiple rationales for the 
division of  labour in each programme of  GM Dialogue and CoRWM.  
 
There are constituent agents within the ST system, such as organisational institutions, the 
market, technology trajectories, knowledge production, the policy-making process, 
discourse, etc. For example, there are various governmental departments and institutions, 
non-governmental institutions, NGOs, industries, individual citizens, the media and various 
interest groups in the system of  GM regulation and radioactive waste management 
regulation in the UK. These agents interact with one another within the system. They also 
have multiple layers in their own interior structure. For example, there are smaller 
constituent elements, such as various departments, groups, individuals, policies etc. within 
each agent. These nested smaller elements also interact with each other. These multi-
layered constituents of  agents in the ST system go through the reflexive process within, 
and across, different layers.  
 
Likewise, GM Dialogue and CoRWM were one of  the events for policy-making in each 
regulation system with many other agents, with whom GM Dialogue and CoRWM 
interacted. Furthermore, within each programme, there were various constituent parts in 
various forms, such as groups, smaller deliberation exercises, or stages; and individuals were 
the components of  each of  those groups, exercises and stages, interacting with one another. 
In other words, various divisions of  labour of  the programme reflected these divergent 
layers. 
 
Boundaries determining these layers were sometimes explicit, objective and agreeable; but 
sometimes, implicit, subjective and disputable. The relatively more objective, explicit 
boundaries of  the division of  labour, which were more or less agreed upon amongst 
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stakeholders, became the rationales for setting the initial divisions of  labour. There were 
for example, three strands of  GM Dialogue, and four decision-making phases and three 
groups of  actors within CoRWM. These explicit boundaries for the divisions of  labour 
were followed by anticipated roles attached to these categories. For example, expert groups 
were composed/or divided up, such as ‘participatory process experts’, ‘environmental 
scientists’ and the stakeholder groups were divided and entitled with  ‘specific interest 
associations’, ‘local residents’, ‘NGOs’, etc. The titles of  the groups, to which they 
belonged, also implied more or less their given roles in the programme. The examples are 
the Steering board of  GM Nation? strand, the Panel of  Science Review , Expert Advisory 
Groups of  the Economic Study for GM Dialogue, and the Committee, Public and 
Stakeholders, Scientists and Specialists for CoRWM.  
 
On the other hand, the rather subjective, implicit boundaries also shaped the division of  
labour. These tacit, disputable boundaries often appeared to be contrasting, and competed 
with one another for determining emerging, endogenous, bottom-up divisions of  labour. 
Taking the example of  CoRWM, the different understandings of  Committee members and 
the stakeholders outside over the role of  scientific knowledge and the public in radioactive 
waste management policy- making process caused conflicts and controversy amongst them. 
Committee members in particular were the experts who had been working in this specific 
area for some time, but they still had such contrasting views on this issue. These different 
understandings of  the issues brought about the departure of  two of  its members, and 
addition of  some new roles within the programme such as the Quality Assurance group. 
There also similar discrepancy emerged in GM Dialogue. Different opinions about defining 
legitimate public for public meetings on GM policy were contested and generated different 
forms of  deliberation exercises such as three different tiers of  open public meetings and 
focused discussion - Narrow-but-Deep. Narrow-but-Deep was a kind of  experimental 
deliberation practice in order to check whether there would be other kind of  public, so 
called ‘silent majority’ who did not have specific interests in the issues. Likewise, these 
subjective and contested boundaries for ‘labour’ of  deliberation from different participants 
also determined certain divisions of  labour of  the programmes. 
 
Since an agent is a constitution of  many elements, for example, the government is not an 
homogenous subject, but consists of  various departments, individuals, rules etc. and their 
respective characteristics. The same applies to even a single person. Therefore, participants 
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brought multiple attributes into the process and they projected different categories with 
these different attributes to understand one another and to divide the ‘labour’.  Therefore, 
even single person(s) did not participate in the programme either with a single identity or a 
solitary role. Instead, such a person brought multiple identities and roles into the process 
with his/her multiple attributes of  knowledges, identities, convictions and networks. These 
multiple attributes of  individual persons, and the multiple components of  the groups (or 
organisations), such as various departments and people in the groups, and their respective 
perspectives, were the elements constructing various rationales for the divisions of  labour. 
For example, GM policy had many different aspects, like ecology, economy, health, EU 
regulations etc.; and radioactive waste management had various aspects to be considered, 
like energy, climate change, local environment, equity between generations etc. Participants 
projected different categories with different aspects to recognise or define procedural and 
substantive issues. In other words, participants displayed divergent ontological boundaries 
over the issues and shaped their respective rationales for divisions of  labour, which were 
contested by one another. 
 
Therefore, significant discrepancy emerged between participants’ perceptions concerning 
each other’s roles, which generated disputes and affected group dynamics. For example, 
participants within the deliberation exercises in GM Dialogue and CoRWM applied 
different identities to, and anticipated different roles of, the same person according to their 
own understanding and for their own interests. A social scientist within Science Review 
panel (of  GM Dialogue), found contrasting views between what he thought to be his role 
and what other fellow natural scientists expected him to play in the panel.  Another 
example was the differently projected identity to the same person by the different fellow 
members as ‘industry person’ or ‘pure academic’ in GM Dialogue. Also other instance was 
shown in the case of  different roles attached to a single local councillor in CoRWM’s case. 
He considered himself  a legitimate representative of  their site, but he was seen as one of  
local stakeholders by a local NGO group. Such as these examples, a single person was seen 
differently from either a professional expert, someone’s friend, or a sponsor of  their 
funding, and their role in the process were anticipated differently as either a mediator, a 
delegator, or an organiser, etc. by different people.  
 
In addition to these different understandings of  each other’s roles within the group at the 
individual level, there were also different understandings over the collective role of  the 
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groups of  actors within the programme. For instance, an interviewee from Corr Willbourn 
Research and Development, who designed and ran two deliberation exercises within GM 
Nation? criticised the evaluation team of  their  direct intervention during the process. He 
argued that their intervention could have influenced the process, which was not what their 
role should have been in the process of  GM Nation?. The organising groups, stakeholders’ 
groups, sponsors, evaluation groups, etc. often faced contrasting views on each other 
group’s collective roles.  
 
These examples of  participants’ different understandings of  ‘labour’  constructed their 
respective informal, tacit rationales for divisions of  labour of  the programmes; and created 
various responses, such as attempts to intervene in the process, whether negotiating, 
compromising, segmenting, aligning or networking, which accordingly, shaped various 
divisions of  labour. 
 
Despite the participants’ contrasting views on divisions of  labour, the decisions were made 
to be implemented anyway, and were presented in various deliberation exercises within each 
programme. Whatever it was, with the winning rationale at a certain stage and, thus formed, 
division of  labour, there were also different interpretations on this formed divisions of  
labour. Participants continued producing their various rationales for the divisions of  labour 
through their reflexive interactions with one another. Therefore, diverse rationales over the 
divisions of  labour of  GM Dialogue and CoRWM were multiplied.  
 
6.2 Reflexivity, and Re-thinking the Notion of  Deliberative Democracy 
 
Recognition of  the implications of  reflexivity in the divisions of  labour in real-world 
macro-deliberation then draws our attention to the notion of  deliberative democracy. The 
division of  labour discussed in macro-deliberative democracy theory was a suggestion for 
maximising two essential qualities – inclusiveness and deliberativeness. However, due to the 
quality of  reflexivity which was not fully, explicitly considered by such process, the ways in 
which the divisions of  labour were played out in real macro-deliberation, were much more 
complex and contrasting than those characterised in theory. Accordingly, recognition of  
reflexivity also suggested new aspects of  the two qualities of  inclusiveness and 
deliberativeness of  deliberative democracy. This part of  the discussion displays the ways in 
which these two qualities appeared in real-world macro-deliberation exercises.  
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6.2.1 Inclusion through Endogenous ‘Fermentation’ Process  
 
Inclusiveness is one of the primary qualities of deliberative democracy theory in relation to 
incorporating a wide spectrum of the public’s values, interests, knowledges and 
perspectives into deliberations on policy. The idea of a division of labour is employed in 
the attempt to institutionalise this concept by those who suggest a macro-approach to 
deliberative democracy. Given the inherent tension of wide inclusion and deep deliberation, 
the division of labour sounded useful for maximising both qualities, since it might have 
been able to widen the boundary of participation without compromising the depth of 
deliberation. This was an instrumentalist’s approach to inclusion by the provision of 
optimal designs of the divisions of labour to allocate people to those devised divisions to 
deliberate upon issues. However, my empirical findings suggested a rather different 
possible way to this conventional, instrumentalist’s approach to inclusion of various values, 
interests, knowledges and perspectives in to the process. 
 
Firstly, due to diverse rationales for the divisions of  labour, there remained a 
representativeness issue in question among the stakeholders. Secondly, after developing 
various divisions of  labour aiming for inclusion of  many values, interests, knowledges and 
perspectives to be discussed in various methods, there were, in fact, few efforts to integrate 
the results of  the divided labours into the decision-making process. However, instead of  
the top-down efforts to integrate the divided labours into the decision-making process, 
there were bottom-up efforts to engage with other parts of  the process by the participants. 
They, themselves, brought many other issues to the discussion table on top of  the given 
issues from the designers or organisers of  the meetings, and they connected themselves to 
other groups of  actors inside and outside of  the programmes in order to deliver their 
message and to be kept informed. During the process, the participants inter- reflected on 
each other by challenging, contesting or competing with one another regarding their 
respective rationales (including the given ones from the designer). This inclusion process 
was rather endogenous, complex, non-static, and intertwined, which I would call a 
‘fermentation’ process. In such a kind of  fermentation process, diverse values, interests, 
knowledges, perspectives and rationales were intermingled. These were quite the opposite 
characteristics to the instrumentalist’s approach to inclusion. That is an attempt to provide 
certain protocols of  the divisions of  labour, which is a mechanical, top-down, static way of  
aggregating plural values, interests, knowledges and perspectives.  
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GM Dialogue and CoRWM represented an unprecedentedly large scale of  public 
engagement in the UK ST regulation history. A huge number of  people became involved 
and a wide range of  issues were discussed by them. Participants had diverse rationales over 
the divisions of  labour, and they interacted with the rationales of  others, including the 
given ones. Through a reflexive process, a significant degree of  endogenous divisions of  
labour took place, and the process was moving on and developing. Therefore, a top-down 
approach with a structured design to embrace such diversity in rationales over the divisions 
of  labour, and such changes over time, might not have been effective. Actually, there was 
little attempt in the designing process to integrate all the divided labours into the process. 
Even in the case of  GM Dialogue, the opposite attempt was suspected: the up-front 
proclaimed rationale for the three-strand design by the Government - the inclusion of  
different perspectives - was suspected as possibly the Government’s intention for 
preventing the different perspectives from providing an integrated answer to the 
Government.  
 
Instead of  mechanical downstream efforts to collect the entire list of  participants’ 
divergent meanings, and screen them out for decision-making, my empirical analysis 
suggests a new way of  inclusion. It was the reflexive upstream approach through which 
participants engaged themselves with one another. In this way, participants’ divergent 
representations (values, interests, knowledges, identities, roles, relationships, networks etc.) 
cross-reflected and influenced one another through a kind of  endogenous, murky and even 
possibly smelly (acknowledging and embracing sometimes unpleasant political part) 
fermentation process. 
 
6.2.1.1 Representativeness  
 
Defining and inviting certain groups of  participants to partake in a public engagement 
exercise for ST regulation are associated with the representativeness issue of  social actors 
in the ST regulation system. Namely, it is the question who should participate with what 
kind of  role? There were widely divergent views on this and serious discussions about the 
definition of  ‘the public’ for designing GM Dialogue and CoRWM took place. However, 
contrasting views still remained among stakeholders. 
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Many voluntary participants in the public meetings of  GM Dialogue and CoRWM were 
often from NGOs, or those who were ‘self-selected’ to come and offer opinions on the 
issues. There were different views on whether these people could represent the general 
public or not. This discussion relates to the representative issue of  public deliberation. In 
other words, it is the matter of  defining ‘the legitimate public’ and ‘the legitimate 
procedure’ for the policy-making process. Voluntary participation does not rely solely on 
participants’ willingness to participate, but the procedural conditions are decisive elements 
for them to make it, since participation requires resources for attending meetings and 
deliberating upon the issues. Therefore, voluntary participation is also associated with the 
issue of  power. Given this situation of  co-existing contrasting definitions of  ‘the public 
and stakeholders’ among participants, it would be meaningless to argue that public 
deliberation serves the quality of  inclusiveness for deliberative democracy. Likewise, there 
were widely different understandings over the roles of  experts and science in such 
deliberation exercises for technological risk issues (GM crops and radioactive waste 
management) among participants.  
 
6.2.1.2 Efforts at Designing Integration of  Divided Labours  
 
Instances of  deliberation within GM Dialogue and CoRWM varied in their size, location, 
format and authority. In UK science policy, this employment of  widely varied means and 
rationales for the divisions of  labour was novel to these public engagement exercises. From 
the view of  macro deliberation theory it is commendable that such attempts should be 
made to reach out to such diverse voices. However, given huge investment in design, 
organisation and participation itself, there was surprisingly little effort to integrate these 
distinct strands and extract thus realise the benefits of  such investment.  
 
A wide public deliberation was the primary principle centred in their whole programme of  
GM Dialogue and CoRWM. Accordingly, various methods of  the divisions of  labour were 
exercised at public debate events, for example, diverse sub-deliberation activities of  GM 
Nation?, in GM Dialogue, and of  the PSE (Public and Stakeholders Engagement) within 
CoRWM. As well as these methods of  direct attendance at the physical meetings, online 
communication was highly advertised in order to engage many people. Both cases strongly 
promoted active use of  the Internet for the process. Most of  the meetings’ minutes and the 
official reports of  GM Dialogue and CoRWM were put on websites to receive feedback. 
Comparing these efforts with the rationale of  maximising the level of  inclusiveness, there 
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were few designing and organising efforts made to integrate the results of  variously 
designed deliberation exercises. It seemed that designers and organisers were satisfied with 
the fact that the programmes came across to a huge number of  people, up and down the 
country, and gave them a chance to ‘have their say’.  
 
This lack of  integration efforts at designing integration of  divided labours does not 
correspond to the primary principle of  both programmes GM Dialogue and CoRWM, 
namely ‘the engagement of  wider public (and stakeholders)’. The design of  three strands 
of  GM Dialogue, for example, which was claimed to include diverse perspectives, turned 
out to have served the opposite role of  preventing an integrated but undesirable answer to 
the Government.  
 
6.2.1.3 Endogenous Integration 
 
In contrast to this relative lack of  formal, codified, top-down efforts to integrate the 
divided labours into the process, my analysis shows, on the other hand, a variety of  ways in 
which participants themselves made bottom-up efforts to do so. This evidence suggests a 
different approach to think about inclusion of  widely-divided labours into a deliberation 
process.  
 
Participants tried to exert their influence, not only within their event, but also across 
different deliberation exercises, where they did not directly belong. In doing so, they got to 
know the events in other parts of  the programme and they also took the issues of  their 
event to other parts of  the programme. Within the programme, in particular, people had 
cross membership and roles over different groups and stages, and delivered their message 
from one to another. In GM Dialogue for example, despite the absence of  downstream 
effort to integrate three distinct strands, many participants of  each strand themselves tried 
to be engaged with other strands both in official and personal way. In the case of  CoRWM 
also, instead of  evidence of  explicit, systematic aggregation of  the outputs of  variously 
devised PSE events, there was a rather implicit, discursive way of  inter-linking participants 
of  those events. Committee members devoted themselves to attending various PSE events. 
The role of  them in the events was not only providing information but also more 
importantly building up close relationships with stakeholders by showing the Committee 
was listening to them. Participants’ various relationships with one another in formal and 
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informal ways, and individually and collectively, enabled participants to be connected to 
one another. Various networks were important channels amongst participants within the 
programme, as well as between the inside and other stakeholders outside for delivering 
their messages in both cases of  GM Dialogue and CoRWM. Networks in this light, served 
the crucial means for the actors, who were located in divided labours to be inter-linked with 
each other. Through these rather discursive and endogenous interactions, different parts of  
the programme were inter-linked and inter-fed with one another.  
 
In addition, the issues in the discussions themselves were entangled with each other. 
Therefore, despite various designs of  deliberation exercises for different issues, participants 
often re-introduced all sorts of  issues into their discussion. Taking the example of  GM 
Dialogue, it was recognised from the beginning stage, when the results of  the Foundation 
Workshops were released, that the public’s issues were covering a wide range of  issues. In 
the public meetings, although the three topics were given at the beginning, people actually 
discussed almost everything. They discussed such fundamental questions as, ‘Do we need 
GM crops?’ even before thinking about commercialisation. It was not because they did not 
follow the guidelines, but because the issues were all inter-related. In particular, for the case 
of  regulation for technological risks, policy is not just a technical matter, but associated 
with social and ethical values. Artificial and mechanical categorisation and division of  the 
issues for discussion may not be the best way, nor be easy.  
 
Therefore, despite the efforts for mechanical categorisation and the division of  issues for 
discussion, they emerged together as mixed and interlinked in real deliberation exercises. 
Barbagallo and Nelson (2005), who worked on organising Open Meetings as part of  the 
Science Review in GM Dialogue addressed this issue. They (the British Association for the 
Advancement of  Science) had argued that science and other matters should not be 
separated for discussion, but this argument had not been heeded at that time (ibid.). The 
leader of  the SU team of  the Economic Study in GM Dialogue also pointed this out. They 
found the issues that were separated into three strands were actually ‘hugely linked-up’ in 
their discussion while they were looking at the costs and the benefits of  commercialisation 
of  GM crops in the UK. 
 
It was clear that pre-determined, structured divisions of  labour did not last entirely, as they 
were initially meant to, throughout the programme. The given, codified rationales for initial 
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certain types of  divisions of  labour were not thoroughly kept by the participants during the 
deliberation. Instead, the rationales for divisions were challenged, contested and changed. 
Therefore, they were added to, converged, diverged, displaced or replaced by new ones, 
which entailed a constant re-framing process of  both the procedure and the contents of  
the programme as time passed. Through this reflexive process, participants’ representations 
(e.g. relationships and meanings) were kind of  fermented into the decision-making process. 
In other words, this was an inclusion process by a clear upstream effort from participants 
endogenously to be cross-linked and cross-fed with other parts of  the programme.  
 
6.2.2 Deliberation is ‘Discursive Relations’ rather than Rational Reasoning  
 
As the ways in which inclusion was played out were contingent on the reflexive process of  
the divisions of  labour, the other property, i.e. deliberation was also influenced by the 
quality of  reflexivity.  Deliberation appeared as a complex mix of  various forms of  
material, social and political relations of  participants, rather than simply that characterised 
as an ‘argumentative form of  reasoning’ in theory. My empirical analysis of  two macro risk 
deliberations in practice strongly supports the criticism on the current concept of  
deliberativeness in established deliberative democracy theory, since the reality is too far 
removed from this narrowly defined property of  deliberation. In particular, for the context 
of  deliberation on technological risks at a relatively macro level in terms of  its scope and 
scale, the current notion of  deliberativeness is not applicable to understand the deliberation 
process. My empirical findings depict a radically different picture of  deliberativeness to that 
of  the theory.  
 
A wide range of  different participants brought their diverse attributes, such as knowledges, 
identities, convictions and networks into the deliberation process. These participants’ 
attributes played their part as internal elements of  the programme. Furthermore, there 
were the external elements of  the programme, such as political discourse, governmental 
and non-governmental institutions and policy networks, which influenced their power in 
the deliberation process. Dynamic reflections between these internal and external elements 
shaped the deliberation process. During these reflections of  the elements of  the 
programme, deliberation appeared as a form of  various ‘discursive relations’ among 
participants. Instead of  merely communicative activity such as rational argumentation or 
reasoning, participants had been through various forms of  material, social and political 
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relations, such as segmenting, aligning, competing, negotiating and networking.  
 
The phrase ‘discursive relations’ has been used by a number of sources. Most of these 
relate in some way to the work of Michel Foucault (e.g. The Archaeology of knowledge, 1972) 
and its commentaries in various disciplines (e.g. political economy, feminism, linguistics 
etc.). Here, the term ‘discursive’ is employed in the second adjectival form given as follows 
in the Oxford English Dictionary definition: “of or relating to discourse or modes of 
discourse…” (See footnote 61 below).  ‘Discursive relations’ therefore refers to the 
various kinds of relation that may in some sense be seen to be associated with discourse. 
 
In particular, this phrase is used in Nancy Fraser’s work on Habermas’ Public Sphere 
(Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy, 1990). Although she refers to the concept only once, her argument is telling 
for the present discussion. For Fraser, “[t]he public sphere in Habermas's sense is also 
conceptually distinct from the official economy; it is not an arena of market relations but 
rather one of discursive relations, a theater for debating and deliberating rather than for 
buying and selling. Thus, this concept of the public sphere permits us to keep in view the 
distinctions between state apparatuses, economic markets, and democratic associations, 
distinctions that are essential to democratic theory.” (Fraser 1990, p. 57) 
 
Given my own understanding of reflexivity developed in this thesis, however, this term 
‘discursive relations’ also carries a helpful further overtone. Another distinct adjectival 
meaning listed by the Oxford English Dictionary is: “1. digressing from subject to subject 
… fluent and expansive rather than formulaic or abbreviated”61
                                                 
61Available from: 
. In addition to specifying 
the association with discourse, then, this reference to informal expansive fluency nicely 
invokes the particular styles of relation that I envisage as most relevant. Among all those 
kinds of relation that are variously associated with discourse, I refer here to those that most 
 (http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/discursive?q=discursive)  
1 digressing from subject to subject: students often write dull, secondhand, discursive prose 
(of a style of speech or writing) fluent and expansive rather than formulaic or abbreviated: the 
short story is concentrated, whereas the novel is discursive 
2 of or relating to discourse or modes of discourse: the attempt to transform utterances from one 
discursive context to another 
3 Philosophy, archaic proceeding by argument or reasoning rather than by intuition 
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display this (already much-mentioned) quality of ‘dynamism’, so central to my 
understanding of reflexivity. 
 
6.2.2.1 Reflections of  Multiple Elements of  the Macro-Deliberation Process  
 
Inter-reflections of  internal elements within the programme 
 
Participants’ plural knowledges, multiple identities, contrasting convictions, and various 
relationships were the elements, which influenced the deliberation process within the 
programme. Inter-reflections amongst these internal elements generated new sets of  
interests, knowledges, identities, roles and relationships of  the participants, which shaped 
the new context of  their deliberation. 
 
A different type of  knowledge was one of  the most important anticipated attributes of  the 
participants in the deliberation process. In particular, for ST regulation context, like GM 
Dialogue and CoRWM, knowledge was one of  the primary, explicit qualifications for 
participation. There were also some other attributes, which were informal and not explicitly 
presented in their official title or role, such as identities, convictions and personal networks. 
Participants performed their role(s) with their explicit attributes or official qualifications, 
such as ‘bio-chemist’, ‘environmentalist’, or ‘participatory process experts’ with their 
specific knowledge. As well as these explicitly presented qualifications, their informal 
attributes were materialised in, and thus also influenced, the deliberation significantly by 
forming group dynamics, specific relationships, new identities, interests, bias, and so on. 
Therefore, there were many more elements influencing deliberation than the explicitly seen 
attributes in such things as titles and roles, with which the participants were invited. The 
informal, implicit attributes shaped deliberation behind the publicly-acceptable reasoning 
with explicit rationales. Therefore, some explicit attributes, such as different types of  
knowledge, were set at the front as flagged attributes and contributions from participants. 
As well as the explicit attributes, there were many other attributes influencing the 
deliberation process, although they were not claimed explicitly in public.  
 
Taking the example of  participants’ identities attached to their affiliation and areas, they 
brought with them specific stereotypes, bias and aspirations. For instance, ‘pure scientists’, 
‘industry guy’, ‘government man’ and ‘NGO person’ were the informal titles attached to 
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the participants by others. These informal titles reflected their anticipated roles, one to 
another. Confronting but implicit structures amongst participants, such as anti- and pro-
GM (or anti- and pro-nuclear) also determined informal divisions. In the case of  
convictions underlying the participants’ views, they sometimes appeared to represent an 
intractable discrepancy amongst participants and, sometimes, as a reason for alliance. This 
fundamental difference was not reconciled through deliberation, but remained in disputes 
and influenced group dynamics. Participants’ informal relationships with their colleagues 
and friends were also critically influential to the deliberation process. Participants passed on 
their own and others’ opinions across different deliberation exercises inside the programme, 
as well as with those outside of  the programme, through informal networks. Therefore, 
although the messages were influential enough to inform the process, sometimes the 
source and the way the messages were constructed and delivered into the process, were not 
transparent. In other words, personal networks transferred various ideas to be examined, 
but also delivered publicly non-arguable values attached to the ideas, such as prejudice, 
personal interest, etc. 
 
These internal elements (both explicit and implicit) interacted with one another within the 
programme. Participants’ plural knowledges, identities, convictions and networks 
influenced each other by competing with, changing and shaping one another. Through 
these interactions, they generated new sets of elements, such as new identities, relationships, 
disputes, decisions, interests, roles etc., and these constituted the deliberation process. 
 
 
Inter-reflections between internal elements and external elements 
External elements outside the programme, such as political discourse, governmental and 
non-governmental institutions and policy networks, interacted with the internal elements 
of  the programme. The programme had been developed through the continuing process 
of  responding to, as well as being intervened by, these external elements. 
 
The context in which the process was taking place was important regarding its influence on 
the procedure: for example, existing political discourses and various political events, like 
BSE and the Iraq war for GM Dialogue, and nuclear energy policy and climate change for 
CoRWM; the political and geographical location of  the UK in its international relationship; 
and various institutions in the domestic regulatory system, and, of  course, the Government. 
All of  these were elements outside the programme but still exerted significant influence on 
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the deliberation process.  
 
Participants, individually or collectively, responded to the environment in which the 
deliberation was situated. While they interacted with elements outside of  the programme, 
they produced new understandings, relationships, knowledges, certain groups etc. For 
example, they used certain political discourses for their argumentation; they made 
alterations in their decisions as responses to outside criticism; and they made or used 
various networks to exert their power. These newly-produced responses constituted a new 
context for them, to which, again, the participants had to respond. While they responded 
to the contextual elements outside and interacted with other participants inside, 
participants formed and experienced various relations.  
 
6.2.2.2 Various Forms of  Relations  
 
Deliberation in theory should only be argumentative form of  public reasoning excluding 
political power, personal interest, or strategic manipulation internally or from outside. 
However, the deliberation process did not take place solely around the table with rational 
dialogue, and public reasons. Instead, people built up, and went through, material, social, 
political relations with their knowledges, interests, relationships, identities, roles, 
expectations, aspirations etc. during the course of  the programme, in order to deliver their 
message. In other words, participants turned those various elements of  the programme to 
account in their interactions and relationships with one another.  
 
For example, diversity in participants’ knowledges, backgrounds, convictions and interests 
segmented the group into several smaller gatherings; as well as participants allied together 
with others who shared their interests and views to make their voices louder. This 
emergence of  smaller, nested groups resulted in informal and formal divisions of  labour in 
the programme. In order to realise their interest, participants also competed and negotiated 
with one another in their power relationships. They fought for them, as well as sometimes 
being compromised by the power structure. It was not an argumentation process with 
publicly-defendable reasons alone; instead, participants strategically developed and 
employed their rationales and experienced a lot of  power struggles, in the rationalisation of  
their argumentations. Networking with people, inside and outside, for example, was a 
critical part of  deliberation as a resource for participants’ power to influence the 
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deliberation. Therefore, the decision made was not only the result of  an argumentative 
reasoning process. Instead, the decisions and the process were shaped through participants’ 
various relations while they were deploying and materialising various elements of  the 
programme to be influential in such political and social interactions and relationships with 
one another in the process. 
 
In short, the quality of  reflexivity, in this context of  real-world macro deliberation, 
displayed a much more complex and contrasting picture of  the two fundamental qualities 
of  deliberative democracy to that articulated in deliberative democracy theory. In reality, 
‘inclusion’ took place in a kind of  bottom-up fashion, by participants’ engaging themselves 
with one another, rather than according to premeditated design. In this way, participants’ 
divergent meanings were cross-reflected and influenced one with another, not through 
theoretically-envisaged top-down aggregation, but through a kind of  endogenous process 
of  ‘fermentation’. In addition, deliberation in practice emerges as a much more complex 
and dynamic scene than a mere communicative activity of  public reasoning. It comprises 
various forms of  material, social and political relations of  participants – what this thesis 
calls ‘discursive relations’.  
 
6.3 Relevance of  Two Deliberative Exercise Cases to Decision Making 
for Science and Technology Governance  
 
This section draws implications from my findings on the roles that the two case study, 
practical macro-deliberative exercises played in terms of  decision making in UK ST 
governance.  
 
Although the two cases analysed – GM Dialogue and CoRWM – were chosen as examples 
of  macro-level deliberation in UK ST policy-making, they were each concerned with 
different policy issues. GM Dialogue addressed the commercialisation of  GM crops, while 
CoRWM was set up to produce policy options for the management of  the legacy of  
nuclear waste. While they both dealt with technological risk as it related to governance, the 
nature of  each risk was rather different. GM Dialogue was mandated to review the social, 
ecological, economic, and environmental harm and benefit respectively of  commercial 
farming GM crops on UK land. On the other hand, CoRWM needed to find the best 
solution to the management of  existing radioactive waste. This difference in the purpose 
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of  deliberative practice brought a different structure to each programme (as detailed in 
chapters 4 and 5). GM Dialogue was divided into three strands respectively named GM 
Nation? (a public debate), Science Review (a review of  current scientific knowledge by 
scientists), and Economic Study (an economic cost and benefit analysis). Conversely, 
CoRWM consisted of  four stages of  decision making facilitated by three main groups of  
actors – the Committee, Scientists and Specialists, and Public and Stakeholders.  
 
The influence of  the recommendations of  these programmes on policy making in each 
area also differed. The results of  GM Dialogue did not give the green light to the 
government. Therefore, for Margaret Beckett, Secretary of  State for DEFRA, its outcome 
was perhaps not very satisfactory, as she was highly supportive of  GM technology and 
might have wanted to push its development forward. After GM Dialogue was completed, 
the House of  Commons Select Committee on Environmental Food and Rural Affairs 
Eighteenth Report (November 2003)62
 
 urged the government to make its position clear on 
how to incorporate the results of  public debate in its GM technology policy decisions: 
“We endorse the view that it is critically important that the holding of the debate is 
seen to have an influence on the decisions subsequently made by Government.We 
recommend that in its response to the report of  the public debate (and to this report) 
the Government set out exactly how it will take into account the outcomes of  the 
debate in its decision-making about GM technology. In particular it should set out 
precisely the legal framework under which decisions about GM will be taken 
(Paragraph 8. Taking account of the debate, in Conclusions and Recommendations)” 
 
However, what the government stated in its response to the final report of  GM Nation?, 
‘The GM Public Debate: Lessons learned from the process’, in March 2004 was not at all 
clear on this issue. Rather, it considered only the methodological aspects of  public debate, 
and the sceptical view and uneasiness of  the public around GM technology were not taken 
into account in the policy it implemented. GeneWatch UK (2004) argues that while the 
results of  the other two strands of  GM Dialogue – Science Review and the Economic 
Study – and that of  the other research project, the FSEs in particular, were influential in 
government’s approach to GM technology, the results of  GM Nation? were not clearly 
reflected in that at all. 
                                                 
62 House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2003) Conduct of 
the GM Public Debate, Eighteenth Report of Session 02–03. 
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The House of  Commons Select Committee on Environmental Food and Rural Affairs 
Eighteenth Report (November 2003) addresses its suspicion that if the government actually 
intended to listen to diverse perspectives from the public through GM Nation?: 
 
“The public debate was an imaginative initiative, but nonetheless represents an 
opportunity missed. Although other reasons for its failure can be found, including, no 
doubt, a degree of public apathy, two principal problems resulted from Government 
decisions: the tight deadline set for completion of the process, which meant that 
relevant data (the reports from the Strategy Unit and the GM Science Review Panel, and 
the outcome of the FSEs) was not available, and the paltry resources allocated to the 
debate. The Government, in its response to our report, must allay the suspicion that, 
having agreed to undertake a public debate, it did as little as it could to make it work. 
(Paragraph10. Summary, in Conclusions and Recommendations)”  
 
As discussed previously, there was suspicion of  government intention with regard to its 
rationale for three different strands to GM Dialogue, which was at official level, for 
reviewing different perspectives and integrating them into policy making. It was argued that 
the government did not actually anticipate that all three strands together would produce the 
unanimous recommendation, which it may not desire. The absence of  a single overseeing 
committee presiding over all three strands corroborates this position.  
CoRWM was rather different in terms of  its influence on policy making. Its 
recommendations were expressly welcomed by the government. The following quotation is 
from a government statement responding to the report and recommendations of   
CoRWM (2006): 
 
“Accordingly Government welcomes CoRWM’s report and believes it provides a 
sound basis for moving forward. Most recommendations can be acted on immediately; 
others require us to undertake more work. 
In particular, Government accepts that geological disposal coupled with safe and 
secure interim storage is the way forward for the long term management of the UK’s 
higher activity wastes… (UK Government and the devolved Administrations 2006, p. 
3)” 
 
CoRWM made 15 recommendations to the government. Although the Committee 
emphasised geological disposal as a long-term management solution for radioactive waste, 
the set of  recommendations was presented as a package that incorporated other issues such 
as the importance of  volunteerism and interim storage. This integrated perspective was 
stressed by the Committee.  
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However, the government’s apparent immediate welcome, but which concentrated on 
geological disposal alone for a solution to the radioactive waste problem and the rush to 
implement it in order to move on, was criticised by the Committee members themselves. The 
following quotation is from a letter 63
 
 that Pete Wilkinson, Committee member wrote to 
Hilary Benn, Secretary of  State for DEFRA, on 8 October 2007: 
“Instead of  taking the CoRWM recommendations as a package and initiating a full 
programme involving research, storage review and announcing how it will go about 
implementing the monitoring of  alternatives to disposal, Government has selected what 
it sees as the solution offered by CoRWM and, to the exclusion of  everything else and 
ultimately at the potential expense of  the MRWS programme, is pursuing a narrow 
programme of  implementing disposal. This is an unsustainable response and will do 
little to enhance the level of  public confidence which CoRWM painstakingly developed 
over three years.” 
 
This attitude of  the government supports the suspicion raised in this thesis that its strategic 
purpose was to use CoRWM as a springboard for re-introduction of  nuclear new build in 
the UK. According to the remit of  CoRWM, its priority task was to provide policy options 
for managing legacy nuclear wastes, and Committee members were so sensitive to this issue 
that they clearly stated that their recommendations should be considered only for the 
legacy radioactive wastes only. However, after CoRWM had provided an answer to the 
question of  managing the problem by means of  a legitimate decision making process, the 
government attempted to exploit this legitimacy to push its nuclear policy forward. 
 
GM Dialogue and CoRWM are both examples of  macro deliberation as each according to 
its own regulatory system comprised numerous micro deliberations in the form of  division 
of  labour; although, as discussed above, each played a different role in the governance of  
the technology it addressed. On the other hand, in the broader context of  UK ST 
governance, they can each be regarded as individual examples of  multiple public 
deliberations that dealt with risk policy issues and contributed to the deliberative turn in ST 
governance.  
 
As discussed in the section on different ontologies on the division of  labour in the theory 
chapter, scholars have differing views on the roles and forms of  public deliberation in 
society with regard to institutions, methods of  participation, and the decision-making 
spheres applicable to the public and the scientific community respectively. Moreover, 
                                                 
63 A letter sent by Pete Wilkinson, a member of CoRWM, to the Secretary of State in October 2007 
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discussions on different ontologies draw different boundaries of  subject, which lead to 
multiple layers of  the ST system. In the sense of  the possible existence of  such different 
boundaries in the reflexive process due to divergent ontologies, GM Dialogue and CoRWM 
are examples of  sub–deliberations within the system of  UK ST governance, especially 
considering that the timing of  these two deliberation exercises was within the six-year term 
of  the Blair Government.  
 
GM Dialogue and CoRWM played an experimental role in macro deliberation on risk 
policy in terms of  addressing wider issues and participation in nationwide public debate. In 
this sense, both programmes were meaningful. In spite of  the facts that no clear policy 
influence emerged from the GM Nation?(Wilsdon and Willis 2004; GeneWatch UK 2004; 
Grove-White 2006), there were shortcomings in the procedure, and suspicions abounded 
around the strategic purpose of  exploiting such public deliberation for specific government 
policy orientation, there were significant outcomes in terms of  innovative, symbolic and 
social learning practice, and the attempt to implement macro-level public deliberation in 
the interests of  UK ST governance. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This final chapter synthesises the key findings of  the thesis discussed in the previous 
chapter and provides a definitive answer to the overarching research question: 
 
What are the implications of  reflexivity in the understanding of  the division of  labour in 
macro risk deliberation exercises? 
 
7.1 Implications of  Reflexivity in Understanding the Division of  
Labour in Macro Risk Deliberations 
 
The first contribution of  this thesis is in addressing the significant degree and role of  
reflexivity in macro risk deliberation, which has not been fully recognised in macro-
deliberative democracy theory. Accordingly, although macro approaches to deliberative 
democracy suggest the concept of  division of  labour in order to maximise both 
inclusiveness and deliberativeness, they do not fully account for how this mechanism might 
operate in practice, overcoming the paradox of  plurality64
 
 in such a treatment of  division 
of  labour.  
The results of  my examination of  two practical macro risk deliberation exercises fill this 
gap in the theory, addressing the role of  reflexivity in enabling division of  labour to work 
in such an approach. It was found that it was reflexivity that enabled division of  labour to 
achieve both defining qualities of  deliberative decision making. However, the way in which 
macro deliberation operated – in other words, how division of  labour worked for achieving 
deliberativeness and inclusiveness – proved to differ from that assumed in deliberative 
democracy theory. Due to reflexivity, the role of  which has not hitherto been fully 
recognised in macro-deliberative theory, the way inclusion and deliberation played out 
through division of  labour contrasted to that characterised in the theory. Addressing such a 
nexus of  inclusion, deliberation and reflexivity in deliberative democracy is the second 
contribution of  this thesis. 
 
                                                 
64 This concept is discussed in detail on page 42 of Chapter 2.  
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Macro-deliberative approaches employ division of  labour to maximise both key qualities of  
deliberativeness and inclusiveness of  deliberation, and overcome the inherent tension 
between them. However, the question arises as to whether the macro approach itself  can 
manage the inherent dilemma between inclusion and division, such as the paradox of  
plurality. In other words, there is the question of  how the idea of  dividing the deliberative 
decision-making process into multiple micro deliberations in order to include more people 
for deeper discussion on more issues can work without leading to problems around 
inclusion and representativeness. In order to answer this question, I initially made a close 
observation of  the ways in which division of  labour took place in actual macro deliberation 
contexts.  
 
Division of  labour is the instrument that proponents of  macro-deliberative democracy 
perceive to be critical if  the goals of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness are to be achieved. 
Although ideas about how to design division of  labour differ, these individuals believe that 
certain optimal protocols for division of  labour can be employed to identify the best design, 
which may be utilised to ensure that macro deliberation has the best chance of  realising its 
aim of  including a wide range of  voices from society in deep, free, open and rational 
reasoning. This is the instrumental management approach that attempts to find an optimal 
design for division of  labour and harness it for the implementation of  policy practices.  
 
However, in contrast to such an approach, the way in which division of  labour took place 
in the case studies tended to be upstream, endogenous, non-static, and discursive – a 
reflexive way. Through recursive inter-reflections of  various multiple elements of  
deliberations, widely divergent rationales for the division of  labour were continually 
generated and applied to the process of  developing the deliberations, which facilitated the 
evolution of  the overall process. During the course of  the reflexive process of  the 
divisions of  labour, a wide range of  meanings, values and interests on the part of  
participants and other stakeholders were cross-reflected, cross-linked, and integrated into 
the overall decision-making process.  
 
This represented a discursive, endogenous and reflective fermentation process that resulted 
in a kind of  bottom-up inclusion rather than a top-down aggregation of  different opinions. 
Deliberation did not in this case constitute a rational dialogue based solely on knowledge 
and reasoning that could be defended in public. Rather, it signified an amalgamation of  
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various relations of  participants (and wider stakeholders); the embracing of  political power 
dynamics; social relations comprising different configurations and networks; and the 
constituent elements of  these relationships, such as knowledges, personal convictions, 
personal relationships, identities, political discourses, and policy networks. Such new 
characteristics of  deliberation can be described as a mixture of  discursive relations that 
range far outside what theory defines as equal, free and rational dialogue for the common 
good. 
 
7.2 Relevance of  a ‘More’ Reflexive Deliberation for Science and 
Technology Governance  
 
Given the conclusion of  the previous section, the question arises as to why macro risk 
deliberations in particular provide an environment conducive to such reflexivity; in other 
words, what are the specific conditions for greater reflexivity in the deliberation exercise? 
This triggers a second question with regard to what this recognition of  the importance of  
reflexivity can contribute to knowledge in terms of  designing and delivering macro-
deliberations, so as to such alternative approach to be benefit to deliberative and inclusive 
decision making processes.  
 
It was not the primary purpose set for this thesis either to reach a verdict on reflexivity as a 
good thing or a bad thing65
 
, or to identify principles for facilitating reflexivity. However, in 
this conclusive chapter, answering the above questions will help determine the relevance of 
greater reflexive deliberation in ST governance, which, in turn, will prove useful in gauging 
the extent of the viable extrapolation of the findings of the study. 
Close observation of the ways in which the divisions of labour were played out in macro 
deliberations revealed some features of the context in which reflexivity seemed to be more 
vibrant. Considering the concept of reflexivity as it arose naturally during the reflections of 
subjects, such reflections were found to be vibrant when there were many subjects who 
freely inter-reflected with one another and the results of their reflections became new 
constituents of the environment, which also functioned as subjects in the environment. 
According to this understanding, a higher degree of reflexivity is most likely to be achieved 
by means of an unrestricted discursive structure that accommodates multiple subjects, the 
                                                 
65 Lynch (2000) stresses that reflexivity has values in providing a methodological virtue  but itself 
is “not an epistemological, moral or political virtue (p.26)”. 
197 
 
 
 
divergent ontological perceptions are acknowledged, and their inter-reflections are 
encouraged.  
 
These contextual features for the vibrant reflexivity resonate with the characteristic of 
macro-deliberations that is, an expanded form of deliberation which embraces a wide range 
of participants, their attributes, contextual elements, methods and issues, operating within a 
structure that is not tightly organised but non-static, fluid, expansive and discursive. The 
discursive structure and plurality of deliberative elements are the characteristics of macro 
deliberation that differentiate it from micro deliberation. This is the reason why reflexivity 
does not feature distinctively in the micro form of deliberation. This observation suggests 
that the inherent nature of reflexivity in perpetuating reflection in an uncontrollable 
manner notwithstanding, certain conditions of reflection can facilitate or decrease the level 
of reflexivity. 
 
Thus, reflexivity is facilitated by the conditions of macro deliberation, which also operates 
through reflexivity. This paradoxical argument resonates with the duality of reflexivity 
elaborated in Chapter 2. Accordingly, reflexivity arises naturally during the reflection of  
subjects, the results of  which recondition their subsequent reflections. Likewise, a wider 
range of  participants and their attributes together with various external contextual elements 
form the basis for their inter-reflections in deliberation process. The results of  these 
recursive reflections continually generate new sets of  elements that subsequently re-
constitute the environment for reflections.  
 
Such a process may be represented as the downside of  reflexivity in governance issues to 
those who want managerial control, as it is inherent, autonomous and contingent in nature. 
However, what we can benefit from its autonomous and recursive power is that it can be 
expected to facilitate the endogenous development of  ST system. As we saw in the 
divisions of  labour in the two case studies, there was a high level of  endogenous divisions 
of  labour, and consequently the deliberative process continually evolved throughout the 
lifetime of  each programme. Many participants found this to be a good thing and 
encouraged such continuous change, regarding it as development. Another useful function 
of  reflexivity in governance is found in the role in the inclusion of  such diverse meanings 
of  society. Otherwise, the exogenous, top-down approach with its fixed design does not 
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enable the inclusion of  such controversial and ontological divergence in the meanings of  
society.  
 
Accordingly, despite the fact that there is a significant level of  reflexivity in governance and 
its autonomous, inherent and recursive nature cannot be fully controlled, there are benefits 
to be gained from its reflective, self-developing and discursive characteristics. Indeed, 
reflexivity in deliberative decision making may contribute to the efficacy of  ST governance. 
The following section elaborates the implications of  the application of  greater reflexive 
deliberative decision making in ST governance. 
 
7.2.1 Inclusion of  the Multiple Meanings of  Social Actors  
 
Various representations (such as relationships and meanings) of  social actors are multiplied 
by the reflexive process and become the sources of  further reflexivity as they form new 
constituents of  the ST system. In other words, the reflexive process is the means by which 
social actors explore multiple representations and incorporate them into the ST system.  
 
The virtue of  plurality in meanings of  social actors in modern public policy making 
(Wynne 2002) notwithstanding, it is simultaneously a challenge to include such a variety of  
meanings of  society in the process. This challenge makes the case for a ‘closing down’ as 
well as an ‘opening up’ procedure, since policy making should embrace not only the 
process of  making available all these multiple meanings for exploration, but also that of  
filtering them for the final decision making. Participants do not only want to have their 
voices heard; what they ultimately want is to have an influence on decisions. The challenge 
of  opening up and closing down many different voices can perhaps be aided by the 
reflexive process. It is a kind of  fermentation process that helps the system open up for 
reflection on plural meanings such as alternative and conflicting positions; and it may also 
help the system close down to reach a decision through an endogenous, fermentative 
integration process of  a wide range of  meanings. 
 
Otherwise, the actual inclusion of  the diverse meanings of  many people negotiating deep 
discussion towards a final decision may not be feasible. It may be naïve to believe that 
processes of  mechanically formalised way of  aggregation or reduction can facilitate the 
inclusion of  plural meanings, especially when it comes to the uncertainty and controversy 
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in governance of  new science and technology. Rather, recognition and promotion of  the 
reflexive process, which is somewhat reflective,  endogenous, self-contingent, self-
influential, and discursive, offers the chance to improve the inclusion of  the multiple 
meanings of  social actors in ST governance.  
 
7.2.2 Structural Change of  the System  
 
The evolutionary processes that the deliberation programmes have been developed 
demonstrate the potential of  reflexivity in promoting structural change of  the system. It is 
particularly important that the change takes place throughout the whole structure in groups 
and stages, a factor that also has critical implications in terms of  the autonomy of  change.  
 
The established forms, and newly-emerging forms, of  the divisions of  labour interacted 
through discursive relations before moving on to the next stage in which explicit division 
of  labour was undertaken. This evolutionary process took place within and across different 
groups of  participants and at various stages of  the overall programme. Participants 
interacted with each other in their attempts to realise the rationale of  each in the division 
of  labour, which had consequences in respect of  the evolution of  design through the 
course of  each programme. As the programme progressed, participants underwent a 
journey, reformulating the divisions of  labour by contesting and performing their own 
rationale as much as possible. Therefore, to a great extent, endogenous divisions of  labour 
took place through participants’ discursive relations; meaning that the structure had 
consequently significantly evolved towards the end of  the programme.  
 
It may be necessary for decision making process to be relatively less structured, when it is 
the case of  the huge scale and scope of  ST governance. Accordingly, it would be difficult 
to establish managerial intervention in all cases. It will be so in particular when issues under 
deliberation were diverse and distributed in that context. Any attempt to modify the overall 
structure in this context would not be a straightforward uniform managerial issue. Rather, 
real change may be more effectively and efficiently addressed by the inside of  the system. 
The reflexive process found in the analyses of  my two cases suggests potential for this 
mode of  structural change (development) of  the ST system. 
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7.3 Importance of  a Deliberative Turn for Decision Making 
 
Proponents of  deliberative democracy claim that such a process has benefits for ST 
governance in terms of  either its democratic value in the decision making process, or 
substantive value in problem solving – or both. And perhaps deliberative decision making 
sounds promising to those who are interested in delivering policy, considering its potential 
for increasing the acceptance of  a final decision. Likewise, deliberative decision making was 
considered a good way of  responding to the limitations and failures of  a current policy 
making system very much based on technocracy, as its defining qualities of  inclusiveness 
and deliberativeness accord well with the societal demand for a shift in the mode of  ST 
governance towards more openness and transparency. The context of  emergence of  two 
cases in early 2000s corroborates this argument. 
 
However, unsolved issues such as those around representation and contrastingly diverse 
views on how deliberative mechanisms should be designed and delivered warn us that 
burdening this trend with a surfeit of  expectations could bring other disappointments. This 
could especially be the case with the current narrow conception of  deliberative democracy. 
In other words, if  the aims or contributions of  deliberation to the policy making process 
rely on the current model of  decision making approach to inclusion as open, equal, rational 
dialogue for the common good, they will create the illusion that all deliberation practices 
can give legitimacy to any decision – even those made with the strategic purpose of  
gratifying self-interest of  specific groups in decision making process. The risk of  the 
strategic employment of  deliberative democracy in a specific stakeholder’s self-interest is all 
too real if  we overlook the elements of  the actual policy context of  deliberation and 
exclude diverse decision making mechanisms, both of  which could prevent the true 
participation of  society. At the beginning of  this thesis, I raised several issues related to the 
strategic purposes of  deliberative exercises reflected in the discourse of  public engagement 
in the UK. The two case studies representing practical technological risk deliberation 
demonstrated attempts to strategically employ public deliberation exercise in specific 
interests, by the government in particular, but there were also challenges to these attempts 
from other parts of  society.   
 
In this context, therefore, this study suggests that we have to accept first, enormous effort 
in the conceptualisation and implementation of  deliberative mechanisms (those for ST 
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governance in particular) notwithstanding, there still remain many conflicting notions 
around the implementation of  deliberative democracy. And second, it is not at all easy to 
find legitimate solutions through deep, rational and equal dialogue that takes into account 
the divergent values and interests of  wider society, in particular dealing with uncertain and 
controversial technological risk issues.  
 
Deliberative mechanisms may need to extend not only their boundary of  participation, as 
the macro- deliberative approach suggests in terms of  its methods and range of  
participants, but also embrace the broader stage that encompasses such elements as 
political, social and material relations as part of  deliberation process. The advocates of  
deliberative democracy should accept that the idealised narrow definition of  deliberation as 
equal and free reasoning among widely diverse interests, values, meanings of  society can 
neither reflect the real deliberation process nor possibly be implemented, if  they desire a 
high quality of  inclusiveness and deliberativeness. Indeed, perhaps it is not through a neatly 
standardised setting for a rational reasoning that these things can be attained, but by a 
messy, smelly and murky fermentation process. 
 
To conclude, recognition of  the inherent quality of  reflexivity in macro-deliberation 
provides an enhanced understanding of  the complex public engagement process of  ST 
governance. In particular, my empirical analysis suggests that it might be very difficult (or 
even impossible) to provide a formalised set of  design criteria for macro-deliberation for 
ST governance. Therefore, the designing attention probably needs to be shifted from the 
prescriptive provision of  structured design protocols, towards construction of  the 
environment for actors to afford their own reflexive deliberation. Such an arena can be 
built by developing and promoting various types of  networks; capacity building for 
competent reflection such as providing access to information on relevant issues and 
opening up channels for networking; ensuring incentives for participation; assuring 
appropriate policy influence; and encouraging a diversity of  methods.  
Then, let them brew! 
 
7.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Focusing on two macro-deliberation exercises around technological risk related policy 
making, the theoretical and empirical discussion in this thesis has provided a detailed 
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picture of ways in which these public deliberation programmes unfolded. In particular, it 
has offered useful insights for those who are interested in designing such practices. This 
last section suggests some specific directions for further research in this area. Given the 
narrow focus of this study limits on particular instances of deliberation, it is possible more 
confidently to generalise further questions, than answers. The general relevance of the key 
object of attention here, divisions of labour, underscores this possibility of wider learning. 
Whilst the present findings may be quite circumscribed to the instances addressed, the 
questions that arise may be more widely applicable to more general deliberative practice in 
ST governance and, potentially, other policy arenas. 
 
In order reasonably to test and interrogate the picture yielded in this study, further research 
might share key features of the analytical framework developed here. In particular, the 
central focus might lie on policy making processes concerned with technological risks and 
with relationships between macro-deliberation exercises, and the general quality of 
reflexivity in governance. It is at the conjunction of these themes where this work might 
best be improved and expanded.  
 
A first such area for further research might lie with the governance of different 
technological risks, associated with technologies other than nuclear power or genetic 
engineering. Newly emerging technologies are a particularly intensive focus for attention. 
More specific characteristics of suitable foci in this regard, would be where uncertainties 
and conflicts among stakeholders are more pronounced than in other science-related policy 
making – leading to involvement of an unusually wide range of stakeholders and their 
diverse perspectives in policy-making. Nano-technology may offer a particularly 
appropriate example of an area for such further work on reflexivity in public deliberation. 
 
Second, the lessons learnt in this thesis might inform more general research extending 
beyond the governance of specific technologies, to broader and more diverse fields such as 
climate change. Here, the greater complexity might be expected to amplify the central 
message, concerning the importance of diversity and dynamism in the ways disparate, yet 
interlinked issues can be articulated at the same time. The challenge of tackling climate 
defies understandings that multiple aspects and actors can be formally articulated at 
different levels, groups and stages. Instead, the comprehensive approach to structural 
change, extending to the structures, where the deliberation is undertaken, would be 
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required. This salience of broad societal structural change – encompassing individual 
behaviour, technologies, economies, industries, environments and societies – makes climate 
change an area in which the open, unstructured dynamic qualities of reflexivity highlighted 
here become particularly important. And the structural changes implicated in discussion of 
climate change are densely interlinked, and mutually contingent. So the present notion of 
reflexivity – and a reflexive approach to governance – might have a particular premium in 
helping conceptualise the kinds of pervasive qualities necessary in discursive relations – 
transcending small, codified sequential nested structures and extending instead into more 
dynamic fluidity between different moments and spaces.  
 
Another possible context for the application of the lessons of this study might concern not 
only ST governance, but also other policy making processes. Examples might include 
urban planning or local governance. Here we also encounter similar challenges of diversity 
in opinions and interests often emerge as conflict, facing controversy or sometimes 
deadlock. Stakeholders have their respective reasons to argue, and develop their rationales 
to deliver their messages. Including those opinions and interests into the decision making 
process is not always seen as fair and rational to all parties. The reflexive processes 
explored and examined here may help the actors themselves to inter-reflect on each other’s 
rationales, and to go through their own decision making process. 
 
In all such ways, the shedding of light on this crucial quality of reflexivity has hitherto been 
too much ignored under dominant instrumental perspectives – where interests focus on 
public engagement programmes more as a means to some prior given end, than as a way to 
deliberate different ends themselves. It is on this broadest stage that the acknowledging of 
the key features of reflexivity in governance becomes most important. In particular, the 
ways in which the qualities might be understood in the light of this thesis as reflective, 
endogenous, self-contingent, self-influential, and discursive, may offer a useful caution in 
the face of mainstream pressures for overly-formalised, rigidly-structured processes in 
public engagement programmes. Here there may be repercussions not only for research but 
also for policy for design, in that the value is suggested of experimenting with more relaxed 
approaches to procedural design, with greater attention to enabling convivial environments 
for reflexivity. This might involve, for instance, providing self-organising platforms for 
actors’ own reflexive interactions with their own societal networks and affording them the 
time, resources and latitude necessary more fully to explore and experience not only the 
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implications of the focal issues, but also the nature and potential for democracy itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
205 
 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
Barclay, C. (1999) Genetically Modified Crops and Food. House of Commons Library Research 
Paper 99/38, March 31. 
 
Barbagallo, F. and Nelson, J. (2005) ‘Report: UK GM Dialogue Separating Social and 
Scientific Issues’, Science Communication, 26 (3), pp. 
 
318-325. 
Bauer, M.W. and Gaskell, G.D. (eds.) (2000) Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: 
A Practical Handbook for Social Research. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Beck, U. (1992) Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications. 
 
Beck, U. (1997) The Reinvention of Politics: Rethinking Modernity in the Global Social Order. 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Beck, U., Bonss, W. and Lau, C. (2003) ‘The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: 
Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme’, Theory, Culture & Society, 20(2), pp. 1–
33. 
 
Beck, U., Giddens, A. and Lash, S. (1994) Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Benhabib, S. (ed.) (1996) Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of  the Political. New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Blair, T. (2002) ‘Science Matters’. (Prime Minister’s speech delivered at the Royal Society, 
London, May 23, 2002). Available from 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page1715.asp [Accessed February 3, 2007]  
 
Bloomfield, D., Collins, K., Fry, C. and Munton, R. (2001) ‘Deliberation and Inclusion: 
Vehicles for Increasing Trust in UK Public Governance?’, Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy, 19(4), pp. 501-513. 
 
Blowers, A. (1996) ‘Transboundary Transfers of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes’. In 
Sloep, P. and Blowers, A. (eds.) Environmental Policy in an International Context, Book 2 
Environmental Problems as Conflicts of Interest. London: Open University of the Netherlands, 
pp. 151-186.   
 
Blowers, A., Lowry, D. and Solomon, B. (1991) The International Politics of Nuclear Waste. 
London: Macmillan. 
 
Bohman, J. (1996) Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press. 
  
Bohman, J. and Rehg, W. (eds.) (1997) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. 
Cambridge, MA: The MIT press. 
 
Bregman, J. (2000) ‘Theoretical Frameworks of Deliberative Democracy’, working draft.  
Available from http://cyber.law.harvard.edu.  
206 
 
 
 
 
Bryman, A. (2003) ‘Triangulation’. In Lewis-Beck, M.S., Bryman, A. and Liao, T.F. (eds.) 
Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications Ltd., pp. 
1142-1143.  
 
Cabinet Office (2002) Risk: Improving Government’s Capability to Handle Risk and Uncertainty. 
Cabinet Office Strategy Unit Report, November 2002. 
 
Cabinet Office (2003) Field Work: Weighing Up the Costs and Benefits of GM Crops. London: 
Cabinet Office Strategy Unit. 
 
Central Office of  Information (2002) ‘Desk Research on Strategic Considerations for the 
Debate’ (A Report to GM Nation? Steering Board).  
 
Chilvers, J. (2007) ‘Towards Analytic‐deliberative Forms of Risk Governance in the UK? 
Reflecting on Learning in Radioactive Waste’, Journal of Risk Research, 10(2), pp. 197-222. 
 
Chilvers, J. (2008) ‘Deliberating Competence: Theoretical and Practitioner Perspectives on 
Effective Participatory Appraisal Practice’, Science and Technology & Human Values, Vol 33(2) 
pp 155-185. 
 
Cohen, J. (1997) ‘Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy’. In Bohman, J. and 
Rehg, W. (eds.) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics, Massachusetts: The MIT 
Press, pp. 407-438. 
 
Cohen, J. (1998) ‘Democracy and Liberty’. In Elster, J. (ed.) Deliberative Democracy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 185-231. 
 
Cohen, J. (1999) ‘Reflections on Habermas on Democracy’, Ratio Juris. 12(4), pp. 385-416.  
 
Collins, H.M. and Evans, R. (2002) ‘The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of 
Expertise and Experience’, Social Studies of Science, 32(2), pp. 235–296. 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2001) ‘European Governance: A White 
Paper’. Available from http://ec.europa.eu/governance/white_paper/en.pdf 
 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (2006) Managing Our Radioactive Waste Safely: 
CoRWM's Recommendations to Government. CoRWM Doc 700. London: Committee on 
Radioactive Waste Management 
 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (2004) ‘3rd Plenary Meeting Minute’, 
January 2004 (Doc 122) 
 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (2004) ‘5th Plenary Meeting Minute’, March 
2004 (Doc 276) 
 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (2004) ‘7th Plenary Meeting Minute’, May 
2004 (Doc 496)  
 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (2004) ‘13th Plenary Meeting Minute’, 
December 2004 (Doc 879)  
207 
 
 
 
 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (2005) ‘14th Plenary Meeting Minute’, 
January 2005(Doc 935) 
 
Committee on Radioactive Waste Management (2005) ‘23rd Plenary Meeting Minute’, 
November 2005(Doc 1417) 
 
Corr Wilbourn Research and Development (2002) A Report on the Foundation Discussion 
Workshops Conducted to Inform the GM Public Debate. London: Corr Wilbourn Research and 
Development. 
 
Corr Wilbourn Research and Development (2003) Qualitative Research on a Series of Reconvened 
Group Discussions for the ‘Narrow but Deep’ Strand of the GM Public Debate. London: Corr 
Wilbourn Research and Development. 
 
Demeritt, D., Dyer, S. and Millington, J.D.A. (2009) ‘Pest or Panacea? Science, Democracy, 
and the Promise of Public Participation’, Environment, Politics and Development Working Paper 
Series, no. 10. London: Department of Geography, King’s College London. Available from 
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/geography/research/epd/Demeritt10.pdf 
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs et al. (2002) Managing Radioactive 
Waste Safely: Summary of Responses to the Consultation September 2001–March 2002. (A 
consultation report published jointly by the UK Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs, the National Assembly for Wales, the Scottish Executive and the 
Department of Environment Northern Ireland) 
 
Department of Trade and Industry (2000) Excellence and Opportunity: A Science and Innovation 
Policy for the 21st Century. London: HMSO. 
 
Department of Trade and Industry (2003) Our Energy Future–Creating a Low Carbon Economy. 
London: TSO (The Stationery Office). 
 
Dorfman, P. (ed.) (2008) Nuclear consultation: public trust in government. London, Nuclear 
consultation working group. 
 
Dryzek, J. (2000) Deliberative Democracy and Beyond. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Durant, J. and Lindsey, N. (2000) The ‘Great GM Food Debate’- A Survey of  Media Coverage in 
the First Half  of  1999. Parliamentary Office of  Science and Technology Report no. 138. 
London: House of  Commons. Available from 
http://www.parliament.uk/documents/post/report138.pdf.  
 
Elster, J. (1998) Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Eriksen, E.O. and Weigård J. (2003) Understanding Habermas: Communicative Action and 
Deliberative Democracy. London and New York: Continuum Press. 
 
European Environment Agency (2001) Late lesson from early warnings: The precautionary 
principle 1898-2000, Copenhagen, Denmark: European Environment Agency. 
 
European Environment Agency (2013) Late lessons from early warnings: science, precaution, 
208 
 
 
 
innovation, Copenhagen, Denmark: European Environment Agency. 
 
Faulkland Associates (2006) Evaluation CoRWM Final Evaluation Statement. CoRWM Doc 
2071. 
 
Fiorino, D.J. (1990) ‘Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of 
Institutional Mechanisms’, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 15(2), pp. 226-243. 
 
Fishkin, J.S. and Laslett, P. (2003) Debating Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Fraser, N. (1990) ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually 
Existing Democracy’, Social Text, no. 25/26, pp. 56-80. 
Fraser, N. (1992) ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of  Actually 
Existing Democracy’ In Calhoun, C (ed.) Habermas and the Public Sphere. Massachusetts, 
Cambridge: The MIT Press. pp. 109-142.  
Friends of the Earth (2007) Planting Prejudice: How UK Government Support for GM Undermines 
Sustainable Farming Policies. London: Friends of the Earth, England Wales and Northern 
Ireland. 
Funtowicz, S.O. and Ravetz, J.R. (1992) ‘Three Types of Risk Assessment and the 
Emergence of Postnormal Science’. In Krimsky, S and Golding, D (eds.) Social Theories of 
Risk. New York: Greenwood Press. pp. 251–273. 
 
Giddens, A. (1984) The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration, Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (1990) The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Giddens, A. (1993) New Rules of  Sociological Method, 2nd Edn. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press. 
 
Greenpeace (2007) Talking Nonsense – The 2007 Nuclear Consultation. 
  
Grin, J. (2006) ‘Reflexive Modernization as a Governance Issue, or Designing and Shaping 
Restructuration’. In Voss, J.P., Bauknecht, D. and Kemp, R.
 
 (eds.) Reflexive Governance for Sustainable 
Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 57-81. 
Grove-White, R. (2006) ‘Britain’s genetically modified crop controversies: The agriculture 
and environment biotechnology commission and the negotiation of ‘uncertainty’’, 
Community Genetics, 9, pp.170-77. 
 
Harbermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of  Law and 
Democracy. (Translated by Rehg, W.) Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Hendriks, C. (2002) ‘Institutions of  Deliberative Democratic Processes and Interest 
Groups: Roles, Tensions and Incentives’, Australian Journal of  Public Administration, 61(1), pp. 
64–75. 
 
Hendriks, C. (2004) ‘Public Deliberation and Interest Organizations: A Study of  Responses 
209 
 
 
 
to Lay Citizens Engagement in Public Policy’. (Unpublished PhD Thesis at the Australian 
National University) 
 
Hendriks, C. (2009) ‘The Democratic Soup: Mixed Meanings of Political Representation in 
Governance Networks’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and 
Institutions, 22(4), pp. 689–715. 
 
HM Treasury, Department for Trade and Industry and Department for Education and 
Skills (2004) Science & Innovation Investment Framework 2004‐2014. Available from  
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/spend04_sciencedoc_1_090704.pdf  
 
Horlick-Jones, T., Rowe, G. and Walls, J. (2007) The GM Debate: Risk, Politics and Public 
Engagement. London: Routledge. 
 
House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (2003) Energy White Paper–
Empowering Change? Eighth Report of Session 2002-03. London: HMSO. 
 
House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (2003) Conduct of the 
GM Public Debate, Eighteenth Report of Session 02–03. London: HMSO. 
 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (1998) EC Regulation of 
Genetic Modification in Agriculture, Second Report of Session 98-99. London: HMSO. 
 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (1999) Management of Nuclear 
Waste. London: HMSO 
 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2000) Science and Society. 
London: HMSO.  
 
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology (2004) Radioactive Waste 
Management.  London: HMSO. 
 
Irwin, A. (2006) ‘The Politics of  Talk: Coming to Terms with the ‘New’ Scientific 
Governance’. Social Studies of  Science, 36(2), pp. 299-320. 
 
Jasanoff, S. (1987) ‘Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science’, Social Studies of Science, 
Vol. 17 (2) pp. 195-230. 
 
Jasanoff, S. (1997) ‘Civilization and madness: the great BSE scare of  1996’, Public 
Understanding of  Science, 6, pp. 221-232. 
 
Jasanoff, S. (2003) ‘Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science’. 
Minerva, 41(3), pp. 223–244. 
 
Keane, J. (2000) ‘Structural Transformations of  the Public Sphere’. In Kenneth, L.H. and 
Van Dijk, J. (eds.) Digital Democracy: Issues of  Theory and Practice. London: Sage Publications. 
pp. 70-89.  
 
Kelly, J. (2002) ‘Public Attitudes to the Commercialisation of GM Crops’. A Report on 
Desk Research for COI Communications, December 2002. 
 
210 
 
 
 
Kemp, R.V., Bennett, D.G., and White, M.J. (2006) ‘Recent Trends and Developments in 
Dialogue on Radioactive Waste Management: Experience from the UK’. Environment 
International, 32(8), pp. 1021–1032. 
 
Kemp, R. and Loorbach, D. (2006) ‘Transition Management: A Reflexive Governance 
Approach. In Voss, J.P., Bauknecht, D. and Kemp, R. (eds.) Reflexive Governance for Sustainable 
Development. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar, pp. 103-130. 
 
Kickert, W.J.M., Klijn, E-H. and Koppenjan, J.F.M (eds.) (1997) Managing Complex Networks: 
Strategies for the Public Sector. London: Sage Publications Ltd. 
 
Konig, A. (2006) ‘Safe Foods: Improving Decision-making on Food Safety’, Food Quality 
and Safety Research, Wageningen: Institute of Food Safety.  
 
Leach, M., Scoones, I. and Wynne, B. (eds.) (2005) Science and Citizens: Globalization and 
the Challenge of Engagement. London: Zed Books. 
 
Lehtonen, M., and Martiskainen, M. (2010) Pathways towards the nuclear revival in Finland, 
France, and the UK, Paper presented at the Sussex Energy Group conference “Energy 
transitions in an interdependent world: what and where are the future social science 
research agendas?’ 25-26 February 2010, University of Sussex, UK. 
 
Levidow, L. (2007) ‘European Public Participation as Risk Governance: Enhancing 
Democratic Accountability for Agbiotech Policy?’, East Asian Science, Technology and Society: 
an International Journal, 1(1), pp. 19–51. 
 
Levine P., Fung, A. and Gastil, J. (2005) ‘Future Directions for Public Deliberation’, Journal 
of Public Deliberation, 1(1), Article 3. pp. 1-13. 
 
Levitt, R. (2003) ‘GM Crops and Foods. Evidence, Policy and Practice in the UK: A Case 
Study’, ESRC UK Centre for Evidence Based Policy and Practice, Working Paper no. 20. 
 
Lidskog, R. and Andersson, A-C. (2002) The Management of  Radioactive Waste A Description of  
Ten Countries. Stockholm, Sweden: Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. 
Löfstedt, R. and Holrick-Jones, T. (1999) ‘Environmental politics in the UK: politics, 
institutional change and public trust’ in Cvetkovich, G. and Lofstedt, R.(eds) Social Trust and 
Risk Management, Earthscan, London, pp.73-88.  
 
Lövbrand, E., Pielke, R. Jr. and Beck, S. (2011) ‘A Democracy Paradox in Studies of 
Science and Technology’, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 36(4), pp. 474-496. 
 
Luskin, R.C. and Fishkin, J.S. (2002) ‘Deliberation and “Better Citizens”’. A research paper 
available from the Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University  
Available from (http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2002/bettercitizens.pdf) 
 
Lynch, M. (2000) ‘Against reflexivity as an academic virtue and source of privileged 
knowledge’, Theory, Culture & Society, 17(3), pp. 26–54. 
 
GM Nation? Steering Board (2003) ‘GM Nation? The Findings of the Public Debate’. 
211 
 
 
 
London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
 
GM Science Review Panel (2002) ‘1st Panel Meeting Minute’. December 10, 2002. 
 
GM Science Review Panel (2003) ‘2nd Panel Meeting Minute’. February 18, 2003. 
 
GM Science Review Panel (2003) ‘GM Science Review: First Report’. London: Department 
of Trade and Industry. 
 
GM Science Review Panel (2004) ‘GM Science Review: Second Report’. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry. 
 
MacKerron, G. (2004) ‘Nuclear Power and the Characteristics of  ‘Ordinariness’–the Case 
of  UK Energy Policy’, Energy Policy, 32(17), pp. 1957–1965. 
 
Mackerron, G. and Berkhout, F. (2009) ‘Learning to Listen: Institutional Change and 
Legitimation in UK Radioactive Waste Policy’, Journal of  Risk Research, 12(7–8), pp. 989–
1008. 
 
Mansbridge, J. (1999) ‘Everyday Talk in the Deliberative System’. In Macedo, S. (ed) 
Deliberative Politics. NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 211-239. 
 
Marsh, D. and Furlong, P. (2002) ‘A Skin Not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in 
Political Science’. In Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. (eds.) Theory and Methods in Political Science, 2nd
Morton, A., Airoldi, M. and Phillips, L.D. (2009) ‘Nuclear Risk Management on Stage: A 
Decision Analysis Perspective on the UK’s Committee on Radioactive Waste Management’. 
Risk Analysis, 29(5), pp. 764-779. 
 
Edition, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 17-41. 
 
Newman, J. (2001) Modernising Governance: New Labour, Policy and Society. London: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
 
Office of Science and Technology (1997) The Use of Scientific Advice in Policy Making. London: 
Department of Trade and Industry.  
 
Office of Science and Technology (1998) Memorandum to the ‘Scientific Advisory System: 
Genetically Modified Foods’ Inquiry by the House of Commons Science and Technology Committee. 
London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
 
Office of Science and Technology (2000) Guidelines 2000: Scientific Advice and Policy Making. 
London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
 
Office of Science and Technology (2001) Code of Practice for Scientific Advisory Committees. 
London: Department of Trade and Industry. 
 
Parkinson, J. (2006) Deliberating in the Real World: Problems of Legitimacy in Deliberative 
Democracy. NY: Oxford University Press. 
 
Pellizzoni, L. (2001) ‘The Myth of the Best Argument: Power, Deliberation and Reason’, 
British Journal of Sociology, 52(1), pp. 59–86.  
212 
 
 
 
 
Pellizzoni, L. (2003) ‘Knowledge, Uncertainty and the Transformation of  the Public 
Sphere’, European Journal of  Social Theory, 6(3), pp. 327–355. 
 
Performance and Innovation Unit (2002) The Energy Review, A Performance and Innovation 
Unit Report, February 2002. London: Cabinet Office. 
Phillips, L., Bridgeman, J. and Ferguson-Smith, M. (2000) The BSE Inquiry: The Report. 
London: HMSO. 
 
Pierre, J. and Peters, B.G. (2000), Governance, Politics and the State. Basingstoke and London: 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 
 
Renn, O. (1998) ‘The Role of  Risk Communication and Public Dialogue for Improving 
Risk Management’, Risk Decision and Policy, 3(1), pp. 5-30. 
 
Renn, O. (2004) ‘The Challenge of Integrating Deliberation and Expertise: Participation 
and Discourse in Risk Management’. In McDaniels, T. and Small M.J. (eds.) Risk Analysis 
and Society: An Interdisciplinary Characterization of the Field. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. pp. 289-366. 
 
Renn, O. (2006) Risk Governance: Towards an Integrative Approach. IRGC White Paper no. 1. 
Geneva: International Risk Governance Council (IFGC). 
 
 
Renn, O. and Roco, M.C. (2006) ‘Nanotechnology and the Need for Risk Governance’, 
Journal of  Nanoparticle Research, 8(2), pp. 153–191. 
Renn, O., Webler, T. and Wiedemann, P. (1995) Fairness and Competence in Citizen Participation: 
Evaluating Models for Environmental Discourse. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers. 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity, and 
Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
Rowe, G., Horlick-Jones, T., Walls, J. and Pidgeon, N. (2005) ‘Difficulties in Evaluating 
Public Engagement Initiatives: Reflections on an Evaluation of the UK GM Nation? Public 
Debate about Transgenic Crops’. Public Understanding of Science, 14(4), pp. 331–352. 
 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (1998) Setting Environmental Standards, 21st 
Report. London: HMSO. 
 
Royal Society (2005) The Royal Society Response to the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management 
Consultation: How Should the UK Manage Radioactive Waste?. Royal Society Policy document 
13/05, June 2005. 
 
Royal Society (2006) The Long-term Management of  Radioactive Waste: the Work of  the Committee 
on Radioactive Waste Management. Royal Society Policy document 01/06, January 2006. 
 
Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (1981) Second Annual Report. London: 
HMSO.  
 
213 
 
 
 
Saward, M. (2003) ‘Enacting Democracy’, Political Studies, 51(1), pp.161–179. 
 
Schneider, S.M. (1997) ‘Expanding the Public Sphere through Computer Mediated 
Communication: Political Discussion about Abortion in a Usenet Newsgroup’. 
(Unpublished PhD Thesis at the MIT) 
 
Shulman, S.W., Schlosberg, D., Zavestoski, S. and Courard-Hauri, D. (2003) ‘Electronic 
Rulemaking: A Public Participation Research Agenda for the Social Sciences’, Social Science 
Computer Review, 21(2), pp. 162-178. 
 
Smith, A. (1776) An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of  the Wealth of  Nations. London: W. 
Strahan. Google eBook, Available from 
http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=C5dNAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=adam
+smith+1776&hl=en&sa=X&ei=6j2OULW9HqTliQLL_YD4DA&ved=0CCwQ6AEwA
A#v=thumbnail&q&f=false 
 
Steele, J. (2001) ‘Participation and Deliberation in Environmental Law: Exploring a 
Problem-solving Approach’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 21(3), pp.415-442. 
 
Stern, P. and Fineberg, H. (eds.) (1996) Understanding Risk: Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society. Washington D.C.: National Academy Press. 
 
Stirling, A. (1998) ‘Risk at a Turning Point?’, Journal of Risk Research, 1(2), pp.97–109. 
 
Stirling, A. (2005) ‘Opening Up or Closing Down: Analysis, Participation and Power in the 
Social Appraisal of Technology’. In Leach, M., Scoones, I. and Wynne, B. (eds.) Science and 
Citizens: Globalization and the Challenge of Engagement. London: Zed Books, pp. 218–231. 
 
Stirling, A. (2006) ‘Precaution, Foresight and Sustainability: Reflection and Reflexivity in 
the Governance of  Technology’. In Voss, J.P., Bauknecht, D. and Kemp, R. (eds.) Reflexive 
Governance for Sustainable Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 225-272. 
 
Stirling, A. (2008) ‘''Opening Up'' and ''Closing Down'': Power, Participation, and Pluralism 
in the Social Appraisal of Technology’, Science and Technology & Human Values,  33(2) pp. 
262-294. 
 
Smith, A. and Stirling, A. (2007) ‘Moving Outside or Inside? Objectification and Reflexivity 
in the Governance of  Socio-technical Systems’, Journal of  Environmental Policy and Planning, 
9(3-4). pp. 351-373. 
 
Sewell Jr., W.H. (1992) ‘A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation’, 
American Journal of  Sociology, 98 (1), pp. 1-29. 
 
Toke, D. and Marsh, D. (2003) ‘Policy Networks and the GM Crops Issue: Assessing the 
Utility of a Dialectical Model of Policy Networks’, Public Administration, 81(2), pp. 229–251. 
 
UK CEED (1999) ‘Executive Summary of the National Consensus Conference on 
Radioactive Waste Management’. Available from 
http://www.ukceed.org/engagement/consensus-conference/consensus-conference-
executive-summary  
214 
 
 
 
UK Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (2001) Crops on Trial. 
London: UK Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission. 
 
UK Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission (2002) Sub Group Meeting 
Minute, September 23, 2002. 
 
Van Zwanenberg, P. and Millstone, E. (2005) BSE: Risk, Science and Governance. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Voss, J-P. (2007) ‘Designs on Governance: Development of Policy Instruments and 
Dynamics in Governance’. (Unpublished PhD Thesis at the University of Twente) 
 
Voss, J-P. and Kemp, R. (2006) ‘Sustainability and Reflexive Governance: Introduction’. 
In Voss, J-P., Bauknecht, D. and Kemp, R. (eds.) Reflexive Governance for Sustainable 
Development. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. pp. 3-30. 
 
Warren, M.E. (1993) ‘Can Participatory Democracy Produce Better Selves? Psychological 
Dimensions of  Habermas's Discursive Model of  Democracy’. Political Psychology, 14(2), pp. 
209-234. 
 
Watson, J. (2007) ‘Can New Nuclear Power Strengthen Energy Security?’, Sussex Energy 
Group Policy Briefing, no. 2, December 2007. 
 
Wilsdon, J. and Willis, R (2004) See-through SCIENCE: Why public engagement needs to move 
upstream. London. 
 
World Health Organization (WHO) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (2006) 
Food Safety Risk Analysis: A guide for National Food Safety Authorities. FAO Food and Nutrition 
Paper, no. 87. Rome: WHO and FAO. 
 
Wynne, B. (1991) ‘Knowledges in Context’, Science, Technology and Human Values, 16(2), pp. 
111-121. 
Wynne, B. (1993) ‘Public Uptake of  Science; A Case for Institutional Reflexivity’, Public 
Understanding of  Science, 2(4), pp. 321–330. 
Wynne, B. (2002) ‘Risk and Environment as Legitimatory Discourses of Technology: 
Reflexivity Inside Out?’, Current Sociology, 50(3), pp.459–477. 
 
Wynne, B. (2006) ‘Public Engagement as a Means of Restoring Public Trust in Science–
Hitting the Notes, but Missing the Music?’, Community Genetics, 9(3), pp.211–220 
 
Wynne, B. (2007) ‘Dazzled by the Mirage of Influence?: STS-SSK in Multivalent Registers 
of Relevance’, Science, Technology, & Human Values, 32(4), pp. 491-503. 
 
Yin, R.K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods. 3rd
 
 ed. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Young, I.M. (1997) ‘Difference as a Resource for Democratic’. In Bohman, J. and Rehg, W. 
(eds.) Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics. Cambridge, MA: The MIT press. 
215 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I  INTERVIEWEE SELECTION 
 
Bearing in mind that the focus of  the study was to explore divergent views on the division 
of  labour in macro deliberation, all those selected for interview had participated directly in 
either the GM Dialogue or CoRWM, playing a certain role (roles) within each programme 
respectively. People who had been involved across different events were preferred, since it 
was hoped they had been aware of  various issues and understood the detailed narrative of  
each event as well as those across different events. In practical terms, it was also an 
economical approach to interview those who had been involved in more than one event.  
 
In addition to the events in which prospective interviewees had participated, I also 
considered the roles they had played – e.g. leader, designer, organiser, deliberator, sponsor – 
in the operation of  the their respective programmes. While conducting a document analysis, 
I found that some significant themes emerged – division of  labour; integration and 
relationship; principles underlying design and implementation of  the events and the whole 
programme; and discrepancy. These emerging themes also formed an important guide in 
my consideration of  people to approach with a view to interviewing them. Accordingly, I 
made a list of  interview candidates in respect of  both GM Dialogue and CoRWM 
participants with a rationale for the selection of  each individual.  
 
Although the initial list was not fully accessed due to practical difficulties, during 
uncovering meaningful implications in terms of  commonality and disparity across different 
interviews, I was convinced that the available access to the candidates was enough to 
support my argument. Given that the research aim was to present divergent views and their 
influence in the deliberation process rather than depict all idiosyncratic views, neither a 
large number of  interviewees nor the same number of  participants from the GM Dialogue 
and CoRWM was necessary. Instead, I obtained meaningfully divergent views from various 
people in respect of  their different roles and perspectives with the aid of  the triangulation 
technique established in the methodology chapter, Chapter 3 Research Design. Indeed, I 
approached the study with the assumption that it was not the range of  perspectives 
themselves, but the sensitivity and detailed nuance of  their meanings and inter-relations 
that constituted and illuminated the concept of  reflexivity and division of  labour in macro 
deliberation. 
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List of  interviewees and rationale for each selection 
 
Detailed information on the interviewees selected for this study is presented below. A total 
of  19 people participated in personal in-depth interviews. One was interviewed by 
telephone and the remainder through face-to-face discussion. A few were contacted more 
than once in order to follow up and seek further information. One participant is 
represented anonymously in view of  the sensitive concerns expressed in the interview. 
Relevant information on institutional affiliations and/or specialties regarding the arguments 
of  this thesis is presented in the text of  the thesis with direct quotations from interviews. 
In addition to such bio-data, more importantly here, the following provides details of  the 
aspect of  each programme in which interviewees participated. Interview locations and 
dates are given in brackets.  
 
Tables A1.1 and A1.2 below show basic interviewee information – i.e. name, 
groups/events involved in, and rationale for selection – in respect of  GM Dialogue and 
CoRWM participants respectively. These details were compiled based on interviewee 
selection criteria such as events participated in and roles adopted. Accordingly, the rationale 
for the selection of  each interviewee also informed the guide I developed to determine the 
specific aim of  each interview and formulate the questions to be asked to achieve it.  
 
GM Dialogue 
 
• Ian Coates, leader of  Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit Team of  the Economic Study 
(Guildford, 30 November 2009) 
• Robin Grove-White, AEBC member and Steering Board member of GM Nation?          
(Anglesey, 19 and 20 October 2009) 
• Paul Rylott, AEBC member and Steering Board member of  GM Nation? (Suffolk, 
24 November 2009) 
• Andy Stirling, Science Review Panel member (Brighton, 4 December 2009) 
• Sue Mayer, AEBC member (London, 14 December 2009) 
• Simon Hughes, COI (London, 12 June 2009 ) 
 
• David Corr, Corr Wilbourn Research and Development (London, 26 May 2009 ) 
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• Anonymous Evaluation Team member (location withheld, 31 March 2008 and 11        
December 2009) 
 
Table A1.1 Rationale for Selection of  GM Dialogue Interviewees 
 
  
Name 
 
AEBC and three strands involvement 
 
Rationale  
AEBC GM 
Nation? 
Science 
Review 
Economic 
Study 
1 Ian 
Coates  
 
   v 1) Leader of  the Strategy Unit team, who led the 
Economics study strand that comprised three 
Advisory expert groups.  
2) An economist; significantly involved throughout 
the whole Economic study strand as a designer 
and organiser as well as participant, producing the 
contents of  the report of  analysis.  
3) His experience as a leader of  the leading team 
was perhaps different from the two chairs of  the 
other strands. The members of  the other two 
groups were recruited from outside the 
government, while the Strategy Unit team for 
Economic study strand was composed of  civil 
servants in the Cabinet Office. The team 
appointed three Advisory groups composed of  
individual experts whose roles were only advisory 
rather than decision making. This was clearly stated 
in the final report.  
2 Robin 
Grove-
White 
v v  v 1) Member of  the AEBC and Steering Board. 
According to AEBC meeting minutes, he was 
heavily involved and played a significant role in the 
inaugural stage of  the GM Dialogue and design of  
the GM Nation? strand. He could thus have a 
different perspective on the GM Dialogue and GM 
Nation? strands from those of  the chair or 
secretariat.   
2) Participant of  an event in the Economic study 
strand.  
3) An academic and former director of  
Greenpeace. 
3 Paul  
Rylott 
 
v v  v 
 
 
 
1)Member of  the AEBC, Steering Board, and 
Advisory team of  Economic study strand.   
2) From a multinational pharmaceutical company. 
3) As a member of  Advisory expert group, 
involved as an advisor and participant in many 
activities run under Economic strand. Therefore, 
he was in a position to share his experience of  and 
opinion about the process of  designing and 
implementing the strand. His perspective could be 
compared with those of  the team leader (Ian 
Coates) and other members. 
4) As he was a member of  the AEBC, his 
perspective on interaction and inter-understanding 
between AEBC and Economic study strand could 
be compared with that of  others. 
4 Andy 
Stirling 
  v  1) Member of  the Science Review panel.  
2) One of  the few social scientists on the panel, 
while the majority had backgrounds in the natural 
sciences in fields broadly related to biology. He 
could thus contribute his views on the relationship 
between natural and social sciences as it had 
emerged in the expert deliberations. 
(There has been some debate around the role of  
scientific knowledge in public risk deliberation as a 
counterpart to social issues. This matter was 
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manifested as a conflict among designers in the 
GM Dialogue (such as the BA’s argument 
concerning the relationship between science and 
social issues) as well as the CoRWM (David Ball’s 
critique of  the lack of  scientific input). In 
particular, the Science review strand was designed 
to assess current scientific knowledge around GM 
crops. However, according to the composition of  
the leading group, it seemed that natural science 
was considered to be the only legitimate source of  
scientific knowledge to be input into this 
deliberation.  
5 Sue 
Mayer 
v   v 1) Member of  the AEBC. 
2) Director of  GeneWatch UK. 
3) Participated in an event organised under the 
Economic Study strand as a relevant NGO 
representative. 
6 Simon 
Hughes 
 v   1) Director of  COI Live events team. 
2) Able to narrate the inaugural stages of  the GM 
Dialogue and GM Nation? strand.  
2) Able to share his experiences of  working with 
the AEBC and the Steering Board regarding tasks, 
roles, conflicts, communication etc. 
3) Able to share his experience of  the COI, which 
was a controversial participant as it was a 
government body and thus contradicted the 
principle of  independence from government.   
4) His GM Nation? duties, which were to develop 
a framework and organise events with COI 
subcontractors. As he was a kind of  event 
supervisor, he knew the details of  public meetings, 
for example, how they recruited participants, what 
data they used most, what principle they most tried 
to adhere to, etc. 
5) His experience and opinions could be compared 
with others who participated in event design and 
organisation.  
7 David 
Corr 
 v   1) Co-director of  Corr Wilbourn Research and 
Development, which, as a COI subcontractor, 
conducted two events under the GM Nation? 
strand(Foundation workshop and Narrow-but-
deep).  
2) Able to share his experience of  working with 
the AEBC, Steering Board, and COI regarding 
tasks, roles, conflicts, communication, etc.  
8 Anony
mous 
Evaluati
on 
Team 
member 
 v   1) An official GM Nation? strand evaluation team 
member. The team had observer status from the 
inaugural stage. Therefore, he was able to provide 
a different perspective on the GM Nation? process 
from those of  other actors participating directly in 
design, organisation and deliberation; which could 
be compared with other actors’ opinions and the 
official GM Nation? report.  
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CoRWM  
 
• David Ball, resigned committee member (London, 17 November 2009) 
 
• Fred Barker, committee member (Bristol, 5 November 2009) 
 
• Keith Baverstock , dismissed committee member (Eastbourne, 1 December 2009) 
 
• Andrew Blowers, committee member (Bedford , 25 November 2009 ) 
 
• David Collier, CoRWM official evaluator from Faulkland Associates Ltd. (London, 
3 November 2009)  
 
• David Lowry, independent research consultant specialising in UK and EU nuclear 
and environment policy (London, 17 November 2009) 
 
•    Malcolm Lynden, participant in CoRWM Nuclear Site Stakeholder Round Table,             
local government councillor for Oldbury on Severn (Bristol, 23 November 2009) 
 
• Gordon MacKerron, chair of  committee (Brighton, 27 November 2009) 
 
• Adam Scott, secretary of  committee from Defra (London, 29 October 2009 ) 
 
• Sam Usher, CoRWM programme manager from AMEC NNC (telephone 
Interview, 8 January 2010) 
 
• Pete Wilkinson, committee member (London, 3 November 2009) 
 
 
Table A1.2 Rationale for Selection of  CoRWM Interviewees  
 
 Name Rationale  
1 David Ball 1) Committee member who particularly contributed to the draft of  the working group on the 
decision-making process.  
2) Resigned in May 2005, arguing that the CoRWM was not organised on scientific principles and 
also in protest at the sacking Keith Baverstock. He was therefore able to provide a quite different 
perspective on the programme from those of  the other committee members, particularly on the 
fundamental issue of  its approach to the science–public/stakeholder input dichotomy. 
2                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Fred Barker 1) Committee member and first chair of  the PSE working group. Although he resigned from this
position, he continued to be heavily involved in the development of  the PSE programme, which 
was the core CoRWM initiative. The minutes of  the sixth meeting give the reasons for his 
resignation as “the heavy work load, group dynamics, and a feeling that his input would be better 
as a member of  the PSE WG than constrained in the chair.” Therefore, I would be able to enquire 
about the inaugural stage of  the PSE programme with the company WS Atkins and other 
members of  the PSE working group. 
2) Knowledgeable about the process of  designing and implementing the PSE programme as a 
member of  the PSE working group. 
3) Able to share his perspective on the issue of  group dynamics as a reason for his resignation, 
that is, any conflict or tension within the committee and/or sub-committee over the way in which 
the CoRWM should work. 
3 Keith 
Baverstock 
1) Committee member who was dismissed. Therefore, able to contribute a different perspective 
on the issue of  insufficient scientific input in the CoRWM process.  
2) Able to share his experience of  relationships and other group dynamics among committee 
members. 
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 4                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Andy 
Blowers 
1) Committee member on the board of  Nirex. 
2) Chair of  the Principles Working Group, which was responsible for developing the fundamental 
principles of  the CoRWM. Therefore, he would be able to shed light on the origins of  such 
principles (e.g. his paper Doc 208: Deliberative Democracy), how they were developed with others 
through the course of  the programme, and how they were put into practice.  
 
5 David Collier  1) Director of  Faulkland Associates, which acted as a consultancy in the monitoring and 
evaluation of  the CoRWM.  
2) Lead evaluator and the author of  the final evaluation report (Paul Haigh: the support 
evaluator). Although Faulkland Associates did not join the CoRWM until the seventh plenary 
meeting (end of  phase one), its role was significant as a monitor and evaluator. Therefore, would 
be able to share his experience over the process as an observer, and shed light on the interaction 
and different perspectives of  the participants in the CoRWM. 
3) Able to shed light on the tension between the roles of  advisor and objective evaluator. ( he 
mentions the difficulty of  the dual role of  independent evaluator and advisor to the chair 
(Evaluation Report, p. 46)). 
6 David Lowry  1) An academic and consultant in the area of  radioactive waste management: he was not a 
committee member, but could have helpful insight into the process of  the CoRWM, as he has 
built a career in this area (he also worked with some committee members on other occasions). 
Therefore, he would be able to contribute some detached or different observations and opinions 
on issues raised during the process. CoRWM was criticised for an unbalanced procurement list for 
allocating its work. In support of  this argument, several members showed interest in bidding for 
management positions on the committee. The evaluation report (p. 14) also mentions “apparent 
lack of  involvement of  counter-experts that comment on nuclear issues from a sceptical 
perspective at public and stakeholder meetings.” He would thus be able to illuminate this matter 
and other criticisms of  the CoRWM. 
7 Malcolm 
Lynden 
1) Participant in the Nuclear Site Stakeholder Round Table. 
2) A parish councillor. 
3) Not only able to share his experience as a participant in the stakeholder discussion, but also his 
dual role as a local government councillor and a local resident. He was actually criticised by a local 
environmental group for his opinions and representative position. 
8 Gordon 
MacKerron 
1) Chair of  the CoRWM. 
2) His perspective as chair of  the committee could be compared with those of  other members: his 
perspective might also be different from those of  other organisations and individuals who were 
involved in the programme.  
3) In particular, he could share his experiences on the issue of  relationships with other 
stakeholders and the government. 
9 Adam Scott  1) Member of  Defra committee secretariat. 
2) Does not only have experience on overall matters. 
3) Possibly has a different perspective from those of  CoRWM members: able to share his opinion 
on the different perspectives among CoRWM members as a kind of  observer.  
5) Able to provide information on the relationship and any issues raised between the government 
and the committee. 
10 Sam Usher   1) CoRWM project manager as representative of  AMEC Nuclear Holdings Ltd. AMEC NNC was 
appointed as a manager of  the programme after a year’s leadership by WS Atkins. Although the 
former was not involved from the outset, due to on-going development during the course of  the 
programme, it actually contributed to its design as well as implementation.   
2) However, AMEC NNC must have had a different perspective from that of  the committee: 
although the former was involved in the design and implementation of  the programme, the 
committee was the decision maker, meaning that the role of  AMEC NCC differed from that of  
the other somewhat. 
3) AMEC NNC acted as an agency for the procurement of  external individual experts and 
organisations, and had a particular perspective as a middle manager. Therefore, it would be able to 
provide information on how the principles of  the programme were put into practice from design, 
and how the designer’s and practitioner’s perspectives differed;  
4) and whether this led to confusion over roles or any conflict with the committee, which regarded 
itself  as the ultimate designer, certainly of  strategy. 
11 Pete 
Wilkinson 
1) Committee member. 
2) Former director of  Greenpeace and also Friends of  the Earth. 
3) Given his career as an NGO officer who had interests in the nuclear field, he would be able to 
provide a different perspective from those of  other committee members, and would also be aware 
of  the views of  other NGOs not directly involved in the CoRWM process.  
4) He officially expressed his opposition to deep geological disposal on many occasions; he would 
therefore be able to share his experience  for dealing with a different opinion from that of  other 
members of  the committee. 
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In addition, I also engaged in extensive email communication and made many telephone 
calls while I was collecting data. The following is a list of  people whose communications 
were particularly significant to this study. Although their contents are not quoted verbatim 
in the thesis, the information they provided contributed significantly to background 
knowledge for conducting the case studies and designing the interview guide.  
 
• Max Wallis – Barry & Vale Friends of  the Earth (emails November 2009) 
 
• Renaud Wilson – Defra (emails March 2009) 
• Richard Bowden – BERR (emails January, April and October 2008) 
• David Sherlock – Defra (emails December 2007and October 2008) 
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APPENDIX II INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
 
Construction of  interview questions 
 
I analysed various published and unpublished documents. Resources I collected from the 
official websites of the two case study programmes comprised the minutes of meetings; 
background, sub, interim and final reports; and official evaluations and responses from the 
government. I also gathered newspaper articles and published critiques. The analysis of 
these documents provided guidance for designing the intensive interview guide.  
 
I found that certain themes emerged from the document analysis, namely, division of 
labour; integration and relationship; discrepancy; and principles underlying the design and 
implementation of events as well as the whole programme. These four themes formed a 
basis for the development of the interview guide. Questions were thus formulated 
according to these same four themes for all interviews, and then adapted to suit each 
interviewee.  
 
Although key issues under the four different themes formed the main and common 
research focus, each interviewee was associated with a different event, role, perspective, 
relationship etc. In order to explore the details of such disparity across various actors, the 
questions were revised according to the information from the document analysis to meet 
the requirements of specific events or situations that interviewees had directly experienced. 
Therefore, I referred the interviewee to a particular event or quotation from a relevant 
document. Accordingly, each set of questions contained both general and specific items. 
 
I present below three sample interview guides. Although questions were categorised under 
the different themes for use in a semi-structured, in-depth interview, the order of  questions 
during the actual exchange invariably differed from that presented in the guide. Rather, I 
led the discussion according to the interviewee’s responses, considering the flow of  the 
conversation and checking to ensure that I had not missed an important question.  
 
The three example interview guides comprise that developed for Ian Coates, who led the 
Economic Study of  the three strands of  GM Dialogue; Andy Stirling, who was a panel 
member of  the Science Review strand of  GM Dialogue; and Gordon MacKerron, who 
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chaired CoRWM. Thus, these examples demonstrate differently customised questions 
according to the event and the role each interviewee adopted.  
 
*Underlined questions denote those specifically tailored for the interviewee.  
 
Example interview questions 
 
EXAMPLE 1: Interview with Ian Coates (Economic strand of  the GM Dialogue) 
 
Division of labour  
1. Could you tell me how you got involved in this programme? 
2. If  you were recruited, why do you think this was? Was it, for example, because of  a 
particular skill or a particular viewpoint? Or did you volunteer and, if  so, why?  
3. What role did you play? What do you think your recruiters thought your role 
should be, and how do you think your role was perceived by others in the process?      
4. Do you recall whether there was any kind of  group that was naturally and 
informally formed amongst your team? Or how did you divide yourselves? 
5. 
6. How would you describe the roles they played? Do you think others would take a 
different view about these roles? If  so, what are those views? 
Who do you think are the important groups of  actors engaged in the GM 
Dialogue?  
7. Did you experience any difficulty generally while you were working through the 
programme (or event)? (E.g. Communicating with others / a design issue / 
delivering events /practical issues like time, etc.)  
8. Were you satisfied with your position and authority in playing your role? Did you or 
others with whom you were engaged perceive any kind of  constraint?  
If  so, what was that and its reason? 
 
Integration and relationship 
 
1. With whom did you communicate most in your time in the overall process? 
2. How effective was the communication? What were the difficulties and benefits of        
         communication with others within your group and with other groups during the 
event?  
3. What were the difficulties you had and the values you appreciated working with 
different people in your group and also other groups of  people?  
4. There was an ‘away day’. What do you think was the purpose of  this and was it 
helpful?   
5. Who were the stakeholders you worked with? Explain how your team worked with 
stakeholder groups? (E.g. individual information gathering or from a meeting with 
all stakeholders like a workshop?) 
6. There were various groups of  actors and also different events under the GM 
Dialogue. What do you think the reason for this was? Do you think efforts were 
made to integrate these diverse actors and activities and, if  so, how well did this 
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work? 
7. Do you think your group’s work transferred well to the other groups or later 
processes? If  not, what was the reason? And what would be a possible solution to 
this? 
 
Principles underlying design and implementation of  events and the whole 
programme 
 
1. What do you think were the most important principles underlying this programme 
(or event), and what do you think they should be (or what should the outcome be)?  
2. Do you think these principles mostly had a consensus amongst participants? Or do 
you remember any dissent over these principles?   
3. How would you describe any unique feature of  this programme (or event) 
compared with any other participatory programme or decision-making process on 
the same subject that you experienced, engaged in, or read about in the literature? 
4. Do you think the overall programme or its components changed as it evolved? If  so, 
what would be the reason do you think? Were such changes intentional and 
encouraged or considered a problem by the designer (or implementer/organiser)?  
5. 
6. There were various events under this programme. What do you think their roles 
were?  
What would you say was the role of  the GM Dialogue as a whole in GM crop policy 
making? What should it have been? 
7. There were some informal and private meetings among members with stakeholders 
and external experts. What is your view of  this?  
8. Informed by the hindsight of  your experience of  this exercise, what would you 
advise designers and practitioners of  a future such exercise to do differently?  
 
Discrepancy  
 
1. How would you define ‘the public’ and ‘science’? And what do you think are their 
respective roles (including the Economic study) in GM crop policy making?  
2. What was the reason that integration did not really happen despite the recognition 
of its significance? Particularly mentioned was the integration with science review as 
on many occasions, scientific and economic considerations are associated with each 
other and thus “regular communication will be necessary.” 
3. What were the roles of the Strategy Unit, Advisory team, and Economic study? 
(Reference: in scoping note, “a prerequisite of a good debate is information” and 
providing this was the Economic study’s main role in supporting the debate; and it 
was stated that, “the report does not draw definitive conclusions or put forward 
policy recommendation” (final report)) 
4. Do you recall any other institution that influenced or tried to intervene in the GM 
Dialogue process at any level? 
5. What do you think were the roles of the AEBC and the Steering Board role in the 
GM Dialogue? How do you see them? 
6. Your team reported some progress to the Steering Board. How about the Science 
review panel? 
7. What do you think was the influence of the GM Dialogue (and the Economic 
study) on the policy? 
8. Who was not involved in this stage; who should have been you think? And who 
had too much power or was too influential in the process? 
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9. Could you explain the process of forming expert advisory groups: e.g. the 
environment, product chain, and the industry and science group? 
10. Who were the stakeholders you worked with? Explain how your team worked with 
stakeholder groups? (E.g. individual information gathering or from a meeting with 
all stakeholders, like a workshop?) 
11. How do you recall the relationship with the government; was there any pressure? 
From whom? 
 
EXAMLE 2: Interview with Andy Stirling (Science Review strand of  the GM 
Dialogue) 
 
Division of labour  
1. Could you tell me how you got involved in this programme (and panel)? 
2. If  you were recruited, why do you think this was? Was it, for example, because of  a 
particular skill or a particular viewpoint? Or did you volunteer and, if  so, why?  
3. What role did you play? What do you think your recruiters thought your role should 
be, and how do you think your role was perceived by others in the process?     
4. Could you make a list of  actors who played important roles in the GM Dialogue?
5. How would you describe the roles they played? Do you think there was anyone who 
should have been invited but was not there?   
     
6. Do you recall whether there was any kind of  group that was naturally and 
informally formed amongst the panel members? Or how did you divide yourselves? 
7. 
8. 
The idea of  sub-groups was suggested by the secretariat. What was the reason for 
this? 
9. 
Did panel members think there were enough perspectives or expertise, or was there 
any feeling of  lack in certain areas or too many from a specific area? 
10. 
Do you think the panel was composed of  well-balanced perspectives?  
11. Did you experience any difficulty generally while you were working through the        
programme?  
What was the reason for including new two members? 
          
Integration and relationship 
1. What were the values you appreciated working on the science review panel?  
2. How was the relationship between the government and David King? Were you 
completely free from any type of political pressure? 
3. The BA was commissioned to organise an open meeting even before the panel 
meeting started. Wasn’t the panel involved in designing the open meeting at all? 
How was the relationship with the BA and also with OST? 
4. Who were the panel stakeholders? Who was the most difficult group or appeared as 
the main party to be dealt with within the panel and outside the panel, and what were 
the reasons for that? 
5. There was an ‘away-day’. What do you think was the purpose of  this and was it 
helpful?   
6. What was the reason for emphasis on the integration of  the three strands do you 
think? 
7. Do you think your group’s work transferred well to the other groups or later 
processes? If  not, what was the reason? And what would be a possible solution to 
this? 
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Principles underlying design and implementation of  events and the whole 
programme 
 
1. What do you think were the most important principles underlying the GM Dialogue? 
And what do you think they should have been (and the same question in respect of  
the Science review and other two strands)? 
2. What would you say was the role of  the GM Dialogue as a whole in GM crop policy 
making? What should it have been?  
3. How would you describe any unique feature of  the GM Dialogue compared with 
any other participatory programme, or decision-making process on the same subject 
that you experienced, engaged in, or read about in the literature? 
4. Do you think the overall programme or its components changed as it evolved? If  so, 
what would be the reason do you think? What were the benefits and costs?   
5. There were some informal and private meetings among members with stakeholders 
and external experts. What is your view of  this? What was the reason for or purpose 
of  informal and private meetings?  
6. Informed by the hindsight of  your experience of  this exercise, what would you 
advise designers and practitioners of  a future such exercise to do differently?  
 
Discrepancy 
  
1. How would you define ‘the public’ and ‘science’? And what do you think are their 
respective roles in GM policymaking?  
2. Who do you think should be invited to represent the public in GM policy making? 
And what should be their role? 
3. Do you personally think there is a difference in roles between the public and other 
stakeholders? If so, what is it? And did the panel consider them separately? For 
example, 1) the work plan paper of the third panel meeting states: “Overall, our 
objective is critically to review the current state knowledge focussing on peoples 
[both scientists’ and the public’s] interest and concerns about GM;” 2) the panel 
received comments from individual citizens and organisations through the website. 
Did the panel treat them differently? 
4. Do you recall any other institution that influenced or tried to intervene in the GM 
Dialogue process at any level? 
5. What was the feeling among panel members about the FSA’s approach? For 
example, in the third meeting, regarding FSA matters, David King mentioned that 
the “FSA is at arm’s length from government… It was better that the Agency was 
not directly engaged with the review.” 
6. What was the statutory advisory committee’s role? In terms of the ACRE and 
ACNFP,     
were the panel happy with the initial work done by the ACRE? 
6.  What was David King’s general view on issues such as public participation, science 
and GM compared with the views of other members of the government, 
particularly Howard Dalton, Margaret Beckett and Michael Mitchell? 
7.  What was members’ feeling about his position? (He remarked during the panel 
meeting that if the panel member was saying that the review was not an objective 
process, it was an attack on him as chairman and also the panel). 
8.  Could you explain about the moment of discussion on the freedom of the voice 
and the threat to undermine research in the meeting on7th June 2003? 
9.  Phil Dale conveyed the Steering Board’s thoughts on the Science Review to the 
panel: how about the other way? 
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10.  What was the decision-making process within the panel? (“proposal that 
uncertainty should be distinct topic was rejected. ” From the minutes of the 
second meeting). 
 
EXAMPLE 3: Interview with Gordon MacKerron (CoRWM) 
 
Division of labour  
1. Could you tell me how you got involved in this programme? 
2. If  you were recruited, why do you think this was? Was it, for example, because of  a 
particular skill or a particular viewpoint? Or did you volunteer and, if  so, why?  
3. What role did you play? What do you think your recruiters thought your role should 
be, and how do you think your role was perceived by others in the process?      
4. 
5. How would you describe the roles they played? Do you think others would take a 
different view about these roles? If  so, what are those views? 
Who do you think were the important groups of  actors engaged in the CoRWM?  
6. Do you recall whether there was any kind of group that was naturally and informally 
formed among the committee members? If not, how did you divide yourselves? 
7. Did you experience any difficulty generally while you were working through the 
programme (or event)? (E.g. communicating with others / design issues / delivering 
events /practical issues like time, etc.)  
8. Were you satisfied with your position and authority in playing your role? Did you or 
others with whom you engaged perceive any kind of  constraint?  
If  so, what was that and its reason? 
 
Integration and relationship 
 
1. With whom did you communicate most in your time in the overall process? 
2. What values did you appreciate in working for the CoRWM?  
3. What was the relationship with the government like? Were you completely free from 
any type of political pressure? With whom did you talk most in your communication 
with the government (Robert Jackson only or ministers directly)? 
4. Who among the stakeholders was the most difficult group or appeared to be the 
main party to be dealt with by the CoRWM? 
5. There was an ‘away-day’. What do you think was the purpose of  this and was it 
helpful?   
6. Integration was not an idea that was focused on from the beginning. Rather, its 
importance was realised as the programme progressed and working groups were 
formed. What was the initial issue that prompted this recognition? 
7. There were various groups of  actors and also different events in the CoRWM. Do 
you think efforts were made to integrate these diverse actors and activities and, if  so, 
how well did this work? 
8. Do you think your group’s work transferred well to the other groups or later 
processes?  If  not, what was the reason? And what would be a possible solution for 
this? 
 
Principles underlying design and implementation of  events and the whole 
programme 
 
1. What do you think were the most important principles underlying the CoRWM?  
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2. How would you describe any unique feature of  the CoRWM compared with any 
other participatory programme or decision-making process on the same subject that 
you experienced, engaged in, or read about in the literature? 
3. Do you think the overall programme or its components changed as it evolved? If  so, 
what would be the reason do you think? What were the benefits and costs?   
4. What would you say was the role of  the CoRWM as a whole in radioactive waste 
management policy making? What should it have been? (the same question to the 
committee). 
5. There were some informal and private meetings among members with stakeholders 
and external experts. What is your view of  this? What was the reason for or 
purpose of  informal and private meetings? “The Chair reported a number of  
informal meetings that he or other Members had had during February…These 
were informal contacts not decision-making meetings…” (Minutes of  CoRWM 
plenary meeting) 
6. Informed by the hindsight of  your experience with this exercise, what would you 
advise designers and practitioners of  a future such exercise to do differently? 
 
  
Discrepancy  
 
1. How would you define ‘science’ and its role in radioactive waste management 
policy making?  
2. Who do you think should be invited to represent the public in radioactive waste 
management policy making? And what should be their role? 
3. Do you think there is a difference between the role of the public and that of other 
stakeholders? If so, what were the different roles of the public and other 
stakeholders in the CoRWM process, and what should they have been? 
4. Do you recall any other institution that influenced or tried to intervene at any level 
in the CoRWM process? 
5. How would you describe the characteristics of the NDA? (As it was also a 
stakeholder group associated with individual committee members and the 
government, and people had different views on it). 
6. Were there any complaints or worries about members’ interests regarding 
procurement?  
7. What do you think was the most serious criticism of the CoRWM from both the 
inside and outside?  
8. What were the respective roles of the House of Lords and the Defra advisory 
group from Phase Three and onwards? 
 
 
 
 
